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Countries are unequal in terms of economic development. The reasons underly-
ing the disparity among nations have been the subject of research for several years.
Recently, a line of thought has argued that institutional progress is the primary de-
terminant of why nations fail or succeed in creating modern, well-governed states
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013). According to this reasoning, the pathway to en-
hancing development would be by enforcing effective state capacity, the rule of
law, and democratic accountability (Fukuyama, 2014). Thus, one of the mecha-
nisms that could potentially ensure strong institutions would be through procedures
such as free and fair multi-party elections.
Open elections, where voters periodically choose candidates or parties to repre-
sent them and their interests both locally and nationally, are widely accepted as a
system that promotes governments that improve social welfare, because democracy
prevents powerful groups from capturing the state to extract rent, reduces social
conflict, and constrains kleptocratic dictators (Acemoglu et al., 2014). In principle,
electoral competition works well for the quality of governments, just as economic
competition works well for market efficiency. That is, successive elections increase
the chances that good politicians will be selected to run a government. Society,
in turn, would benefit from good governance, and consequently, institutions would
become stronger. Although some studies note that democracy does not lead to eco-
nomic growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001; Giavazzi
and Tabellini, 2005), other studies indicate that countries with long histories of lib-
eral democracy have produced better institutions in the long run and that they are
economically advanced (Barro, 1996; Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005).
Democratic accountability
The central mechanism by which democratic systems would ultimately benefit
economic development would be through electoral accountability. Politicians would
have incentives to behave according to voter preferences as voters would reward or
punish incumbent politicians according to their performance (Barro, 1973; Besley
and Burgess, 2002; Duch and Stevenson, 2006; Ashworth, 2012). If the incumbent
government’s performance is disappointing from the voters’ point of view, then they
1
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would have the alternative to vote for opposition political parties (Ferraz and Finan,
2011; Costas-Pérez et al., 2012). In this way, the checks and balances work as
a learning process for politicians to know voter preferences and, subsequently, to
implement public policies that meet the demands of the electorate.
In the political economics literature, a range of theoretical models has adopted
the accountability mechanism to explain the behavior of agents and its impact on
the economy. Among all of these models, two classes are worth mentioning because
they have been widely employed. The first class of models is the political-agency
framework, which focuses on the extent to which voters can discipline elected rep-
resentatives with career concerns in environments with moral hazard and adverse
selection (Ferejohn, 1986; Persson et al., 1997; Besley and Burgess, 2002). The sec-
ond class is the citizen-candidate framework. This class of model removes the dis-
tinction between citizens and politicians by assuming that the voters choose elected
officials from those citizens who decide to become politicians in the first place and
stand as candidates in an election (Besley and Coate, 1997; Osborne and Slivinski,
1996; Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Mattozzi and Merlo, 2015).
Political parties
An essential component in models of accountability is the supply of competent
political candidates to manage governments. However, it is unclear whether rep-
resentative democracy can provide high-ability and broadly representative political
leaders (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2015; Dal Bó et al., 2017). On the one hand, vot-
ers always have the option to punish an incumbent incompetent by voting for the
opposition candidates. On the other hand, the electoral accountability mechanism
does not ensure that the opposition politicians are competent as well. For instance, if
opposition politicians have low human capital, the electoral dynamics would not en-
sure an improvement in the quality of public management because public managers
who are not necessarily of high quality would be elected to lead the government.
Thus, voter demand for high quality public managers is limited by the supply of
political candidates.
The role of political parties is of utmost importance on the supply of candidates.
After all, it is the political parties that play an active role in the selection of candi-
dates. Political economy models have exhibited challenges on political selection for
the democratic systems because low-quality candidates have a comparative advan-
tage when participating in elections because they have lower opportunity costs and
free-riding incentives (Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Mattozzi and Merlo, 2015). More-
over, this adverse selection of candidates could be exacerbated by the size of the
public budget (Brollo and Nannicini, 2012). For instance, it has been documented
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that an unexpected shock in public revenue can worsen the functioning of political
institutions because it can aggravate the agency problem and deteriorate the quality
of political candidates. A recent line of literature has explored how the organization
of parties works and what the criteria are for selecting candidates (Guarnieri, 2011;
Avelino et al., 2012). Answering these questions would shed light on how to ensure
that the best candidates run for election, thereby ensuring that governments perform
efficiently.
Voters
Voters are pivotal in accountability models, but some of the underlying assump-
tions in these models about voters’ behavior have been contested with empirical
evidence. Three assumptions draw attention. First, the supposition of voters car-
ing only about economic policies and identifying the economic signals correctly
from politicians’ decisions is crucial for the role played by electoral accountability
to work in an ideal world. However, empirical evidence suggests that voters are
sensitive to conditions other than economic policies when assessing an incumbent’s
performance. Voters appear to make substantial mistakes when distinguishing be-
tween economic outcomes originating from exogenous shocks and those resulting
from political decisions, often blaming or rewarding politicians for good or bad
luck (Achen and Bartels, 2004; Leigh, 2009; Healy and Malhotra, 2010; Cole et al.,
2012; Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2016). Voters’ failure to correctly distinguish po-
litical competence from exogenous shocks beyond the control of a politician would
imply improper democratic accountability. In this case, government incentives to
generate policies that maximize the well-being of the citizens would be impaired.
The second empirical evidence that challenges the foundations of models of ac-
countability comes from the fact that voters might be myopic (Healy and Malhotra,
2009). That is, citizens have a short-term memory when it comes to political is-
sues and electoral choice, and they outweigh recent events in their assessment of
government performance (Duch and Stevenson, 2006; Bechtel and Hainmueller,
2011). The political economy literature has highlighted that this characteristic of
voter behavior could create incentives for the implementation of inefficient govern-
ment policies (Healy and Malhotra, 2013). The timing of law enactments or public
spending increases could be distorted to maximize the popularity of the incumbent
(Nordhaus, 1975; Drazen and Eslava, 2010). Additionally, the design of public
policies, such as the balance between relief spending with a short-term effect and
preparedness spending with a long-term effect, could be affected in context of nat-
ural disasters because politicians would benefit electorally from policies that have a
palliative and immediate impact on the well-being of voters (Healy and Malhotra,
3
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2009; Cole et al., 2012).
Other evidence that casts doubt on whether accountability models explain well
the behavior of agents concerns assumptions about voter preferences. If one as-
sumes that voters’ preferences are tied to honesty, competence, and effort, then
elected officials would have incentives to behave according to these attributes. An
obstacle to improving the development of an economy will arise if voter prefer-
ences are grounded on norms and customs that are discordant with public policies
that maximize the well-being of a society. For instance, in a context of clientelism,
where citizens live in vulnerable social conditions, the preferences of voters may
weigh in favor of individualistic transactions to the detriment of policies that ben-
efit society more broadly. This could lead society into a poverty trap in which
voters demand clientelism and the governments strive to deliver it (Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2008). Hence, in the instance that voters provide the wrong incentives
to politicians, accountability models would slide society into a slow-development
course (Healy and Malhotra, 2013; Martinez-Bravo, 2014). Indeed, recent studies
suggest that citizens’ vulnerability is related to people participating in clientelism
(Bobonis et al., 2017).
Governments
The combination of the supply of candidates and voters’ evaluation of incum-
bents’ performance have led to the formation of new governments. For their part,
governments play a central role in formulating public policies. Therefore, it is cru-
cial to scrutinize how they perform when subjected to subsequent elections. In an
ideal scenario, governments are benevolent and always choose public policies that
seek to maximize the well-being of the people. However, a central contribution of
the public choice theory is the recognition that those individuals in power may have
preferences that do not resemble those of a completely altruistic leader. Instead,
it assumes that government behavior is the result of the process involving individ-
ual political actors who react to the incentives they face (Garrett and Sobel, 2003;
Cohen and Werker, 2008).
At least three kinds of incentives can undermine the benevolence of a govern-
ment. The first is related to the desire for re-election. As elected officials enjoy
holding power, they can distort the allocation of public policies strategically to
maximize their chance of remaining in office. In fact, several theoretical and em-
pirical studies have documented that the provision of intergovernmental transfers
responds to electoral incentives (Arulampalam et al., 2009; Brollo and Nannicini,
2012). Governments prioritize their constituencies and regions where there is po-
litical alignment to reap benefits in subsequent elections. This strategic behavior
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happens mainly in election years, given that voters are short-sighted (Solé-Ollé and
Sorribas-Navarro, 2008; Cole et al., 2012; Bracco et al., 2015).
Another behavioral distortion associated with re-election incentives is the fact
that governments prioritize public policies that are more salient from voters. It has
been documented that elected officials favor palliative policies rather than perma-
nent policies (Healy and Malhotra, 2009; Neumayer et al., 2014). That is, incum-
bent politicians could try to remain in power by promoting clientelism. Among
many perverse consequences of patronage politics, numerous studies claim that
such a system exacerbates the allocative inefficiencies of the government, under-
mines the functioning of democratic institutions by leading to reduced political
competition and the lack of provision of public goods (Besley and Burgess, 2002;
Anderson et al., 2015; Bobonis et al., 2017).
The third incentive that could weaken governments in pursuit of maximizing so-
cial welfare is related to the opportunity of rent extraction (Leeson and Sobel, 2008;
Burgess et al., 2012; Brollo et al., 2013). Incumbent politicians can take advantage
of the deviations of resources from the public budget to fund political parties or for
individual use. Although cases of government corruption are common everywhere,
their levels diverge across countries, and there is robust evidence that bribery and
graft are harmful to efficiency (Mauro, 1995; Treisman, 2007; Hunt, 2007; Yama-
mura, 2014).
Thesis structure
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that incentives matter considerably
in both politics and economics. The many actors involved in democratic systems
face several variables of a different nature to make decisions. These actors are sub-
jected to all sorts of shocks that often produce conflicting incentives. The final re-
sponse of the agents can sometimes be counter-intuitive and go against what would
normally be expected. To formulate models that reproduce reality as closely as
possible, it is necessary to empirically understand the behavior of agents when con-
fronted with different shocks. This thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of
the behavioral response of political parties, voters, and governments when affected
by shocks such as corruption scandals, natural disasters, and windfall revenues.
The Brazilian political economy is an interesting context to address the goal of
this thesis. The first reason is that Brazil is one of the biggest democracies in the
world. In addition to the federal government, there are 26 states and 5,565 munici-
palities with regular elections every two years. Citizens choose the executive and the
legislative branches of each jurisdiction through direct elections. The second rea-
son is that it is a developing country with profound social and economic challenges.
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Furthermore, there is a high level of heterogeneity among its regions, which implies
an attractive degree of variation to perform empirical analyses to access factors that
trigger economic and social progress. The third reason is that Brazil has one of the
richest and most disaggregated data collections on elections, the economy, and the
environment at the municipal level.
The following chapter addresses the role of political parties and studies whether
popularity shocks are crucial for electoral accountability beyond their effects on
voter behavior. It specifically examines the impact of the revelation of information
about a government’s conduct on the types of candidates who stand for election.
The empirical test focuses on the Brazilian city council elections in 2004 and 2008.
The identification approach exploits the randomness of the timing of the release of
audit reports on the use of federal funds by municipal governments. The study finds
that when the audit reveals a high level of corruption (i.e., when it represents a neg-
ative popularity shock), the parties supporting the incumbent select more educated
candidates. On the contrary, parties pick, on average, less educated candidates when
the audit finds low levels of corruption (i.e., when it represents a positive popular-
ity shock). These effects are stronger in municipalities that have easier access to
local media. The evidence confirms that parties are strategic players that consider
specific features of the electoral competition when making decisions and that their
decisions are affected by shocks that influence the electoral race.
Chapter 3 is devoted to examining aspects of the voter preference assumptions.
Citizen assessment of government performance is a cornerstone of successful demo-
cratic functioning. However, accountability is a double-edged sword. When voters
misunderstand the stakes, and provide the wrong incentives to elected officials, po-
litical accountability leads to an implementation of suboptimal welfare policies.
This paper reveals that an electorate can demand clientelism. To address this ques-
tion, I study the behavior of voters in a context of vote-buying in Brazilian politics
known as the drought industry. The data cover the Brazilian democratic elections
from 1998 to 2012, and as empirical strategies I implement both fixed-effects mod-
els with panel data and a regression discontinuity design with heterogeneous treat-
ment effects. I find evidence that after a drought, voters increase the vote share of
local incumbent parties that are politically aligned with the central government to
ensure the inflow of partisan government aid relief. Such behavior reinforces the
central government’s incentives to bias policies in favor of politically aligned mu-
nicipalities to influence elections. Consequently, the cycle of distortion of aid relief
allocation is perpetuated.
In connection with the findings indicating that the incidence of droughts and the
Brazilian political economy are directly linked, Chapter 4 investigates the behavior
of the local governments regarding the level of corruption. The analysis studies
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whether the allocation of aid relief policies increases the level of corruption in the
context of natural disasters. More specifically, the study investigates the number of
federal emergency declarations against droughts, as a proxy for aid relief, and the
number of irregularities in the local governments’ expenditures found by auditors in
Brazilian cities during a full mayor’s term. The study implements an instrumental
variable approach exploiting the quasi-random nature of the cycle component of
a municipality’s aridity relative to its trend. The findings show that an additional
recognition of the state of emergency leads to an increase in corruption per capita
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2. Popularity Shocks and Political
Selection §
2.1. Introduction
Electoral accountability is a crucial mechanism that helps guarantee the sustain-
ability of modern democracies. It allows sufficiently informed voters to assess the
government’s performance and hold politicians accountable for their actions (Barro,
1973; Mayhew, 1974). An extensive empirical literature shows that voters reduce
their support of parties and officials involved in political scandals and reward politi-
cians who are perceived to perform better (Ashworth, 2012; Ferraz and Finan, 2008;
Snyder and Hirano, 2012; Chong et al., 2015; Costas-Pérez et al., 2012; Bagues and
Esteve-Volart, 2016).1
In this paper, we follow up on these findings and account for the possibility that
political parties might anticipate voters’ punishment, or reward, and change the
composition of the pool of candidates selected to run for office accordingly. Specif-
ically, we show that the release of information about government corruption affects
the quality of candidates of the incumbent coalition. Intuitively, one might expect
that if a political party (or coalition of parties) supports a government that faces a
negative popularity shock, it might react by selecting more appealing and compe-
tent candidates to compensate for the expected poor results in the following election.
Symmetrical intuitions could hold if there is a positive popularity shock: one might
expect the party to behave strategically by reducing the share of costly, high-ability
candidates given that the election will be less competitive.2 These ideas are closely
related to a recent strand of literature showing that political parties are strategic
players that take into account specific features of the electoral competition when
§The paper in this chapter is coauthored with Gianmarco Daniele and Sergio Galletta.
1Interestingly, this effect might not arise when voters already believe politicians to be malfeasant
(Arias et al., 2017) or when the media market structure does not provide incentives to supply politi-
cally relevant information to their audiences (Larreguy et al., 2017).
2We follow recent studies by considering education level as a proxy for politicians’ ability. See,
for example, Ferraz and Finan (2009), Galasso and Nannicini (2011), Gagliarducci and Nannicini
(2013), Besley et al. (2011) or Daniele and Geys (2015). In the next section, we discuss the reasons
and the implications of the fact that high ability candidates are costly for political parties.
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making decisions (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011; Mattozzi and Merlo, 2015).
We address this issue in the Brazilian context by looking at the effect of popu-
larity shocks resulting from the disclosure of reports about potential misconduct in
local governments on the ability of candidates for city councilor in the 2004 and
2008 local elections. Hence, we relate the education level of candidates from the
coalition supporting (or opposing) the incumbent government with the release of
information about its (dis)honesty. This information was made available to voters
through an anti-corruption program introduced in 2003 by the Brazilian central gov-
ernment that monitors how municipalities spend federal funds. The primary task is
performed by auditors who examine municipalities’ accounts to verify the correct
use of federal transfers.
Municipalities are randomly selected into the anti-corruption program, and the
timing of the release of the report is also random. These characteristics are crucial
for our identification strategy, as they help to assess the multi-faceted endogeneity
issue of linking government conduct and the general quality of local politicians.
Another important aspect for our purposes is that the process of selecting candidates
for the city council has a similar schedule in all Brazilian municipalities. This makes
it possible to define when, during the term, the selection process is taking place.
Further, although city councilors are elected using an open-list proportional system,
parties play a central role in selecting candidates. In practice, a citizen is eligible
to stand for election if he has been affiliated with the supporting party for at least
12 months before election day. Formally, the candidate list is decided during party
conventions that, by law, are held in June of each election year. This list must be
submitted at least 3 months before election day.
We exploit the randomness of the timing of corruption disclosures and, condi-
tioning on the level of corruption, compare the ability of the pool of candidates in
municipalities where the audits were released during the candidate selection period
(i.e., from 12 to 3 months before the election) with that of municipalities in which
the audits were released either before or after the selection period. While our identi-
fication strategy closely follows the one used in (Ferraz and Finan, 2008), we define
treatment slightly differently to suit our distinct research question.
Our findings, which are based on 1,321 municipalities that were audited in the
period 2003 − 2010, show that when reports are disclosed during the political selec-
tion period, they lead to a significant change in the average ability of the candidates
running for the city council who belong to the party (or coalition) of the incumbent
mayor.3 This effect crucially depends on the level of corruption reported. Indeed,
the spread of information about government conduct can provide either a positive




or negative shock to the expected electoral results, depending on citizens’ prior be-
liefs about the quality of the government (Besley, 2007). On the one hand, we find
that there is a decrease in the candidates’ average education of nearly 4.5 months of
schooling when low levels of corruption are reported (i.e., lower than the median).
On the other hand, we find an increase of nearly 4 months of schooling when sub-
stantial corruption is reported (i.e., higher than the median). In other words, there
is a difference of 8.5 months of schooling depending on the results of the audit,
which corresponds to about 30−35% of one standard deviation. These symmetric
results are not surprising in a context where trust in politics is very low, and re-
leasing information about the absence of corruption could be more unexpected than
the opposite.4 The effect is of a similar magnitude when considering the sample of
freshmen candidates or when we look at the median level of education. Interest-
ingly, the effect is larger when we constrain our analysis to municipalities that have
easier access to information due to the existence of local radio stations. Indeed,
our findings are confirmed when using a different proxy for candidates’ ability, i.e.
individuals’ main occupation. However, we do not find any change in other observ-
able characteristics such as age and gender. Moreover, the undesirable selection of
low ability candidates in municipalities that experience a positive popularity shock
fades away the closer the release of the audit report is to the election. Finally, we
find that changing the composition of the candidate pool does not have a significant
effect on electoral outcomes. In fact, voters still punish corrupt parties, in particular
where local radio stations are available, and the elected candidates do not appear to
have different characteristics compared to those elected in municipalities where the
report was released outside the selection period.
To our knowledge, we are the first to estimate the effect of popularity shocks
about the incumbent government on the quality of political candidates. Our findings
are closely related to the recent literature that emphasizes that the characteristics of
the electoral race affect candidate selection. This could be caused by a change in ei-
ther individuals’ incentives to enter politics or parties’ incentives to select particular
types of candidates (Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Galasso and Nannicini, 2011). Our
interpretation of the results is more in line with studies that emphasize the role of
the demand for politicians (i.e., party selection) than those that focus on the supply
of politicians (i.e., self-selection of individuals). For instance, Galasso and Nan-
nicini (2011) focus on parties’ role in selecting candidates. Studying the Italian
parliamentarian elections, they show that better candidates (i.e., those with more
years of schooling) are selected in districts where the electoral race is expected to
4Brazilians have very low confidence in political parties. More than 85% of the individuals
interviewed in the 6th wave of the World Values Survey (2010 − 2014) responded that they have
little or no confidence at all in political parties.
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be more competitive. Mattozzi and Merlo (2015) further show that the incentives
to select high-ability candidates crucially depend on the electoral system. Specif-
ically, high-ability candidates are less likely to be chosen in proportional than in
majoritarian systems, as the latter are characterized by a higher level of electoral
competitiveness. Likewise, Esteve-Volart and Bagues (2012), studying Senate and
House elections in Spain, find that parties tend to select female candidates where
they are less likely to be elected.
A second group of studies instead focuses on the supply side, showing that both
monetary and non-monetary incentives might affect individuals’ decision to enter
politics. Kotakorpi and Poutvaara (2011), Ferraz and Finan (2008), and Gagliar-
ducci and Nannicini (2013) show that higher salaries attract more educated individ-
uals to politics in Finland, Brazil and Italy, respectively. Daniele and Geys (2015)
and Daniele (2017) exploit shocks in the presence of criminal organizations in Ital-
ian municipalities to show that educated individuals drop out of politics when crim-
inal groups are stronger, as they decrease the expected payoffs from politics (Dal Bó
et al., 2006).5
Further, we complement the literature on political scandals. For instance, Fer-
raz and Finan (2008) focus on random audits in Brazilian municipalities to show
that publicly exposed corrupt incumbents are less likely to be re-elected in the next
election. In addition, Snyder and Hirano (2012) show that in US House elections,
incumbents involved in scandals have a higher probability of losing their primary
elections, and receive less votes in general elections compared to non-scandal in-
cumbents. Chong et al. (2015) show that voters punish both incumbents and chal-
lengers after receiving information about the inefficient use of public funds in Mex-
ico. Finally, Bobonis et al. (2016) find that foreseeable anti-corruption audits reduce
corruption in the short-term, as they have a disciplining effect on the incumbent. In
a similar vein, we find that the incumbent strategically reacts to the release of cor-
ruption news selecting different candidates.
Our results also contribute to the recent literature on the consequences of Brazil’s
randomized auditing policy. While Litschig and Zamboni (2013) and Avis et al.
(2017) show that increasing the audit risk reduces rent extraction, Ferraz and Fi-
nan (2008), Brollo et al. (2013), and Muço (2016) confirm that releasing the audit
reports indeed has an effect on electoral outcomes.6 Politicians seem to anticipate
this potential electoral punishment by reducing malfeasance when they are eligible
5Finally, Baltrunaite et al. (2014) show that gender quotas increase the presence of (female)
educated politicians. However, they do not discuss whether this is mostly driven by a change in the
supply of or demand for educated politicians.
6These results are relevant to our study, as they provide additional support to the critical assump-
tion that auditing disclosure affects voters’ decisions.
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for re-election (Ferraz and Finan, 2011). Interestingly, Brollo et al. (2013) hint that
auditing policy has an impact on political selection: they show that the disclosure of
the audit reports affects not only the mayor’s likelihood of re-election but also the
probability that he or she will run for reelection. Muço (2016) finds that municipal
audits influence federal elections. Voters also reduce their support for the party of
the incumbent mayor when voting in presidential elections. This result emphasizes
that party labels matter in Brazil.7
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we describe our main hypoth-
esis. Section 2.3 describes the institutional setting. In Sections 4.4 and 2.5, we
present the data and estimation strategy, respectively. The main results and addi-
tional tests are reported in Sections 2.6 and 2.7. We conclude in Section 2.8.
2.2. Hypothesis
In this section, we provide a brief explanation of our main hypothesis and clarify its
underlying assumptions.
As explained above, we depart from the literature on the voting effects of pop-
ularity shocks, which concentrates on whether voters hold politicians accountable.
We instead focus on the idea that parties select candidates they expect to be pop-
ular with voters. Our main hypothesis is that, as selecting high-ability candidates
is costly, political parties will strategically pick them depending on their expected
likelihood of winning the election. Specifically, a positive popularity shock that
increases the chances of winning an election will reduce the propensity to select
appealing, high-ability candidates. A negative popularity shock will have the oppo-
site effect, which increases parties’ motivation to select high-ability and competent
candidates. This reasoning is based on the validity of three main assumptions.
First, it assumes that voters value candidates’ ability when casting their vote. In-
deed, there is a large literature showing that voters primarily care about competence
when picking an elected officer (Kinder et al., 1980; Todorov et al., 2005). Impor-
tantly, there is also empirical evidence that education − which we use as a proxy
for competence − is a valid predictor of electoral success (Dal Bó et al., 2017). Our
findings confirm this evidence. Appendix Table A.1 shows that, after controlling for
city fixed effects and other individual characteristics, educated candidates are much
more likely to be elected.
Second, this hypothesis assumes that selecting high-ability candidates is costly
for a political party. Several papers corroborate the idea that a lack of incentives
7Samuels and Zucco (2014) reach a similar conclusion, as they find that Brazilians conform
their opinions on public policy to those of the parties they support.
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might limit the number of good citizens who choose to enter politics (Caselli and
Morelli, 2004; Messner and Polborn, 2004). In fact, parties might benefit from se-
lecting low-ability politicians, for example if they provide higher rents for the party
or/and have a lower reservation wage (Besley, 2005; Dal Bó et al., 2006). Con-
versely, parties might select better candidates when an election is more competitive
in order to maximize their chances of winning (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011; Mat-
tozzi and Merlo, 2015). In line with these findings, in a recent working paper on
Brazilian local politics, Colonnelli et al. (2017) show that there is a trade-off be-
tween education and party loyalty in the probability that party supporters will have
a public-sector job. Finally, we find that educated candidates receive more party
funds with which to finance their electoral campaigns, which suggests that select-
ing high-ability candidates is costlier for political parties (Appendix Table A.1).
Third, our hypothesis is valid in a political system in which political parties play
a relevant role in selecting candidates, which depends on the country’s institutional
framework. In the next section, we provide evidence of the crucial role that Brazil-
ian political parties play in local elections.
Our reasoning thus far has focused on an incumbent coalition that is directly
hit by a shock. Yet if the effects of a shock spill over to affect the challenger’s
decision making, it is less clear what we should expect. First, the challenging party
might expect the incumbent to react to the shock, and therefore has no incentive to
change its own pool of candidates. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the type
of spillover effect for the challenger is unclear. Assuming that voters have perfect
information, if the incumbent is hit by a negative (positive) shock, the challenger
should experience an electoral advantage (disadvantage). However, Chong et al.
(2015) and Daniele (2017) show that voters may blame the entire political class for
a negative popularity shock, and thus punish both the incumbent and the challenger.
In this case, the negative (positive) effects of a shock would spread to the challenger
as well.
2.3. Institutional Setting
2.3.1. Local Institutions and Electoral Rules
Brazil is a federation with three levels of government. In addition to the federal
government, there are 26 states and 5,565 municipalities. Citizens choose the ex-
ecutive and the legislative branches of each jurisdiction through direct elections.
Local governments have a central role in the provision of a variety of public goods
(e.g., primary education, culture, health care, housing, transportation and munici-
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pal infrastructure). Transfers from upper levels of government cover a significant
proportion of these expenditures.
At the municipal level, the mayor (Prefeito) has executive power while the city
council (Câmara de Vereadores) exercises legislative power. The number of seats
for councilors in each city council is based on population size.8 Mayors and city
councilors are both elected for a term of 4 years, but while mayors are limited to
two terms, city councilors have no term limits. The mayor plays a central role in
defining the expenditure programs, and the city council is responsible for enacting
municipality laws and overseeing the mayor’s usage of public resources. Indeed,
councilors have influence over the allocation of funds, for instance by proposing
petitions, amendments and voting on the municipal budget proposal.
In municipal elections, voters are provided with a list of candidates running for
mayor, at most one for each party (or coalition of parties), and a list of candidates
for city councilor indicating which party they support.9 Voters can cast one vote
for mayor and one vote for councilor. Alternatively, voters can select a party in the
city council election without specifying a candidate. While mayors are elected with
a majority of votes, councilor elections use an open-list proportional system, and
the distribution of seats follows the d’Hondt method. This means that the number
of seats assigned to a party in the city council depends on how many votes all
candidates from that party received. However, for each party, only the candidates
with the most votes will become city councilors.
2.3.2. Party Organization and the Candidate Selection Process
Importantly for our study, political parties play a significant role in selecting candi-
dates to run in local elections (Mainwaring, 1999; Guarnieri, 2011; Avelino et al.,
2012). Only parties registered with the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) within
one year before the elections can present candidates. Almost 30 different parties
presented candidates in the 2004 and 2008 elections. However, the five biggest
parties accounted for more than 65% of all mayors elected in the 2004 and 2008
elections. A similar time constraint applies to citizens who want to register to run
in the mayoral or city councilor elections. They need to have their voting residency
in the district they would like to represent and to be affiliated with their supporting
political party for at least one year before the election. The electoral law requires
parties to nominate candidates during local conventions, but it does not define how
8Local laws define the exact number of seats, but they have to follow federal laws that set the
limit of seats according to the population in the municipality (Art. 29 of 1988 Brazilian Federal
Constitution.). The number of seats ranges from a minimum of 9 in municipalities with less than
fifteen thousand inhabitants, and a maximum of 55 in those with more than eight million people.
9Municipal elections are held in different years than federal and state elections.
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these conventions need to be organized or how candidates should be selected, del-
egating complete autonomy to the executive committee of each party. In the 2004
and 2008 municipal elections, parties had to choose their candidates and coalitions
in a party caucus from June 10−30 of the election year.10 Final candidate lists had
to be registered with the TSE before July 5.11 The maximum number of candidates
a coalition can put forward is twice the total number of seats it holds in the city
council.12 The parties must put forward a minimum of 30% female candidates.
Although local conventions formally control the candidate selection process, na-
tional and regional party bodies can influence it, depending on the party statute
(Avelino et al., 2012; Ribeiro, 2013a,b; Guarnieri, 2011). These differ across par-
ties depending on the number of eligible voters and on whether the system is based
on elections or direct appointment. Some parties select candidates in regional or
national committees, so local candidates do not have to go through an approval
process. In other parties every candidate is elected by vote, and thus presumably
no higher party body can modify the candidate list. Following this classification,
Guarnieri (2011) labels three types of parties:13 monocratic, oligarchic and pol-
yarchic. In monocratic parties, the decision-making process is in the hands of a
single group that has an absolute majority of votes and absolute control over party
decisions. This group includes the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) and the
Partido Progressista (PP). In oligarchic parties, a small number of groups control a
considerable proportion of votes. While no single group can control the party on its
own, the small number of groups facilitates coordination, increasing the cohesion
and stability of the coalition. This group includes the Partido da Social Democracia
Brasileira (PSDB), the Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT) and the Democratas
(DEM). In polyarchic parties, the organization is more decentralized. The deci-
sion making depends on constant negotiations and discussions across and within
different party layers and bodies. Both the cohesion and the stability of coalitions
comprised of such groups are likely to be more precarious. This last group includes
the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) and the Partido do Movimento Democrático
Brasileiro (PMDB).14
10These elections were held on October 3, 2004 and October 5, 2008.
11Changes to the electoral law (Law No. 9504, of 30 September 1997) in 2015 affected some
of the elements we exploit in our analysis. Beginning with the 2016 municipal elections: (1) party
conventions are required to take place from July 20 to August 5 in election years; (2) candidate lists
must be submitted by August 14 and (3) candidates must be affiliated with a political party for at
least 6 months before election day.
12If a party is not in a coalition, the number of candidates cannot be more than 150% of the total
number of seats it holds in the city council. Further, if not all candidates are selected during the party
convention, party leaders may fill the remaining vacancies within 60 days of the election.
13Other scholars reach similar conclusions on classifying Brazilian parties (Ribeiro, 2013a,b).
14Other mechanisms, such as party affiliations, also influence the candidate selection process.
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To conclude, the Brazilian (local) candidates selection process appears a multi-
faceted one, where both local and high level party branches play a role. Importantly
for our hypothesis, we face a selection process characterized by a central role of
political parties.
2.3.3. The Brazilian Anti-corruption Program
In 2003, the Brazilian national government, led by Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, estab-
lished an innovative anti-corruption program to improve the transparency of public
spending and to tackle corruption in local governments. The Controladoria Geral da
União, (CGU), a federal agency, was made responsible for auditing local spending
that has been funded with federal transfers.15 Importantly for our analysis, munici-
palities are randomly selected to the auditing process. Lotteries are held every two
or three months in the Caixa Econômica Federal, in Brasília, in the presence of the
media and members of civil society. Only municipalities with more than 500,000
inhabitants are exempt from the lottery. Further, since lotteries are run indepen-
dently for each state, the probability of being selected for an audit in a given year
varies by state. The first lottery selected 26 municipalities. From the second lot-
tery to the eighth, 50 municipalities were selected each time; 60 municipalities have
been chosen since the ninth lottery.
For each selected municipality the CGU compiles a list of all federal transfers re-
ceived since 2001. Typically, 10 to 15 auditors spend around two weeks in the mu-
nicipal offices searching for potential anomalies. Once the auditors have completed
the inspections, they prepare a report listing any irregularities and malpractices.
The report is then sent to competent authorities for prosecution and made publicly
available on the CGU website about 3 months later. As shown by Ferraz and Finan
(2008), the results of the audits generally receive media attention, especially at the
local level.
2.4. Data
To estimate the effect of corruption disclosure on the quality of the pool of can-
didates, we collect information about Brazilian municipalities from a variety of
sources for the period 2001−2010, which covers two full municipal terms (i.e.,
Party leaders can deliberately withdraw existing affiliations or deny new ones (Guarnieri, 2011).
Another mechanism is to replace, due to irregularities, a local committee with a provisional one
directly under the control of a national/regional party committee. Indeed, there are many cases of
replacements for reasons that are not clearly stated in the statute (Guarnieri, 2011).
15CGU Decree No. 247, June 20, 2003.
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2001−2004 and 2005−2008).16
Information about municipal-level corruption is taken from Brollo et al. (2013).
Their data contain different measures of corruption for all 1,481 municipalities se-
lected in the first 29 lotteries of the anti-corruption program (i.e., audits disclosed
from July 2003 to March 2010). We use a broad definition of corruption that in-
cludes also irregularities that could be interpreted as government mismanagement
rather than true corruption events.17
This definition includes illegal procurement practices and the diversion of funds
− not justifiable payments.18 To account for the different levels of corruption
across municipalities, our analysis uses the variable Corruption, which represents
the amount of misappropriated funds as a proportion of the total amount audited.19
This information is available for only 1,422 municipalities, as it was not possible
to compute the amount of resources involved in some irregularities. The level of
observation is the municipality-term, meaning that we can clearly identify the term
during which electoral irregularities took place. In other words, if a municipality
was selected in a lottery in 2007, it will likely appear in the sample twice, as the
auditors checked spending that occurred in both the 2001−2004 term and the first
part of the 2005−2008 term. We present in Table 2.1 the summary statistics of
Corruption divide by electoral term.
Table 2.1.: Corruption by electoral term
Percentile
N Mean 25% 50% 75% 99%
Term 2001-2004 1299 0.0462 0 0.001 0.049 0.532
Term 2005-2008 709 0.0561 0 0.017 0.068 0.465
Notes: This table reports information about the revealed corrup-
tion over the term 2001-2004 and 2005-2008.
We use candidates’ level of education as a proxy for quality. Specifically, we
consider the minimum number of years necessary to attain a certain degree.20 Al-
ternatively, we use the share of candidates that completed Mandatory School. The
16Table 3.1 reports summary statistics of the variables described below.
17Therefore, in our analysis we do not distinguish between active and passive waste (Bandiera
et al., 2009), as we rely on the fact that both types of misbehaviours might be salient for electoral
accountability.
18The dataset and full details on how the measure is constructed are available at
https://sites.google.com/site/fernandabrollo/home/data.
19In the original dataset this variable is called Broad Fraction of the Amount. Note that we do
not consider a binary measure of corruption as in the Brazilian context, the presence of corruption
might not be informative per se, conversely we exploit the severity of the phenomenon. See Section
2.1 and the footnote 5.
20For candidates who started a degree but eventually dropped out, we assign half the number of
years that would be needed to complete it.
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TSE provides data on the level of education of candidates for the city council. For
each municipality, we distinguish between the Average Education level of candi-
dates in the incumbent’s and the challengers’ coalitions. The incumbent’s coalition
includes candidates from all the parties that run in the same coalition as the in-
cumbent mayor’s party and who belonged to the winning coalition in the previous
municipal election.21 The challengers’ coalition includes candidates running for all
other parties. As an additional measure of quality we consider candidates’ job. That
is, we associate to each candidate the average national salary correspondent to her
profession and we compute coalitions’ Average Income.
Further, we compute the same variable considering new candidates (i.e., those
who were not city councilors in the previous term) and re-running candidates. We
also take into account the Median Education level of candidates and two other char-
acteristics relevant for political selection − the Share of Female candidates and
Average Age.22
We compute similar measures for mayoral candidates, but focus only on candi-
dates belonging to the same party as the incumbent. Finally, we consider the Share
of Seats Won by candidates elected from the incumbent’s coalition.
We control for local political preferences by creating a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the incumbent government was led by a mayor from Partido dos Trabal-
hadores, and 0 otherwise. This variable also controls for whether the municipalities
is ruled by the same party in power at the federal government. The 2000 Brazilian
Census provides data about the Population of the municipality, monthly per capita
Income, Share of Population Employed, the Gini Coefficient of income, the Share
of population with a Secondary Degree, the Share of Population in Urban areas,
the share of population working in different job sectors (Services, Transport, Public
and Commerce). We also construct a dummy variable Media, which accounts for
the presence of local radio stations in the municipal area. This information is taken
from the 2006 municipality survey Perfil dos Municípios Brasileiros: Cultura.
To provide homogeneous results in all our estimates, we apply a sequence of
restrictions to the original dataset on corruption provided by (Brollo et al., 2013).
First, we remove eight municipalities, as they did not yet exist in 2000 when the
population census was conducted. Second, we consider only municipalities in
which at least some parties support the incumbent’s coalition. Therefore, we re-
move 88 more municipalities. Finally, we exclude five municipalities in which there
were no new candidates for city councilor (i.e., they were all incumbents). Clearly,
21We also show in Appendix Table A.4 our main results by defining the incumbent coalition as
composed of all parties that belonged to the winning coalition in the previous municipal election.
22We also construct the two latter variables and the Average Education level for the sample of
elected candidates.
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by applying these restrictions the sample of municipalities we use in our analysis is
no longer random. We address this issue in Section 2.7.
2.5. Estimation Strategy
The main objective of this study is to test whether information shocks that change
citizens’ voting behavior affect the quality of electoral candidates selected by par-
ties. Specifically, we want to compare (1) the ability of candidates running for city
council when the local government experiences an informative shock during the
party selection period to (2) the ability of candidates running for city council in lo-
cal governments that experience a similar informative shock at other points in time.
In order to provide a reliable counterfactual analysis, we exploit the randomness of
the timing of the disclosure of the audit reports to determine the group of Treated
vs. Control municipalities.
To precisely determine the selection period (and hence the composition) of the
two different groups, we identify two important dates in the electoral process. First,
we account for the deadline for parties to provide their candidate lists (i.e., July
5, 2004 for the elections held in October 2004 and July 5, 2008 for the October
2008 elections). Second, we consider the cutoff date for citizens to be affiliated
with a party in order to run as a candidate for that party (i.e., October 3, 2003 for
the October 2004 elections and October 5, 2007 for the elections held in October
2008). Thus, a municipality is considered to be treated if the disclosure of the report
occurred between 12 to 3 months before election day. Indeed, depending on the
lottery results, the communication of the audit reports might occur during, before
or after what we identify as the treatment period. We think our definition makes
clear that the focus on parties’ role in the selection process as the group of citizens
willing to run for public office is mostly predetermined by the time the reports are
disclosed.
It is worth noting that our strategy closely follows the one used in Ferraz and
Finan (2008). However, as we are exploring a distinct research question, our def-
inition of treatment and the way we split the sample between treated and control
municipalities are rather different. Indeed, Ferraz and Finan (2008) define treated
municipalities as those that received an auditing disclosure anytime before the elec-
tion. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we provide results where we use
this latter definition of the treatment group. By doing so, on the one hand, we
loosen the focus on parties’ role in the selection process as now the group of citi-
zens that can become eligible to run for election is not predetermined. For example,
citizens can decide to enroll in a political party as a response to an audit report pub-
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lished more than 12 months before the election, while this would not be taken into
account with our primary definition of treatment. On the other hand, we control
for the possibility that receiving a popularity shock in the three months before the
election causes the withdraw from the electoral competition of previously selected
candidates. For instance, political candidates from the incumbent political party
that experience a very negative popularity shock might withdraw from the electoral
competition so that the incumbent party may replace these candidates. Related to
this point, we also report results where we exclude from the analysis municipalities
that had the auditing disclosed more than 12 months before elections. We do so
given that it is not straightforward to think of them as part of the control group as
the informational shocks occurred before the end of the selection period.23
Another aspect to take into account is that auditing reports reveal a misuse of
public funds that could cover both terms we include in our analysis. This could be
a problem if it were not possible to determine the exact timing of the misbehavior.
In this were the case, citizens would be limited in their judgment as it would be less
clear who was accountable for the discoveries made during the audit. Luckily, the
corruption data we use categorize the misuse of public funds by term and munici-
pality, which allows us to identify the treated and control groups for each term as
reported in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1.: Treated and control definition
Table 2.2 summarizes the sample composition, differentiating accordingly to the
time of the disclosure of the auditing report. Over the two terms, we have 1,695
observations. Following our main definition of treatment: 327 are treated (19.3% of
the sample) and 1,368 are controls (80.7% of the sample).24 We have 182 treated
and 960 control municipalities for the 2001 − 2004 term. Here, the treated munici-
palities are the ones drawn from the four lotteries disclosed between October 2003
and April 2004, while the control group includes all municipalities selected in the
23In summary, the auditing disclosed more than 12 months before elections are used as part of
the control group in Table 2.4, as part of the treated group in Table 2.6 and excluded from the sample
in Appendix Table A.3.
24Instead, if we consider the Ferraz and Finan (2008) definition we would have 905 treated ob-
servations (43.4% of the sample) and 790 as controls (46.6% of the sample).
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Table 2.2.: Sample details
Term 2001 Term 2005 Total
Before elections
More than 12 months before election 68 242 310
Between 12 months and 3 months to election 182 145 327
From 3 months before election 93 0 93
After elections 799 166 965
Total 1142 553 1695
Notes: The table reports details on the sample of 1321 municipalities considered in our analysis. The
level of observation is municipality-term.
other 25 lotteries that had audit reports released in the 2001 − 2004 term. For the
2005 − 2008 term we have 145 treated and 408 control municipalities. The treated
municipalities were drawn from the three lotteries disclosed between January 2008
and June 2008, while the control group comprises all municipalities selected from
the six lotteries disclosed between February 2006 and July 2007 plus the four lotter-
ies disclosed between December 2008 and March 2010 that were audited for federal
funds released in the 2005−2008 term.25
Table 2.3 reports the summary statistics for the two groups of municipalities. In-
deed, although our sample is a sub-sample of those selected within the randomized
lotteries, it seems well balanced. Only the share of the population working in the
industrial sector is different between the two groups at the 5% significance level.
Note that including this variable in our specifications does not affect our findings.
Formally, we start the analysis by estimating the following ordinary least squares
(OLS) model:
Yist = β Tist+ δXi+γs+λt+ εist, (2.1)
where i denotes the municipality, s the state and t the term. Yist can be the
Average Year of Schooling of either all or freshmen candidates for city councilor,
from either the incumbent or the challenger coalition. Tist is a dummy taking a
value of 1 for municipalities with audit reports released during the selection period
(i.e., from 12 to 3 months before the election), while Xi is a set of time-invariant
municipal controls. Finally, γs are state-fixed effects, λt are term-fixed effects and
εis is the error term. We use an OLS model with standard errors clustered at the
municipality level.
25The reports disclosed before February 2006 did not account for funds released in the
2005−2008 term. 374 municipalities appear in the sample twice, as they are part of the control
group for the first term and part of either the control or treated group in the second term. Munici-
palities that were audited more than once appear in our sample only with reference to the first draw.
In this way, we avoid the possibility that the potential long-term effects of the audit would bias our
estimates (Avis et al., 2017).
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Table 2.3.: Differences in the audit outcomes and observable characteristics
Control group Treated group Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Average education in t−1 (incumbent) 9.324 9.348 -0.024
Average education in t−1 (challenger) 9.262 9.165 0.097
Dummy party incumbent PT 0.215 0.202 0.013
Population 26516 23511 3004
Income 581.668 573.920 7.749
Share of pop. employed 37.720 37.313 0.408
Gini coefficient 0.560 0.558 0.002
Avg. municipal number of years of education 3.568 3.483 0.085
Share of pop. in public administration 2.109 2.196 -0.087
Share of pop. in agriculture 16.390 16.792 -0.403
Share of pop. in industry 4.038 3.592 0.446**
Share of pop. in service 6.705 6.551 0.154
Share of pop. in commerce 7.584 7.327 0.257
Share of pop. in transport 1.175 1.137 0.038
Share of pop. in service 6.705 6.551 0.154
Notes: This table displays the mean characteristics of 1321 municipalities (1695 municipality-
term observations) that were audited by the Controladoria Geral da União (CGU) in the period
2003-2009 (i.e., from the 2nd to the 29th lottery ). The control group (column 1) is composed
by 994 municipalities which had disclosed the results of the auditing concerning the term 2001-
2004 either before the 5th of Oct 2003 or after the 5th of Jul 2004, or had disclosed the results
of the auditing concerning the term 2005-2008 after the 5th of Jul 2008 or before the 3rd of
Oct 2007. Instead, the treated group (column 2) is composed by 327 municipalities which had
disclosed the results of the auditing from 12 to 3 months before the elections (i.e., from one
year before elections to the 5th of July 2004 or 2008). Column (3) shows the difference of the
means and the level of significance. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
Thanks to the random assignment of the auditing among municipalities, the coef-
ficient β is the causal parameter of interest. In other words, it represents the average
effect of the release of the auditing reports on candidates’ education levels. State-
fixed effects are included in all specifications, since the random assignment was
stratified at the state level. Therefore, we ensure that our identification accounts for
the heterogeneous probability of selection on the treatment faced by municipalities
from different states. In addition, term-fixed effects account for other unobservable
characteristics that might have changed from one term to the next. We include mu-
nicipal controls in order to provide more precise estimates in case the randomization
still produces a selection of treated and controlled municipalities with unbalanced
characteristics.
We expect the estimates from Equation (2.1) to produce significant results if the
auditing disclosure per se matters in the candidate selection process, regardless of
the actual information provided. However, this would only be the case if the infor-
mation disclosed differs from what the voters or parties expect (Ferraz and Finan,
2008) − i.e., if there is a systematic under- or over-estimation of a municipality’s
level of corruption.
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Therefore, we refine our baseline analysis by taking into account the results of
the auditing process. We produce different estimations to test whether the effect
of the disclosure on the selection of candidates depends on the kind of information
reported. Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
Yist = β1 Tist× Corruptionist+β2 Tist
+β3 Corruptionist+ δXi+γs+λt+ εist, (2.2)
where Corruptionist is the share of corrupted resources. Moreover, to provide
more flexible estimations and to account for potential non-linearity of the effects, we
interact T with a variable identifying municipalities that belong to different quartiles
of the distribution of corruption. In other words, we compare the effect of the
disclosure of different levels of corruption on the level of education of the pool of
candidates. This is a crucial point because, depending on the level of corruption
revealed, the information shock could send either a positive or negative message to
citizens. However, using this approach could raise important issues if our measure
of corruption simply serves as a proxy for other municipal conditions. We check
for this possibility in Section 2.7.
2.6. Results
2.6.1. Baseline Analysis
In this section, we report our central results. Specifically, Columns (1) and (2)
of Table 2.4 show the results from the estimates of Equation (2.1), in which the
dependent variable measures the level of education of all candidates in the incum-
bent’s coalition. As expected, the disclosure of reports per se has no direct effect
on candidates’ quality. Moreover, the inclusion of municipal covariates does not
seem to have a sizable impact on the main coefficient, which is in line with a bal-
anced sample thanks to the randomization of the treatment. The remaining columns
of Table 2.4 report estimates of Equation (2.2). Columns (3) to (5) report the ef-
fect of the auditing, interacted with the level of corruption, on the education of all
candidates selected by the incumbent coalition’s parties. Column (3) provides the
first indication that reporting high corruption boosts the quality of candidates put
forward by the incumbent’s party. The interaction term has a positive sign, but it
is not statistically significantly different from 0. Column (4) reports the estimate
where the treatment status variable interacts with a dummy that identifies whether
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a municipality is in the top 50th percentile of the distribution of our measure of
corruption.26 This result, coherently with Column (3), suggests that when the audit
report is disclosed during the selection period, in municipalities with low levels of
corruption candidates from the incumbent’s coalition have around 4.5 months less
of schooling (coeff. −0.378). However, if high levels of corruption are exposed,
we observe an increase in the average education of slightly more than 4 months of
schooling (coeff. 0.724−0.378 = 0.346). Both coefficients are statistically signifi-
cant. Therefore, there are more than 8.5 months of education difference depending
on the signal provided by the audit. This difference corresponds to about 30–35%
of one standard deviation.27 The coefficients in Column (5) indicate the quartile of
corruption and emphasize that the effect is stronger with higher levels of reported
corruption.28 The last three columns suggest similar results once the focus is only
on new candidates (i.e., those who were not previously on the city council). This
is a crucial finding, as using new candidates rules out the possibility that the esti-
mates rely on a mechanical effect coming from the direct consequences of the audit
(e.g., if the audit led to the incarceration of involved councilors who were mostly
low-ability individuals).29 Table 2.5 shows that the challenging coalition, which is
not directly accountable for the outcome of the audit, does not change the educa-
26The level of corruption in the median municipality was 0.5%. Note that our results are con-
firmed when considering as low level of corruption only cities without any corruption event.
27Note that the magnitude of our findings is comparable with previous papers on political selec-
tion. For instance, Daniele and Geys (2015) and Daniele (2017) estimate a change in politicians’
education due to mafia presence of about 35% of a standard deviation. Kotakorpi and Poutvaara
(2011) find that a 35% increase in salary leads to a 5-percentage-point increase in candidates with
high education. Baltrunaite et al. (2014) report a modest increase of 2-3 months in politicians’
education after the introduction of gender quotas.
28Appendix Table A.3 show that the results are similar if we only use as control those munici-
palities that have the auditing disclosure after the selection period. Appendix Table A.4 provides the
results of changing the definition of the incumbent’s coalition to include all parties that supported
the mayor in the previous election, regardless of whether they do so in the following election. The
results are similar, though the positive effect on the education of candidates running for office in
highly corrupt municipalities is smaller than the one found with our standard definition of incum-
bent’s coalition. This does not change if we consider the extended sample which includes all the
1396 municipalities where there is at least one candidate representing the old incumbent’s coali-
tion. Additionally, Appendix Table A.5 includes an alternative measure of schooling as a dependent
variable − the share of candidates that completed Mandatory School. Our findings are confirmed.
Specifically, the share of candidates that completed mandatory school decreases by 4.3 percentage
points where low levels of corruption are found, and increases by about 3.5 percentage points with
levels of corruption above the median. Further, in Appendix Table A.6, we show that our results
are mainly driven by the candidates’ selection for the 2004 elections. Finally, note that our main
findings do not vary depending on the level of electoral competitiveness. Specifically, the change
in candidates’ ability is not significantly higher in close elections and neither in case the mayor is
re-running for office or is facing term limits (results available upon request).
29Appendix Table A.7 provides results on re-running candidates. While the magnitude of the
effect is similar to the one estimated so far, this is barely significant.
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tion levels of its pool of candidates: the coefficients of interest are not statistically
significant in any of the regressions.30 As suggested in Section 2.2, the effects of
a popularity shock hitting the incumbent might spill to or have the opposite effect
on the challenger. Therefore, these (lack of) results can be read in the light of the
unclear nature of the shock received by the challenger.
Table 2.4.: Audit releases and the quality of candidates - incumbent coalition
All candidates New candidates
Linear Median Quartile Linear Median Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-selection auditing 0.016 0.041 -0.073 -0.378** -0.429** -0.160 -0.448** -0.531**
(0.134) (0.115) (0.131) (0.172) (0.194) (0.141) (0.191) (0.212)
Pre-selection auditing × 1.567 1.796*
corruption (0.993) (1.080)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.724*** 0.723***
above median corruption (0.235) (0.258)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.281 0.448
second quartile of corruption (0.393) (0.459)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.629** 0.691**
third quartile of corruption (0.315) (0.333)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.899*** 0.906***
fourth quartile of corruption (0.280) (0.314)
Corruption 0.297 0.377
(0.452) (0.496)
Above median corruption -0.017 -0.004
(0.097) (0.109)
Second quartile -0.005 0.139
(0.202) (0.207)
Third quartile 0.002 0.040
(0.115) (0.132)
Fourth quartile -0.036 0.005
(0.126) (0.143)
F-test inter 0.181 0.012 0.078 0.142 0.025 0.107
R2 0.117 0.374 0.376 0.379 0.379 0.319 0.320 0.322
N observations 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Average years of education of candidates - as a city councilor - from the
incumbent coalition. Corruption is the share of the amount of the audited budget involved in general violations.
Municipality controls include: dummy party incumbent PT, ln(population), income, gini coefficient, share of
population with a secondary degree, share of population employed, share of population working in agriculture,
share of population working in industry share of population working in commerce, share of population working
in transport, share of population working in service and share of population working in the public administration.
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
So far we considered a municipality to be treated if the disclosure of the report
occurred during the selection period that we define taking places between 12 to 3
months before election day. However, one can still think of a more general defini-
tion of treatment period by considering as treated all municipalities that experience
the disclosure of the report before the election. Therefore, following Ferraz and Fi-
30Our results are unchanged when considering the reaction of the most voted challenging coali-
tion, either in the previous or in the present elections.
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Table 2.5.: Audit releases and the quality of candidates - challenger coalitions
All candidates New candidates
Linear Median Quartile Linear Median Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-selection auditing -0.043 -0.012 0.014 -0.034 -0.048 -0.026 -0.091 -0.114
(0.095) (0.075) (0.088) (0.112) (0.125) (0.090) (0.118) (0.133)
Pre-selection auditing × -0.452 -0.602
corruption (0.886) (0.845)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.038 0.052
above median corruption (0.150) (0.156)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.075 0.138
second quartile of corruption (0.266) (0.277)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.174 0.220
third quartile of corruption (0.191) (0.200)
Pre-selection auditing × -0.058 -0.054
fourth quartile of corruption (0.185) (0.193)
Corruption 0.246 0.309
(0.283) (0.297)
Above median corruption 0.010 0.013
(0.068) (0.069)
Second quartile 0.077 0.005
(0.127) (0.125)
Third quartile -0.017 -0.036
(0.084) (0.086)
Fourth quartile 0.067 0.069
(0.086) (0.088)
F-test inter 0.839 0.983 0.932 0.618 0.846 0.857
R2 0.172 0.515 0.515 0.515 0.515 0.499 0.499 0.500
N observations 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Average years of education of candidates - as a city councilor - from the
challenger coalitions. Corruption is the share of the amount of the audited budget involved in general violations.
Municipality controls include: dummy party incumbent PT, ln(population), income, Gini coefficient, share of
population with a secondary degree, share of population employed, share of population working in agriculture,
share of population working in industry, share of population working in commerce, share of population working
in transport, share of population working in service and share of population working in the public administration.
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
nan (2008), we report in Table 2.6 the results from regressions where now the treat-
ment includes the entire pre-electoral period.31 From Column 1 (all candidates) and
Column 3 (freshmen), we still observe that audits reporting a low level of corrup-
tion lead to a worse political selection, while candidates’ ability increases in cities
reporting above median levels of corruption. However, in the latter case, the mag-
nitude of the estimated effect is lower than the one in Table 2.4. In Columns 2 and
4, instead, we separate the pre-electoral period in three parts: i) at least 12 months
before the elections; ii) between 3 and 12 months before the elections; iii) between
0 and 3 months before the elections. It seems our results are driven uniquely by the
period in between 3 and 12 months. Conversely, it appears that political selection
does not change when the audit is released far from the elections (more than 12
31Brollo et al. (2013) apply also a very similar identification strategy.
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months). Also, audits released just before the elections (less than 3 months) do not
affect candidates’ selection. These results add credibility to our main definition of
treatment.
Table 2.6.: Audit releases and the quality of candidates - before election
All candidates New candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-election auditing -0.311** -0.446**
(0.144) (0.157)
Pre-election auditing × 0.432** 0.540**
above median corruption (0.184) (0.201)
Pre-election auditing (at least 12 months before) -0.039 -0.206
(0.145) (0.160)
Pre-election auditing (between 3 and 12 months before) -0.393** -0.531***
(0.184) (0.205)
Pre-election auditing (between 0 and 3 months before) 0.104 0.028
(0.318) (0.332)
Pre-election auditing (at least 12 months before) × -0.248 0.025
above median corruption (0.199) (0.223)
Pre-election auditing (between 3 and 12 months before) × 0.632** 0.739***
above median corruption (0.252) (0.280)
Pre-election auditing (between 0 and 3 months before) × -0.150 0.006
above median corruption (0.420) (0.438)
Above median corruption -0.044 0.072 -0.076 -0.026
(0.112) (0.130) (0.126) (0.152)
F-test inter 0.052 0.041 0.014 0.105
R2 0.377 0.380 0.321 0.322
N observations 1695 1695 1695 1695
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Average years of education of candidates - as a city councilor - from the
incumbent coalition. Corruption is the share of the amount of the audited budget involved in general viola-
tions. Municipality controls include: dummy party incumbent PT, ln(population), income, gini coefficient,
share of population with a secondary degree, share of population employed, share of population working
in agriculture, share of population working in industry share of population working in commerce, share of
population working in transport, share of population working in service and share of population working
in the public administration. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
Overall, our main result points to the effect of information on shaping the selec-
tion of political candidates. Given the institutional background of the case at study,
our preferred interpretation of the empirical evidence is that political parties, rather
than politicians, do react to the expected electoral shocks. On the one hand, they
increase the quality of candidates in municipalities where elections become more
difficult (i.e., where a severe report has been released) and they need to increase
their popularity. This is in line with previous research showing that parties select
better candidates when they need them, namely during more competitive elections
(Galasso and Nannicini, 2011; Mattozzi and Merlo, 2015). Importantly, this intu-
ition is supported by the suggestive results of Table A.1 and other more accurate
studies showing that educated individuals are more likely to be elected (Dal Bó
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et al., 2017). On the other hand, elections become less risky when the local gov-
ernment experiences a positive shock, such as reporting no or little corruption. In
this case, parties might decide to reduce the number of high-ability individuals if
they are costly. For example, this is possible if the party shares rents with selected
candidates, and this rent is higher the lower the public motivation (Besley, 2007), or
if the party has to supplement candidates’ salaries, as high-ability individuals have a
higher reservation wage (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2015). In our context, as highlighted
in Table A.1, more educated candidates tend to receive a higher direct economical
support from political parties.
Below, we propose additional analyses that complement the previous findings.
We only report results that focus on parties that support the incumbent, as we have
already shown the absence of effects for the challengers.
2.6.2. Additional Analysis
A Test on the Role of Political Parties
Although we believe our results can likely be explained by parties’ strategic be-
haviors, we cannot rule out the possibility that they are also influenced by changes
in the supply of politicians (i.e., the pool of individuals willing to run for office).
This potential effect is already partially reduced because our treated municipalities
cannot select individuals who are external to the party. In other words, the pool
of potential candidates is predetermined with respect to the treatment. Still, even
within this sample of individuals, an effect could be expected. However, in princi-
ple, citizen−candidate models would predict results that are opposite to our findings
(Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996). For instance, one might
expect high-ability individuals to have even lower incentives to enter politics after a
political scandal. Similarly, it is hard to explain why high-ability candidates would
refuse to stand for election in a municipality that appears to have a functioning ad-
ministration, where it would be easier to be elected. Therefore, the effect of the
disclosure of the audit report on individuals’ willingness to enter politics will, if
anything, adjust the size of our coefficients downward.
To provide additional support to our interpretation, we test the heterogeneity of
the estimated effect with respect to the power structure of the mayor’s party. As
explained in Section 2.3.2, in centralized parties top and mid-level party leaders are
the decision-makers, while ordinary members have a greater voice in decentralized
parties. Therefore, we expect that changes in the supply side of politicians would
affect our results mostly when the popularity shock hits a decentralized party. In
other words, it is easier for individuals who are willing to run for office to enter the
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pool of candidates of a decentralized rather than a centralized party.
Table 2.7.: Audit releases and the quality of candidates - party organization
All candidates New candidates
Centralized Decentralized Centralized Decentralized
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-selection auditing -0.374 -0.260 -0.574*** -0.063
(0.246) (0.273) (0.275) (0.323)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.858** 0.633 0.962*** 0.240
above median corruption (0.373) (0.430) (0.401) (0.505)
Above median corruption -0.123 -0.169 -0.110 -0.151
(0.147) (0.190) (0.170) (0.200)
F-test inter 0.151 0.513 0.102 0.887
R2 0.334 0.529 0.292 0.489
N observations 758 437 758 437
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Average years of education of candidates - as a city councilor
- from the incumbent coalition. Corruption is the share of the amount of the audited budget
involved in general violations. Municipality controls include: ln(population), income, gini co-
efficient, share of population with a secondary degree, share of population employed, share of
population working in agriculture, share of population working in industry share of population
working in commerce, share of population working in transport, share of population working in
service and share of population working in the public administration. Standard errors clustered
at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
We operationalize such a measure of party organization by following Guarnieri
(2011)’s definition and consider parties to be decentralized if they are defined as
polyarchic, and centralized if they are classified as either oligarchic or monocratic.
We investigate the potential presence of a heterogeneous effect by splitting the sam-
ple into two groups depending on the incumbent mayor’s party of affiliation and
running separate regressions.32 Table 2.7 presents the results from these regres-
sions. In Columns (1) and (3) we consider municipalities governed by centralized
parties (i.e., PSDB, PDT, DEM, PTB and PP), while in Columns (2) and (4) we use
the sample of municipalities ruled by decentralized parties (i.e., PT and PMDB).
The results tend to confirm our intuition. Indeed, we find a significant change in the
education of the selected candidates only when the incumbent hit by the popularity
shock was affiliated with a centralized party. Column (1) suggests that the pres-
ence of a positive shock decreases the quality of the pool of candidates by nearly
4 months of education (coeff. −0.374), though the coefficient is not significant. A
negative shock significantly increases the level of education by about 6 months of
schooling (coeff. 0.858− 0.374 = 0.484). Column (3) reports similar results for
freshman candidates. In this case, a significant, though negative, effect on candi-
32It is worth highlighting that the mayor’s party of affiliation in a given municipality is not ran-
domly assigned, thus the following results are not intended to establish causal relationships.
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date quality is also observed for positive popularity shocks. In Columns (2) and
(4), in which we limit the analysis to decentralized parties, none of the coefficient
estimates is significantly different from 0. The signs are coherent with previous
findings, but the coefficients are smaller in size.
Alternative Dependent Variables
We first repeat our main analysis on a different measure of candidates quality. That
is, instead of using candidates’ level of education we focus on candidates’ job
(Besley et al., 2017). We estimated each candidate’s salary based on the average
national salary of her profession, which we used to compute coalitions’ average
salary. We used the logarithm of the average income of the incumbent coalition
as the dependent variable. We report these new results in Columns (1) and (6) of
Table 2.8. Both columns report very similar results: a negative popularity shock
significantly increases the average income of the pool of candidates. The average
income increase by 7.6% (coeff. 0.117− 0.041 = 0.076) among all candidates and
9.6% (coeff. 0.157− 0.061 = 0.096) in the sample of freshman. Hence our results
are confirmed by this alternative measure of ability for the case of a negative shock.
However, using this measure, we cannot confirm that a positive popularity shock
affects candidates’ selection.
Second, we check whether the effect of the disclosure on candidates’ average
level of education was driven by a general increase (or decrease) in the quality of the
pool of candidates or whether it came from the selection of a few very good (or bad)
candidates. Therefore, in Columns (2) and (7) of Table 2.8 we estimate Equation
(2.2) by using the median level of education of candidates for city councilor as a
dependent variable. The estimates reveal that the median level of education is also
significantly affected, in the same direction as in the main analysis. In particular, the
disclosure of a positive report decreases the level of median education by 5 months
(coeff −0.431), while it increases by 3 months (coeff. 0.690−0.431 = 0.259) when
the report is negative. The point estimates are similar when looking at freshmen
candidates. This is consistent with a general change in the composition of the pool
of candidates.
Third, we replicate the principal analysis looking at the education of mayoral
candidates. Therefore, the regression reported in Column (3) of Table 2.8 considers
only municipalities in which the party of the incumbent mayor decided to present a
candidate (either the incumbent mayor or a new candidate) in the next election. In
Column (8) we focus on the sub-sample of new candidates. The main coefficients
are not statistically significantly different from 0, but their direction is consistent
35
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with the results for candidates for city councilors.33 The insignificant effect could
be driven by two characteristics of the mayoral race that make the statistical test
weaker. First, there is low variability in the pool of candidates from one term to
the next, as many mayors can run for re-election. This is not an issue if we look
33Recall that for mayor, instead of looking at the coalition, we focus on party affiliation.
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at the results in Column (8), which pertain to new candidates. Indeed, the effects
are larger than those reported in Column (3) for incumbent mayors. The second
characteristic that could be driving the insignificant effect is the limited variability
in the level of education of mayoral candidates: they are usually highly educated,
particularly compared to the general population and city councilors (see Table 3.1).
Finally, we explore the possibility that the disclosure might also affect other can-
didate characteristics − namely age and gender, which have been analyzed in pre-
vious studies on political selection (Esteve-Volart and Bagues, 2012; Daniele and
Geys, 2015; De Paola et al., 2010). We consider the average age of candidates and
the share of female candidates as dependent variables. Our findings, reported in
Columns (4 and 9) and (5 and 10) of Table 2.8, do not highlight any substantial
change concerning these characteristics.34
Timing of the Disclosure
In this section, we test the heterogeneity of the effect of the disclosure depending
on when it occurred to determine whether the effect was mainly due to municipali-
ties in which the audit report was released close to the end of the selection process.
However, it could also be that audits released earlier have the strongest effect be-
cause the incumbent would have longer to change the selection of candidates. For
this analysis we estimate the following regression separately for the sub-samples of





βτ Tist×1(t= τ)+ δXi+γs+λt+ εist, (2.3)
where Tist interacts with a set of dummies for each trimester of the treatment
period. We report the results of these estimates in Figure 2.2. In the left panel we
display point estimates and (95%) confidence intervals from a regression limited to
the sample of municipalities in which audit reports revealed high levels of corrup-
tion, while in the right panel the analysis is constrained to municipalities with low
levels of corruption reported in their audit.
While all coefficients are borderline insignificant, we can draw two interesting
implications. First, the difference between the point estimates from the two groups
of municipalities remains relatively stable over time.
Second, the level of education of the selected candidates is higher the closer to
the election the report is disclosed. This is true regardless of the report’s severity.
Thus, for instance, auditing disclosures that took place from 3 months to 1 month
34We also tested whether the disclosure affects the share of freshmen elected candidates. Also in
this case, we did not find any significant effect (results available upon request).
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Time from the deadline
(b) Low corruption
Note: The y-axis is heterogeneity of the effect of the disclosure and the x-axis represents when the disclosure
occurred.
Figure 2.2.: Timing of the release - high and low corruption sub samples
before the candidate list deadline had no effect on education when they revealed
low levels of corruption, but had a large positive effect in municipalities with high
levels of corruption. Hence, for a policy maker that aims at improving the overall
candidates’ quality would be optimal to concentrate the auditing disclosure closer
to the election. By doing so, it should avoid the unintended negative effect on
candidates’ quality coming from the disclosure of positive reports occurred far from
the election day.
Electoral Results and Local Media
The mass media are the main channel through which citizens are informed about
politicians’ behavior (Enikolopov et al., 2011). Indeed, the effect of a popularity
shock on the electoral results varies depending on the availability and accessibility
of sources of information (Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Costas-Pérez et al., 2012). If
the results shown so far come from parties that act in anticipation of the potential
impact of the audit report on the electoral results, we should also find that parties’
reactions depend on the presence of local media. Therefore, we expect audit reports
to have a greater effect on the quality of candidates where citizens have easier access
to information. To test this hypothesis, we follow Ferraz and Finan (2008) and
account for the presence of local radio stations to characterize the different degrees
of media penetration across municipalities. Therefore, we provide estimates by
separately considering (1) municipalities that have at least one local AM/FM radio
station and (2) municipalities with no local radio stations.35
Initially, we look at the impact of the audit reports on electoral outcomes. It is
35Similarly to what already discuss in section 2.6.2, media presence in a given municipality is not
randomly assigned, which implies the following results are not intended to establish causal links.
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important to emphasize that this analysis adds to previous findings about the effect
of the Brazilian auditing policy on electoral results since, to our knowledge, we are
the first to examine how the disclosure of corruption might also effect city council
elections.36 Hence, we replicate the baseline model using the Share of Seats won
by the incumbent’s coalition as a dependent variable. We first study the whole sam-
ple and then split it depending on whether municipalities have local radio stations.
The results are reported in Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 2.9. The coefficients
of interest are only significant when looking at municipalities where citizens have
greater access to information. On the one hand, Column (2) shows that in munici-
palities where the disclosure of a positive report occurs during the selection period,
the parties supporting the incumbent mayor win 5% more seats, while if the report
is negative they win 5% fewer seats.37 On the other hand, Columns (1) and (3)
suggest that, on average (and in the absence of a media presence) audits have very
little effect on the electoral results. We can draw three important implications from
these results. First, we can confirm that local media play an essential role in the
accountability process. Second, the publication of the audit reports has a real effect
on the election. This is a crucial element as in order for parties to react to the results
of the audit report, they have to expect that voters care enough about the contents
of the report to change how they vote. Third, voters still punish corrupt parties in
elections even if they could select better candidates. Indeed, the electoral reward of
a positive report is not affected by a potential decrease in the quality of candidates.
We then apply the same procedure to our baseline estimation. In Column (4) we
report the same results as Column (4) from Table 2.4, while Columns (5) and (6)
report the results for the samples of municipalities with and without local radio,
respectively. In municipalities with radio stations, when the disclosure of the report
provides a positive signal (i.e., low corruption) there is a decrease in the average
years of schooling of all candidates of a bit less than 7 months (coeff. −0.582),
while there is an increase in education of 3 months when the report provides a
negative signal (coeff. 0.845−0.582 = 0.263). The coefficients are of a similar size
when we consider either all candidates or only new candidates (Column 2). When
we focus on municipalities with no local radio stations, Columns (3) and (4), the
effect is either not significant or borderline significant and the reported coefficients
are also smaller.
36Ferraz and Finan (2008) show that corrupt mayors have a lower probability of being re-elected,
while Muço (2016) finds that voters also reduce their support of a corrupt incumbent mayor’s party
in presidential elections.
37If we replicate this analysis and add to our treated municipalities those in which the report is
disclosed between the end of the selection period and election day, we have slightly different results.
While the punishment for having a negative report is significant and of a similar magnitude, there is
no electoral reward associated with receiving a positive report.
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Table 2.9.: Audit releases, electoral results and the quality of candidates by media
presence
Share of seats won Education of candidates
All Local Radio No Local Radio All Local Radio No Local Radio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-selection auditing 0.011 0.053** -0.019 -0.378** -0.582*** -0.275
(0.018) (0.026) (0.025) (0.172) (0.182) (0.266)
Pre-selection auditing × -0.031 -0.110*** 0.024 0.724*** 0.845*** 0.578*
above median corruption (0.024) (0.034) (0.033) (0.235) (0.304) (0.340)
Above median corruption 0.008 0.013 0.008 -0.017 -0.055 0.029
(0.010) (0.016) (0.014) (0.097) (0.134) (0.141)
F-test inter 0.520 0.006 0.707 0.012 0.006 0.240
R2 0.146 0.188 0.134 0.379 0.427 0.289
N observations 1695 730 965 1695 730 965
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Share of seats won by the incumbent coalition in columns (1-3) and Average
years of education of candidates - as a city councilor - from the incumbent coalition in columns (4-6). Corruption
is the share of the amount of the audited budget involved in general violations. Municipality controls include:
dummy party incumbent PT, population, income, Gini coefficient, share of population with a secondary degree,
share of population employed, share of population working in agriculture, share of population working in in-
dustry, share of population working in commerce, share of population working in transport, share of population
working in service and share of population working in the public administration. Standard errors clustered at the
municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
Overall, the results seem to be coherent with our intuition, as the effect of the au-
dit report appears to be larger, and statistically significantly different from 0 at the
1% level, only in municipalities where citizens are likely to be more exposed to the
media (i.e., those with local radio stations).38 Interestingly, the substantial change
in the quality of the pool of candidates does not seem to be enough to significantly
change the electoral results.39 These results are consistent with recent studies pro-
viding evidence that voters do not seem to be affected by ex-ante justifiable parties’
reactions to popularity shocks (Adams, 2012).
2.7. Identification Checks
2.7.1. Sample Selection
In our analysis we always constrain the sample to municipalities in which the in-
cumbent’s coalition decides to run for election. In other words, our sample is not
random. This might produce a self-selection bias if the disclosure of the audit re-
38We apply the same strategy by replicating the estimates in Table 2.8. The main findings do not
seem to be dependent on the presence of the media, except if the dependent variable is the median
level of education; in that case, similarly to the results of this section, the effect appears to be more
pronounced where local radio stations are available.
39In Appendix B we also provide results indicating the absence of an effect on the average quality
of the elected candidates.
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port affects the stability of the coalition and hence the decision to run for office.
To account for this potential issue, we test whether there is any difference in the
probability of being part of our sample between municipalities in which the audit-
ing report was disclosed during the selection period (i.e., the treated group) or at
other times (i.e., the control group). Therefore, we take the sample provided by
Brollo et al. (2013) which includes all municipalities selected in the first 29 lotter-
ies. From this larger sample we keep the municipalities used so far in the paper
as well as those that were only excluded from the analysis because the incumbent
party did not present any candidates. We then create a dummy variable equal to 1
if the municipality was part of our sample, and 0 otherwise. We replicate the same
procedure for the sample used in the mayoral election analysis. The whole sample
would be composed of 1,858 municipality-term observations, which excludes only
163 observations from the analysis. We report in Table 2.10 the formal test of the
potential presence of self-selection bias, including a number of t-tests showing that
being treated does not affect the average probability of being part of our sample.
This is also true when we look separately at the samples with high and low levels
corruption. In conclusion, this analysis suggests that a coalition’s decision to run
for re-election is uncorrelated with the treatment, and that this is true for different
levels of corruption.
Table 2.10.: Sample selection
Control group Treated group Difference
(1) (2) (3)
All
Re-run city council (inc) 0.911 0.919 -0.008
Re-run mayor all (inc) 0.648 0.621 0.028
Re-run mayor new (inc) 0.362 0.334 0.028
High corruption
Re-run city council (inc) 0.890 0.913 -0.023
Re-run mayor all (inc) 0.670 0.649 0.021
Re-run mayor new (inc) 0.367 0.351 0.016
Low corruption
Re-run city council (inc) 0.930 0.919 0.004
Re-run mayor all (inc) 0.626 0.601 0.025
Re-run mayor new (inc) 0.356 0.322 0.034
Notes: This table reports differences between the control (1502 obser-
vations) and the treated (356 observations) group about the mean prob-
ability of being part of the sample of municipalities we use in the dif-
ferent sections of the paper. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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2.7.2. Robustness of the Corruption Measure
Another potential concern about our identification is that our corruption measure
may be serving as a proxy for other municipal features. In fact, while municipalities
are randomly assigned to either a treated or control group, the level of corruption
is not random and might depend on specific municipal conditions. For instance,
corruption is potentially higher where there is extensive use of public investments,
which usually occurs in bigger and richer cities. If this is true, we may be estimat-
ing how the release of an audit (regardless of its severity) has a differential effect
on candidates’ education, for example in small vs. big or poor vs. rich cities. To
help assess this potential issue, we replicate our baseline estimations and include
additional interaction terms, where we multiply the treatment status dummy by a
set of covariates that could be expected to be correlated with the level of corrup-
tion: Population, Income, Education and Share of Pop. in Public Administration.
The results, presented in Table 2.11, reduce our concerns: in all the estimates, the
interaction between the treatment status variable and the level of corruption is al-
ways significantly different from 0 and the coefficient is relatively stable across the
different specifications. Moreover, the interaction terms that include the covariates
never reach the conventional level of significance, whether analyzed in separate es-
timations (Columns 1 to 4) or jointly (Column 5).40 Overall, this suggests that our
measure of corruption is unlikely to be proxying for other municipal characteris-
tics.41
2.8. Conclusion
This paper provides some of the first evidence on the effect of information about
government behavior on the selection of political candidates. Using city council
election data from Brazil, we find that an unexpected positive shock regarding the
government’s honesty has a detrimental effect on the quality of candidates put for-
ward by its coalition in the next election. By contrast, it selects better candidates
when there is a negative shock. Indeed, we show that these effects are present
whether we use the average or median years of candidates’ schooling. Importantly,
the results of our analysis are of similar size when focusing only on freshmen can-
didates. Our findings also show that the accessibility of information plays a role,
40We find similar results when the interaction term instead uses a dummy for the top 50% per-
centile or dummies for the different quartiles.
41Note that in this table, while the interpretation of the interaction term "Pre-selection auditing
X above median corruption" does not change, the uninteracted coefficent "Pre-selection auditing"
cannot be interpreted as in the previous tables, as in this case, we interact it with more than one
variable in the same regression.
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Table 2.11.: Robustness of the corruption measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pre-selection auditing -0.227 -0.686** -0.969* -0.318 0.128
(0.870) (0.291) (0.499) (0.265) (1.014)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.725*** 0.781*** 0.798*** 0.716*** 0.806***
above median corruption (0.234) (0.239) (0.248) (0.236) (0.246)
Pre-selection auditing × -0.016 -0.108
ln(population) (0.087) (0.100)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.000 0.000
income (0.000) (0.000)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.157 0.130
education (0.110) (0.161)
Pre-selection auditing × -0.025 -0.081
pop. in pub. administration (0.077) (0.083)
Above median corruption -0.017 -0.025 -0.026 -0.016 -0.029
(0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097)
F-test inter 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.002
R2 0.379 0.379 0.379 0.379 0.380
N observations 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the average years of education of candidates - as a city
councilor - from the incumbent coalitions. Municipality controls include: dummy party
incumbent PT, ln(population), income, Gini coefficient, share of population with a sec-
ondary degree, share of population employed, share of population working in agriculture,
share of population working in industry share of population working in commerce, share
of population working in transport, share of population working in service and share of
population working in the public administration. Standard errors clustered at the munici-
pality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
as our results are clearer in municipalities that have radio stations. However, other
candidate characteristics, such as the share of female candidates and the average age
of the pool of candidates, are not affected. We also find that, despite the changes
in the quality of candidates, neither the electoral results nor the types of elected
representatives seem to be significantly affected.
Overall, our analysis first provides one of the few causal estimates supporting the
predictions of recent studies showing that political parties react to specific character-
istics of electoral competition (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011; Mattozzi and Merlo,
2015). Second, we show that information releases might have indirect effects on
electoral outcomes. In light of our results, it could be plausible that studies showing
a change in support for the incumbent after a popularity shock might underestimate
the shock’s pure effect on voters’ preferences, as their voting decisions might also
have been affected by changes to the quality of the pool of candidates. Finally, we
find that the Brazilian policy analyzed in this study does not help improve the quality
of elected politicians. On the contrary, in the absence of corruption we observe that
the incumbent party selects lower-ability candidates. In other words, parties select
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lower-ability candidates when it is easier to win the election. However, our results
also suggest that a way to account for this unintended effect of the anti-corruption
measures on the dynamics of political accountability would be to disseminate all
reports closer to end of the selection period. Indeed, only in this case the disclosure
of positive audit reports has no consequences on candidates’ quality.
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Table A.1.: Education, voting and party contribution
Electoral success Party contributions
(1) (2)
Low level of education 0.027 0.225*
(0.020) (0.026)
Medium level of education 0.070*** 0.422**
(0.020) (0.023)







N observations 243,058 243,058
Municipality FE Yes Yes
Term FE Yes Yes
Notes: These results come from a sample of all candidates as
city councilor for which we have information on the level of ed-
ucation and that received party’s contributions. The dependent
variable is, in column (1), ln(number of votes) received by a can-
didate running for a seat in the city council, while in column (2) is
ln(amount of party’s contribution) to a candidate campaign. The
coefficients on education have as a reference group the candidates
with no education. Low level of education is a dummy indicating
whether a candidate maximum achievement in school was to start
or complete the “ensino fundamental” (i.e., from 1 to 9 years of
schooling). Median level of education indicates whether a candi-
date maximum achievement in school was to start or complete the
“ensino mÃl’dio” (i.e., from 10 to 12 years of schooling), while
high level of education indicates whether a candidate maximum
achievement in school was to start or complete the “ensino su-
perior” (i.e., from 13 to 17 years of schooling). Standard errors
clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p
< 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.2.: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Municipalities sample
Average education - n. of years (incumbent) 9.938 2.186 1 17 1,695
Average education - n. of years (challenger) 9.805 1.675 3.571 14.258 1,695
Average education of freshmen - n. of years (incumbent) 9.919 2.331 1 17 1,695
Average education of freshmen - n. of years (challenger) 9.734 1.687 3 14.3 1,695
Average education of re-running - n. of years (incumbent) 10.137 3.298 1 17 1,466
Average income (incumbent) 1,155.935 455.112 88.745 4,207.949 1,665
Average income of freshmen (incumbent) 1,132.868 499.168 88.745 4,207.949 1,657
Mandatory school (incumbent) 0.678 0.231 0 1 1,695
Mandatory school of freshmen (incumbent) 0.679 0.247 0 1 1,695
Median education - n. of years (incumbent) 9.882 2.891 1 17 1,695
Average age (incumbent) 43.542 4.092 23.5 59 1,694
Share of female (incumbent) 0.211 0.133 0 1 1,695
Median education of freshmen - n. of years (incumbent) 9.822 3.058 1 17 1,695
Average age of freshmen (incumbent) 42.871 4.662 22 67 1,694
Share of female of freshmen (incumbent) 0.237 0.166 0 1 1,695
Average education elected - n. of years (incumbent) 10.472 3.007 1 17 1,540
Average age elected (incumbent) 42.964 6.348 22 69 1,540
Share of female elected (incumbent) 0.132 0.212 0 1 1,540
Mayor average education - n. of years (incumbent) 13.257 4.013 1 17 1,195
Mayor average education freshmen - n. of years (incumbent) 13.206 4.015 1 17 663
Decentralized party 0.305 0.461 0 1 1431
Share of seats won (incumbent) 0.330 0.196 0 1 1,695
Corruption 0.048 0.1 0 0.905 1,695
Media 0.431 0.495 0 1 1,695
Dummy party incumbent PT 0.212 0.409 0 1 1,695
Population 25,936.923 48,667.258 795 461,534 1,695
Income 580.174 317.944 80.967 3,062.481 1,695
Share of pop. employed 37.641 8.202 11.499 75.59 1,695
Gini coefficient 0.560 0.068 0.344 0.796 1,695
Municipality average education 3.552 1.088 0.746 7.711 1,695
Share of pop. in public administration 2.126 1.202 0.122 9.147 1,695
Share of pop. in agriculture 16.467 9.856 0.041 64.043 1,695
Share of pop. in industry 3.952 3.69 0 34.637 1,695
Share of pop. in service 6.675 2.763 0.257 18.756 1,695
Share of pop. in commerce 7.535 3.848 0.26 27.764 1,695
Share of pop. in transport 1.167 0.695 0 5.593 1,695
Share of pop. in service 6.675 2.763 0.257 18.756 1,695
Rerun (coalition) 0.917 0.275 0 1 1,858
Rerun (mayor/ first term) 0.607 0.489 0 1 1,256
Individuals sample
No education 0.025 0.157 0 1 243,058
Low level education 0.375 0.484 0 1 243,058
Medium level education 0.364 0.481 0 1 243,058
High level education 0.235 0.424 0 1 243,058
Party’s contributions 989.35 6,444.851 0.01 1,081,211.875 243,058
Number of votes 305.994 1,110.917 1 165,880 243,058
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Table A.3.: Audit releases and the quality of candidates - restricted sample
All candidates New candidates
Linear Median Quartile Linear Median Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-selection auditing -0.092 -0.026 -0.144 -0.451** -0.496** -0.257* -0.558*** -0.634***
(0.140) (0.120) (0.137) (0.182) (0.202) (0.149) (0.202) (0.222)
Pre-selection auditing × 1.608 2.146*
corruption (1.030) (1.119)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.749*** 0.797***
above median corruption (0.242) (0.268)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.229 0.430
second quartile of corruption (0.402) (0.470)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.713** 0.805**
third quartile of corruption (0.322) (0.342)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.845*** 0.924***
fourth quartile of corruption (0.288) (0.326)
Corruption 0.331 0.114
(0.510) (0.552)
Above median corruption -0.048 -0.081
(0.113) (0.127)
Second quartile -0.022 0.080
(0.224) (0.231)
Third quartile -0.115 -0.106
(0.135) (0.158)
Fourth quartile 0.012 -0.016
(0.146) (0.167)
F-test inter 0.173 0.012 0.067 0.115 0.017 0.099
R2 0.123 0.375 0.378 0.381 0.382 0.315 0.317 0.319
N observations 1385 1385 1385 1385 1385 1385 1385 1385
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: These results come from a sample where we exclude municipalities for which the audit report was pub-
lished more than 12 months before the election. The dependent variable is Average years of education of candi-
dates - as a city councilor - from the incumbent coalition. Corruption is the share of the amount of the audited
budget involved in general violations. Municipality controls include: dummy party incumbent PT, ln(population),
income, gini coefficient, share of population with a secondary degree, share of population employed, share of pop-
ulation working in agriculture, share of population working in industry share of population working in commerce,
share of population working in transport, share of population working in service and share of population working
in the public administration. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p <
0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.4.: Audit releases and the quality of candidates - old incumbent coalition
All candidates New candidates
Linear Median Quartile Linear Median Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-selection auditing -0.102 -0.083 -0.169 -0.323** -0.358** -0.182* -0.370*** -0.402***
(0.112) (0.093) (0.105) (0.137) (0.154) (0.106) (0.139) (0.155)
Pre-selection auditing × 1.224 1.311
corruption (0.878) (0.905)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.414** 0.482**
above median corruption (0.187) (0.189)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.179 0.164
second quartile of corruption (0.320) (0.334)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.253 0.319
third quartile of corruption (0.245) (0.247)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.622*** 0.686***
fourth quartile of corruption (0.229) (0.231)
Corruption 0.097 0.009
(0.409) (0.416)
Above median corruption -0.006 -0.028
(0.086) (0.086)
Second quartile 0.092 0.080
(0.171) (0.172)
Third quartile 0.058 0.038
(0.104) (0.103)
Fourth quartile -0.040 -0.066
(0.110) (0.111)
F-test inter 0.279 0.073 0.190 0.278 0.037 0.124
R2 0.126 0.419 0.420 0.421 0.422 0.417 0.418 0.419
N observations 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Average years of education of candidates - as a city councilor - from the old
incumbent coalition. Corruption is the share of the amount of the audited budget involved in general violations.
Municipality controls include: dummy party incumbent PT, ln(population), income, gini coefficient, share of
population with a secondary degree, share of population employed, share of population working in agriculture,
share of population working in industry share of population working in commerce, share of population working
in transport, share of population working in service and share of population working in the public administration.
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.5.: Audit releases and the quality of candidates - mandatory school
All candidates New candidates
Linear Median Quartile Linear Median Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-selection auditing 0.000 0.002 -0.007 -0.043** -0.053** -0.018 -0.054** -0.060**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.021) (0.024) (0.016) (0.023) (0.026)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.124 0.189
corruption (0.107) (0.119)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.078*** 0.086***
above median corruption (0.027) (0.029)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.056 0.035
second quartile of corruption (0.045) (0.053)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.071** 0.080**
third quartile of corruption (0.034) (0.035)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.102*** 0.102***
fourth quartile of corruption (0.034) (0.037)
Corruption 0.036 0.048
(0.052) (0.057)
Above median corruption -0.003 0.000
(0.011) (0.012)
Second quartile -0.015 0.005
(0.021) (0.022)
Third quartile -0.001 0.003
(0.013) (0.015)
Fourth quartile -0.010 -0.000
(0.015) (0.016)
F-test inter 0.320 0.023 0.146 0.123 0.016 0.155
R2 0.111 0.286 0.288 0.291 0.292 0.251 0.253 0.254
N observations 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Share of candidates which finished mandatory school - as a city councilor - from
the incumbent coalition. Corruption is the share of the amount of the audited budget involved in general viola-
tions. Municipality controls include: dummy party incumbent PT, ln(population), income, gini coefficient, share
of population with a secondary degree, share of population employed, share of population working in agriculture,
share of population working in industry share of population working in commerce, share of population working
in transport, share of population working in service and share of population working in the public administration.
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.6.: Audit releases and the quality of candidates by electoral term
Term 2001-2004 Term 2005-2008
Incumbent Challenger Incumbent Challenger
All New All New All New All New
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-selection auditing -0.612*** -0.711*** -0.088 -0.148 0.157 0.112 0.052 -0.007
(0.227) (0.256) (0.152) (0.162) (0.254) (0.275) (0.148) (0.153)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.783** 0.819** 0.153 0.175 0.331 0.280 -0.197 -0.202
above median corruption (0.304) (0.339) (0.204) (0.212) (0.368) (0.405) (0.213) (0.219)
Above median corruption 0.007 0.030 -0.040 -0.074 -0.213 -0.164 0.111 0.183
(0.115) (0.127) (0.081) (0.083) (0.182) (0.209) (0.119) (0.120)
F-test inter 0.032 0.028 0.891 0.721 0.237 0.546 0.718 0.337
R2 0.389 0.332 0.518 0.496 0.375 0.321 0.515 0.508
N observations 1142 1142 1142 1142 553 553 553 553
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Average years of education of candidates as a city councilor. Corruption is the
share of the amount of the audited budget involved in general violations. Municipality controls include: dummy
party incumbent PT, population, income, Gini coefficient, share of population with a secondary degree, share of
population employed, share of population working in agriculture, share of population working in industry, share
of population working in commerce, share of population working in transport, share of population working in
service and share of population working in the public administration. Standard errors clustered at the municipality
level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Pre-selection auditing 0.183 -0.185 -0.001
(0.226) (0.289) (0.314)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.809
corruption (1.338)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.732*
above median corruption (0.400)
Pre-selection auditing × -0.860
second quartile of corruption (0.764)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.177
third quartile of corruption (0.546)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.841*
fourth quartile of corruption (0.471)
Corruption -0.521
(0.816)








F-test inter 0.646 0.265 0.245
R2 0.229 0.231 0.234
N observations 1466 1466 1466
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is Average years of edu-
cation of candidates - as a city councilor - from the in-
cumbent coalition. Corruption is the share of the amount
of the audited budget involved in general violations. Mu-
nicipality controls include: dummy party incumbent PT,
ln(population), income, gini coefficient, share of popula-
tion with a secondary degree, share of population employed,
share of population working in agriculture, share of popu-
lation working in industry share of population working in
commerce, share of population working in transport, share
of population working in service and share of population
working in the public administration. Standard errors clus-
tered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1, ** p
< 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
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Appendix B Appendix - Elected Candidates
As outlined above, city councilors are elected using an open-list proportional sys-
tem, and citizens still have a say over who will eventually be chosen. Here we
analyze whether the disclosure of the report, affecting candidates’ selection, has
also an effect on the elected candidates. This may happen because selecting more-
(or less-) educated candidates could lead to more- (or less-) educated elected politi-
cians. To do so, we use the usual specification and consider the average years of
schooling of candidates who were elected from the incumbent coalition as a depen-
dent variable. We also provide alternative results that examine the share of females
and the average age of the elected candidates. We report the estimated coefficients
in Table B.1. The main coefficients in all three columns are not significantly differ-
ent from 0, though the signs of the first column are in line with the once from the
main analysis.
Table B.1.: Audit releases and elected candidates
Education Age Female
(1) (2)
Pre-selection auditing -0.102 -1.031* 0.018
(0.263) (0.609) (0.020)
Pre-selection auditing × 0.064 0.866 -0.030
above median corruption (0.351) (0.818) (0.028)
Above median corruption 0.033 0.082 0.010
(0.160) (0.367) (0.013)
F-test inter 0.965 0.342 0.696
R2 0.256 0.086 0.047
N observations 1540 1540 1540
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is average years of educa-
tion of elected candidates in column (1), average age of
elected candidates in column (2) and share of female of the
elected candidates in column (3). Corruption is the share of
the amount of the audited budget involved in general viola-
tions. Municipality controls include: dummy party incum-
bent PT, population, income, Gini coefficient, share of pop-
ulation with a secondary degree, share of population em-
ployed, share of population working in agriculture, share of
population working in industry share of population work-
ing in commerce, share of population working in transport,
share of population working in service and share of popula-
tion working in the public administration. Standard errors
clustered at the municipality level in parenthesis * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01.
However, it is difficult to assess whether voters are responding to the strategic
change in the composition of candidates a party chooses for its ticket/party list, as
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it is not possible to have a proper counter-factual. This would require comparing
municipalities that experienced a shock in which (by accident) the composition of
candidates did not change with municipalities hit by a shock where the composition
did change. Without such a comparison, it is difficult to draw conclusions about
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3. Voters Sometimes Provide the
Wrong Incentives §
3.1. Introduction
Democratic systems based on free elections are commonly accepted as one of the
most efficient means to form welfare-enhancing governments. A wide range of
models (Ferejohn, 1986; Persson et al., 1997; Besley and Burgess, 2002) suggest
that public officers implement optimal policies when they are selected and sanc-
tioned through universal suffrage. In this process, voters retrospectively evaluate
the performances of incumbents and punish or reward them in subsequent elec-
tions. If one assumes that voters’ preferences are tied to honesty, competence, and
effort and that voters hold politicians accountable for those attributes, politicians
have the incentive to behave accordingly. Democracy can produce inefficient poli-
cies, however, if voters’ choices provide misleading incentives for elected officials.
In this case, accountability plays a detrimental role and weakens the motives to im-
plement optimal welfare policies. For instance, in a context where a narrow elite
controls economic institutions and persists in power through patronage by distort-
ing the allocation of public resources, retrospective voting could slide society into a
slow-developing course (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). Understanding the circle
that connects retrospective voting behavior with policy outcomes is a major line of
research (Healy and Malhotra, 2013).
This study addresses this research topic by showing that voters could demand
clientelism.1 I find empirical evidence that an electorate rewards partisan alignment
between different tiers of the government in order to ensure the inflow of public
funds. A partisan alignment between the central government and local politicians
is a strong determinant of intergovernmental transfers. Voters may decide to settle
this connection to take advantage of the short-run benefits of patronage politics.
However, this relationship comes at the cost of encouraging the government to bias
the distribution of public resources toward party labels. Such behavior could be
§The paper in this chapter is single-authored.
1Defined as large-scale exchanges of targeted goods and favors between patrons and client with
a hierarchy of intermediaries (Fukuyama, 2014).
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translated as a failure of government efficiency and might lead to a long-run sub-
optimal equilibrium (Healy and Malhotra, 2009). In a desirable situation, voters
in such environments should condemn individualistic transactions that are more
costly than socially beneficial (Hicken and Simmons, 2008; Shin, 2015). However,
if voters demand it, elections could fall into a vicious circle of clientelism in which
voters from different localities do not cooperate and in which everyone ends up
worse off, similar to a Bertrand trap (Cabral and Villas-Boas, 2005).
The paper demonstrates such a relation by empirically studying voters’ reaction
to droughts, the government’s accountability when assigning drought mitigation
policies, and voters’ responses to this (perverse) accountability in a vote-buying
context known in Brazil as the drought industry.2 Investigating voters’ choices that
undermine social welfare is suitable in contexts where there are frequent natural
catastrophes because these events could lead to a situation where voters must make
a difficult decision. More specifically, considering a scenario in which political
alignment between tiers of government is already in place, voters face the following
dilemma after a shock of drought. Although getting rid of incumbent politicians
in elections should discipline governments into good performance, thereby blaming
the incumbent for a lack of policies that have resulted in permanent solutions, voting
for these incumbents may guarantee partisanship in the provision of palliative poli-
cies from other governmental levels. If citizens in vulnerable conditions who have
their standards of living diminished by natural disasters still show increased sup-
port for politicians in power because of political alliances, then this finding would
indicate a decision in favor of patronage politics rather than disciplining welfare-
enhancing governments. This dynamic is exactly what the paper shows; droughts
drive voters to plead for even more political alignment.
The dilemma faced by voters is based on three premises: 1) whether voters pun-
ish incumbents because of natural disasters, 2) whether voters reward governments
because of aid relief, and 3) whether governments bias the allocation of aid re-
lief. More precisely, the first hypothesis is that droughts alter political preferences
as voters blame politicians for worsening living conditions (Gasper and Reeves,
2011; Bruckner and Ciccone, 2011). This willingness to blame the political class
may arise either because governments have not implemented adaptation policies to
mitigate the effects of droughts or because governments are responsible for some
of the vulnerable social conditions exacerbated by this kind of natural disaster
(Quiroz Flores and Smith, 2013; Heersink et al., 2017). I analyze two types of
2The drought industry, or indústria da seca, is an expression used to refer to the clientelism
relationship between the elite (coronéis) and the peasants (flagelados) who exploit the humanitarian
collapse driven by droughts in Brazil to obtain electoral influence in exchange for votes for water
distribution. This term was first mentioned by Callado (1960). More details in Appendix A.
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Brazilian elections at the municipality level: presidential (1998, 2002, 2006, 2010)
and mayoral (2000, 2004, 2008, 2012). Implementing a fixed effects panel data
analysis, I find that voters indeed punish the incumbent party for droughts in elec-
tions. On average, the president’s party vote decreases by five percentage points,
and the mayor’s party vote decreases by seven percentage points.
The second hypothesis is that central governments are electorally rewarded for
distributing mitigation policies that aim to alleviate the misery triggered by water
scarcity. An increase in the public supply of water and food and infrastructure
investment in the affected areas may reduce economic losses and relieve the pain
of the population. Consequently, voter’s angriness against the political class could
be attenuated or even converted into popularity (Healy and Malhotra, 2010; Bechtel
and Hainmueller, 2011). In the same line, the paper shows that the adverse impact
of drought is, on average, completely compensated by the provision of palliative
and prevention policies in presidential elections but not in mayoral elections. The
results also indicate that voters are keenly aware that it is the central government
that grants the droughts aid relief and that voters react more positively to palliative
rather than preventive policies.
The third hypothesis is that governments tend to allocate intergovernmental trans-
fers strategically. If the central government has strong opportunistic electoral ob-
jectives, the government may distort the provision of aid relief in order to maximize
its chances of re-election (Arulampalam et al., 2009). Indeed, the nature of disaster
relief as an emergency expenditure creates room for discretionary allocations, and
disaster relief is frequently associated with misuse of public spending (Garrett and
Sobel, 2003; Cole et al., 2012). The capture of drought mitigation policies by the
government as a tool to influence electoral outcomes is at the heart of inefficient
resource allocation. Applying a flexible version of the regression discontinuity de-
sign (RDD) with heterogeneous effects proposed by Becker et al. (2013), I show
that before presidential elections, any aligned municipality is more likely to receive
palliative policy than the non-aligned ones. The effect is enormous and reaches al-
most 74 percentage points for droughts categorized as extreme. I do not find similar
opportunistic behavior with the provision of preventive policies or when the target
elections are for mayors.
The dynamics between the negative shock of droughts on elections and the polit-
ical use of mitigation policy converges to a predicament for the electorate, which in
turn allows for the assessment of voters’ choices. In one regard, disciplining gov-
ernment performance implies punishing politicians in power after a serious drought.
However, in the circumstance where there is already party symmetry between lo-
cal politicians and central government, punishing incumbents would extinguish the
political alignment. In this case, changing the incumbent party for the opposition
61
3. Voters Sometimes Provide the Wrong Incentives
parties would result in fewer chances for intergovernmental transfers coming from
the central government. If voters acknowledge the political alignment advantage to
the extent that they reward it or are even aware that there is a bias, incumbents have
no incentive to change the way they operate, which will perpetuate the problem.
As a result, disaster relief could become an institutionalized form of clientelism be-
tween governments and citizens, which in turn prevents the implementation of more
sustainable adaptation policies against droughts, as denounced in Nelson and Finan
(2009).
The main analysis adopts as empirical strategies both the fixed effects panel data
model and also the RDD with heterogeneous treatment effects. The study reveals
that voters reward party alignment in mayoral elections but that there is no evidence
of strategic voting during presidential elections. The reward for the partisan alliance
rises after the shock of a drought. I find that droughts increase the effect of political
alignment by approximately 8 percentage points in the vote share of the mayor’s
party. In presidential elections, however, voters do not seek alignment, and after a
severe drought, the vote share of the president’s party decreases by 12 percentage
points in aligned municipalities. This behavior may be explained by the fact that
voters care about their mayor being aligned with the president before presidential
elections (when this may be beneficial by enhancing the chances of obtaining a
palliative policy), but voters do not seem to care about the president being aligned
with the mayor in the period before mayoral elections (when the central government
seems to act less opportunistically).
The paper contributes by showing that voters can provide the wrong incentives.
The findings complement the existing literature on patronage politics (Shin, 2015;
Anderson et al., 2015). In particular, in a randomized control trial, Bobonis et al.
(2017) show that citizens granted a residential water cistern in drought-prone ar-
eas of Northeast Brazil are less likely to ask politicians for private benefits. This
paper supports their most important conclusion but differs in at least two impor-
tant aspects. First, while the above experiment is based on an intervention from an
international development agency, which means a third party that is independent
from the government-voter relationship, my analysis takes into account policies fi-
nanced by Brazilian governments. This difference is crucial because politicians
claim credit, which is a relevant intrinsic feature of the political economy of the
drought industry. Otherwise, there would be no incentive for discretionary resource
allocation, and government inefficiency would not exist. Distinct from Bobonis
et al. (2017) who, unsurprisingly, do not find that the delivery of cisterns directly
benefits politicians and conclude that political alignment plays no role, my findings
show that voters reward central governments for the provision of drought policy and
that the political alignment advantage is considerable in mayoral elections. In this
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sense, the findings of this paper are closer to those of Martinez-Bravo (2014), who
shows that villages in Indonesia with a village head who is prone to clientelism ex-
perience a stronger electoral alignment with the district-level government. That is,
those village heads are more likely to vote for the party that is politically aligned.
Second, this paper provides a notion of long-run patronage equilibrium. Instead
of analyzing a single electoral period for mayor, my data extend over a period that
captures four national elections and four municipal elections.
The paper is related and contributes to several branches of the literature. First, I
use an innovative measure of drought, the aridity index, which performs better than
the measures used in previous studies in Brazil (Rocha and Soares, 2015; Larreguy
and Monteiro, 2014). This measure is already commonly used in the hydrology
literature (Wolfe, 1997; Arora, 2002). Second, this work contributes to the voter
responsiveness literature by adding evidence that voters punish incumbents because
of natural disasters (Barnhart, 1925; Achen and Bartels, 2004; Gasper and Reeves,
2011; Cole et al., 2012; Fair et al., 2015) and reward them because of aid relief
(Healy and Malhotra, 2010; Fuchs and Rodriguez-Chamussy, 2014). However, this
paper opposes the previous work showing that the effect of aid relief is not strong
enough for a net increase in popularity (Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011; Gasper
and Reeves, 2011; Lazarev et al., 2014). Third, this paper extends the literature
that studies the strategic allocation of resources by central governments that in-
tend to maximize their electoral support (Downton and Pielke Jr, 2001; Solé-Ollé
and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008; Cohen and Werker, 2008; Brollo and Nannicini, 2012;
Larreguy and Monteiro, 2014). Furthermore, this work provides evidence that the
type of election matters for discretionary bias. Lastly, the paper contributes to the
literature that explores how retrospective voting influences policy outcomes (Healy
and Malhotra, 2013).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 gives a conceptual
framework. Section 3.3 presents the data. Sections 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 show the
results of the empirical analysis. Section 3.7 concludes. Appendix A gives an
overview of the institutional setting and explains the roots of the political anecdote
drought industry and its transition to the current situation. Appendix B shows the
robustness checks of the main analysis. Appendix C shows the RDD validation
graphs. Appendix D provides the data sources.
3.2. Framework
Consider a setting in which there are three agents: voters, the mayor, and the presi-
dent. Voters are subject to two types of time-separated elections: mayoral contests
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and presidential contests. In every election year, voters observe the past and make
a judgment related to government performance (retrospective voting) (Nordhaus,
1975), build expectations on what could maximize future benefits (forward-looking
voting) (Drazen and Eslava, 2010), and then decide to vote against or in favor of the
incumbent party. Retrospective voting depends on two observed events: drought
and mitigation policies against droughts. Politicians, in turn, study voter decisions
and adjust their objective function (Persson and Tabellini, 2002).
Voters blame incumbents for droughts
An extended period of water scarcity in a region affects local communities through
economic and health mechanisms (Girma Kebbede, 1988; Felbermayr and Gröschl,
2014; Rocha and Soares, 2015). In these communities, voters, who see themselves
in a worsened condition, are more likely to infer a low effort from incumbents and
blame them for the increase in population vulnerability.
One can argue that drought is an event that is beyond the influence of politicians
and that it is illogical to expect a voter to punish incumbents for reasons other than
government performance. However, the willingness to blame incumbents for natu-
ral disasters is valid under both of the following assumptions of voter information
about drought as an exogenous event from political decisions: fully aware and in-
sufficiently aware. In the case in which voters are fully aware that politicians in
power do not influence the incidence of droughts, voters may still blame incum-
bents for the lack of preparation for negative shocks. In the case in which voters are
insufficiently aware, voters may vote against the politician in office in subsequent
elections as the result of linking their lower standard of living to the performance of
the incumbent.
The economic literature suggests that there are at least two reasons, not mutually
exclusive, why voters may not disentangle economic outcomes originating from
exogenous shocks, such as droughts, from those resulting from political decisions.
The first reason entails a context with asymmetric information, where voters observe
the economic condition and mistakenly infer politicians’ quality and effort. The
second reason is attribution errors, where voters might be wrong about the causes
of economic conditions (Nordhaus, 1975; Wolfers, 2011; Bagues and Esteve-Volart,
2016). Along the same line of reasoning, one arrives at the following hypothesis to
be tested:
• Hypothesis 1: droughts have a negative impact on incumbents in elections.
The economic literature on natural disasters has previously addressed this issue.
For instance, by analyzing extreme weather events in India to examine the hypothe-
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sis that voters respond to events that are beyond a government’s control, Cole et al.
(2012) show that on average, incumbent parties that run for re-election lose approx-
imately three percent of the vote per one-standard deviation change in district-level
rainfall from the optimum level. Similar evidence of adverse effects on incum-
bent re-elections due to droughts can be found for the U.S. (Barnhart, 1925; Achen
and Bartels, 2004) and for Sub-Saharan African countries (Bruckner and Ciccone,
2011). Evidence for such adverse effects can also be found for other types of natural
disasters, such as floods (Arceneaux and Stein, 2006; Fair et al., 2015), tornadoes
(Healy and Malhotra, 2010), hurricane (Abney and Hill, 1966), and others (Ahlerup,
2013; Quiroz Flores and Smith, 2013; Lazarev et al., 2014).
Voters reward incumbents for aid relief
In contrast to droughts, the aid relief from governments may ease public dissat-
isfaction. Households that experience thirst and hunger have their living conditions
ameliorated when external agents send supplies of water and food. Consequentially,
voters might reward politicians in power (or just not punish them) because of the
responsiveness of politicians after natural catastrophes. Even if the mitigation pol-
icy does not come directly from a policy sphere that is controlled by the politician
in office, voters may infer that good politicians are better able to capture extra re-
sources from distinct government tiers to reduce drought consequences. Thus, aid
relief from a specific level of government may indirectly affect elected officials at
other levels of government. In the same logical line, the next hypothesis to be tested
is as follows:
• Hypothesis 2: mitigation policies have a positive impact on incumbents in
elections.
Earlier works have addressed the reward that voters grant politicians in elections
for responsiveness to natural disasters. For instance, Healy and Malhotra (2010)
study the effect of tornadoes on U.S. elections when disaster declarations are made
and show that the incumbent party’s presidential vote share receives an almost four-
percentage point increase. Notably, this study suggests that the benefit of such dec-
larations mostly outweighs the electoral cost of severe weather. Other studies that
show that aid relief converts a negative shock of natural disasters into popularity can
be found for droughts (Gasper and Reeves, 2011; Fuchs and Rodriguez-Chamussy,
2014), floods (Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011), and fires under a non-democratic
regime (Lazarev et al., 2014). I do not find studies showing that governments fail
to convert the negative shock of a natural disaster into a net increase in popularity
with disaster response.
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Aid relief bias
In the Brazilian context, mayors have limited available resources, and most of
the local public revenues come from transfers from higher levels of government.
The president controls the greatest share of public resources and has more decision-
making power to allocate them.3 When there is a drought shock, mayors alone are
incapable of properly responding to citizen demands. Mayors are constrained by
the small level of fiscal capacity to deal with unexpected events. Thus, mayors have
to beg the central government for help. In turn, the central government takes into
account two elements when deciding where to send resources for mitigation poli-
cies. The first is the severity of the drought. High levels of water scarcity lead to a
high probability of federal intervention. The second is political alignments, mean-
ing the mayors in the same party as the president have higher chances of receiving
aid interventions than mayors in the opposition party.
There could be two types of political bias experienced by the central govern-
ment in sending aid relief, namely, opportunistic and partisan bias (Arulampalam
et al., 2009). Assuming that mitigation policies affect voters’ perceptions of politi-
cian quality, this distortion could be used as an instrument to influence electoral
outcomes. An upcoming presidential election could increase the incentives for the
central government to prioritize the allocation of public resources when there is a
political alliance with local politicians in office. In this case, voters might easily
assimilate central government action and reward the president’s party directly in
the voting booth. There will be a political bias, then, if the central government
has a sufficiently opportunistic electoral motivation. For instance, when studying
the U.S. presidential discretion in disaster declarations involving floods, Downton
and Pielke Jr (2001) find that presidents tend to issue disaster declarations more
generously in years when they are facing re-election.
If the central government has a partisan performance motivation, then one should
observe similar behavior before local elections. Furthering the allocation of mitiga-
tion policies to aligned municipalities just before the mayoral elections would boost
the re-election performance of local politicians. On the one hand, the mitigation
policies could help maintain the political alliance with municipalities; however, the
central government has low autonomy in the extraction of rent from municipal gov-
ernments. In this sense, for instance, if the central government is relatively more
opportunistic than partisan, one would expect a greater impetus from the party of
the president to favor aligned municipalities just before the presidential elections
(Arulampalam et al., 2009). Hence, under municipal election circumstances, the
3The most important source of municipal revenues is represented by federal transfers, which
account for 65% of the municipal budget on average (Brollo and Nannicini, 2012).
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central government might exhibit comparatively less biased behavior.
Government efficiency is guaranteed if the central government is fully benevo-
lent. In this desirable situation, elected officials pursue neither opportunistic nor
partisan electoral objectives. Thus, aid delivery policies are orthogonal to party la-
bels, and no bias occurs. Otherwise, the discretionary of allocation of public funds
for the purpose of influencing incumbent electoral performance rather than enhanc-
ing general public welfare would be a failure of efficiency in the provision of the
public policy (Healy and Malhotra, 2009). These discussions call for testing the
following hypothesis:
• Hypothesis 3: the central government biases the allocation of mitigation poli-
cies in favor of aligned municipalities.
The determinants of intergovernmental transfers have been exhaustively studied,
and there is a convincing set of results indicating that party alignment plays a sig-
nificant role in the allocation of public resources in various institutional contexts.
Such evidence can be found for the U.S (Downton and Pielke Jr, 2001; Garrett and
Sobel, 2003), Spain (Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008), India (Arulampalam
et al., 2009), and Brazil (Brollo and Nannicini, 2012). In the closest work that ad-
dresses droughts and declarations of states of emergency in Brazil, Larreguy and
Monteiro (2014) find that non-aligned municipalities are 5 percentage points less
likely to receive drought relief from the central government. The characteristics of
the mitigation policy might also impact the government’s incentive to bias its allo-
cation. For instance, the temporal effect of the policy as palliative or preventive,
the degree of voter awareness of each policy, and the bureaucratic rigidity of policy
implementation might enhance or decrease government strategic behavior (Cohen
and Werker, 2008).
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Political alignment advantage
Prolonged droughts can also affect strategic voting. Citizens affected by wa-
ter shortages could adjust their expectations regarding the persistence and recur-
rence of these events.4 An increase in vulnerability increases the marginal utility of
consumption such that poverty-stricken citizens may also shift preferences toward
private target goods and away from the provision of public goods (Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2013; Bobonis et al., 2017). In aggregate effect, the voters may de-
mand more targeted mitigation policies for droughts. Considering that households
acknowledge that mitigation policies are also a function of political alignment (Lar-
reguy and Monteiro, 2014), as in a long-run patronage system equilibrium (Nelson
and Finan, 2009), the electorate might ascribe even more weight to the alignment
between the incumbent parties at the national and municipal levels when deciding
how to vote. Thus, voters could be induced to vote for an incumbent who is politi-
cally aligned to increase their chance of receiving future government assistance.
The impact of drought-based voter incentives on the inference of the quality of
incumbents and the shift in preferences toward mitigation policies is unclear. Al-
though sanctioning politicians in power after a drought could discipline the gov-
ernment’s accountability by signaling for more sustainable adaptation policies, the
ousting of a politically aligned incumbent after a serious drought will extinguish
political alignment. The final behavior of the voters will determine what they find
to be most relevant, and in this way, will influence the actions of policy makers. If
voters are perishing from a drought and deliberately support the incumbent because
of a political alliance, this behavior would be characterized as a demonstration of
support for patronage among the levels of government. This is the last hypothesis
to test.
• Hypothesis 4: droughts have a positive impact on the re-election of incum-
bents if they are politically aligned with other levels of government.
The exact answer to the above hypothesis suggests that the effect of droughts
on the vote share of an incumbent who is politically aligned would be distinct for
each type of election depending on whether the central government is essentially
opportunistic, partisan, or benevolent. For instance, if the central government is
opportunistic, political alignment is more relevant for the allocation of mitigation
policies when presidential elections are approaching. Then, one would expect that
considering a municipal election, voters ascribe more weight to party alignment in
4Lichand and Mani (2016), when studying 47 municipalities in Ceará, Northeast Brazil, show
that uncertainty about future rainfall affects farmers’ decision-making through cognitive load leading
to a variety of behavioral biases.
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their voting decision. This behavior would be the case since in the years following
mayoral elections, the central government is more prone to send government aid to
the aligned municipalities to increase their electoral performance in the forthcoming
presidential election. In any case, if voters value the chance of receiving targeted
mitigation policies to the extent that the party alignment effect is positive, then
the impact of a drought will further exacerbate this advantage if voters demand
clientelism.
As voters in elections hold politicians accountable by selecting and sanctioning
politicians according to voter preferences, politicians are induced to behave accord-
ingly. If voters signal that they want aid relief with partisan bias, politicians strive to
deliver it. This behavior connects the dots of a clientelism circle. The final outcome
is to some extent similar to a Bertrand supertrap (Cabral and Villas-Boas, 2005). If
all municipalities were to cooperate, the welfare-maximizing strategy would be to
cease the patronage politics that cause an inefficient redistribution of resources and
to demand unbiased policies with an emphasis on long-term prevention. However,
rejecting patronage politics implies bearing an immediate cost to citizens that ma-
terializes in the form of less aid for droughts. This dynamic could mean that the
rational response of individual municipalities may be to favor rather than oppose
patronage.
The voter rationality assumption is what connects all the hypotheses above and
is the most significant shortcoming in the democratic accountability dynamic. The
behavioral response that allows assessing voter preferences requires that they have
a sufficient cognitive capacity to evaluate government performance and form an
expectation of future actions. Thus, if this assumption does not hold, the theory that
justifies the central hypothesis of the paper might generate different predictions.
3.3. Data
The empirical analysis exploits Brazilian data on mayoral elections, presidential
elections, municipality characteristics, the incidence of droughts, and mitigation
policies against droughts. In the following subsections, I show the sources and
explain how I constructed the variables used.
3.3.1. Elections
The 1988 Brazilian constitution enabled free and universal elections after more than
20 years of military dictatorship. The contemporaneously constituted democracy
follows elections with a majority rule in which voters elect the candidate with the
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most votes for each of the three levels of government executive power: the cen-
tral government (president), state government (governor) and municipal govern-
ment (mayor). Elected officials have a four-year term in office. However, election
years are different for mayors and the governor/president. The central government
and state governments are decided together in elections in the same year, but munic-
ipal governments have a specific election, and the timing difference between these
two elections is always two years, as described in Figure 3.1. I extracted data on
mayoral elections (years 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012) and presidential elections











Figure 3.1.: Timing of elections
Two key variables are used in this analysis. The first variable is the vote share of
the incumbent party running for re-election. I construct this variable for the mayor’s
party and the president’s party at the municipality level for both cases. These vari-
ables are implemented as dependent variables throughout the investigation.5
The second variable is the previous margin of victory for the mayor’s candidate
who is affiliated with the same party as the Brazilian president if the candidate is
one of the two candidates who receive the most votes. For this variable, I also need
to extract information related to the 1996 mayoral elections. The previous margin
of victory is used as a running variable for regression discontinuity design (Lee
and Lemieux, 2010). Margins of victory above zero determine whether politically
aligned candidates with the incumbent president were elected. The previous margin
of victory, which is used as a forcing variable, changes with the type of election
analyzed. For municipal elections, I use the margin of victory in the last municipal
election, which is exactly four years before. For federal elections, the margin of
victory used is from the municipal election two years earlier. The difference stems
5It is worth mentioning that for the executive branch in Brazil, re-election has been permitted
only since 1997 (Emenda Constitucional n. 16, 4th of June) but is still limited to two terms. This
restriction means that once a politician with executive power is re-elected, he becomes a lame duck
and cannot be eligible for re-election again. Thus, the vote share of the incumbent politician seeking
re-election is truncated, and using this value in the analysis means losing observations. Using the
vote share of the incumbent party appears to be a better option since these parties can seek re-election
as many times as they try.
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from the fact that for the outcomes of both the 2002 federal elections and the 2004
municipal elections, the previous margins of victory for candidates in the same party
as the incumbent president are drawn from the 2000 mayoral elections. However,
the incumbent presidential party in the federal election in 2002 was PSDB, and the
incumbent party in the mayoral election in 2004 was PT.
During the period for which I test the presence of the drought industry, two par-
ties with different political preferences ruled the Brazilian central government. Fer-
nando Henrique Cardoso from PSDB, a right-wing party, won the election in 1994.
He was re-elected in 1998 and stayed in office until December of 2002. The presi-
dential election of 2002 was won by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva from PT, a left-wing
party. Lula started his term in January of 2003, was re-elected in 2006, and stayed
in office until December of 2010. Dilma Rousseff, who is also affiliated with PT,
replaced Lula in January of 2011 after winning the presidential election in October
of 2010.
3.3.2. Droughts
Droughts in the Brazilian territory are extreme cases of water shortages that pro-
voke negative consequences that go beyond of merely harvest losses. The effects of
drought have historically been associated with the disappearance of lakes, streams,
and vegetation, leading to the death of cattle, goats, and other livestock, which in
turn increases malnutrition and thirst and often leads to humanitarian crisis (Guil-
hoto et al., 2011). Thus, these extreme events are better explained as a matter of
water balance than simply the level of rainfall. The economic literature that ad-
dresses droughts across large areas in Brazil using only episodes with a lack of
rainfall is vulnerable to misidentifying extreme water scarcity in locations that have
an abundance of groundwater as they ignore geographical, vegetation, and soil char-
acteristics. As a matter of fact, it is very unlikely that a period of little rain in the
Amazon rainforest would trigger similar consequences as a similar period in areas
that are susceptible to desertification (PAN-BRASIL, 2004). Thus, using variations
in rainfall could incorrectly suggest that there is water scarcity in highly humid
areas.
In order to overcome the above caveat, I propose an improved measure of the
severity of droughts in relation to those used in Larreguy and Monteiro (2014),
Rocha and Soares (2015), and Bobonis et al. (2017).6 Instead of only using levels
6The measure of drought in the studies of Larreguy and Monteiro (2014) and Bobonis et al.
(2017) is the municipal rainfall z-score, i.e., the deviation from the historical mean normalized by
the historical standard deviation. The measure of drought in the study of Rocha and Soares (2015) is
a dummy variable that indicates that rainfall over 12 months was more than one standard deviation
below the historical average.
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of rainfall, I propose using the ratio between evaporation and rainfall. This proce-
dure of measurement is similar to those used in studies focused specifically on hy-
drology (Wolfe, 1997; Arora, 2002). I define the aridity index as the ratio between






The term AI represents the aridity index. The subscript t represents the month of
the observation for each variable, and the subscript m represents the municipality.
Throughout the paper, I will use a time window of two years, i.e., t = 24.7 This
index gives an idea of how much water is stored in a municipality during the time
window adopted. Higher values of this index indicate that the environment is arid.
I extract monthly precipitation and evaporation data from ground weather sta-
tions from INMET, the Brazilian Institute of Meteorology.8 Figure 3.2a depicts the
location of the 180 ground stations. The monthly level of precipitation and evapo-
ration for every Brazilian municipality is extrapolated as follows. I first locate the
closest ground meteorological station in each quadrant to the north-east, north-west,
south-east, and south-west of every municipality. Then, I compute the distance be-
tween the municipality’s centroid and the ground station. The inverse square of this
distance is used as a weight to proxy weather variables for each municipality.
Since elections regularly occur in October, I account for the level of rainfall and
evaporation prior to this month. I sum the weather data for the 24 months pre-
ceding a specific election. For example, the aridity index of the 2010 presidential
election takes into account the sum of the monthly levels of evaporation and precip-
itation from November 2008 (exactly one month after the mayoral election in 2008)
through October 2010 (the month of the presidential election).
There are three significant advantages of this measure compared with the stan-
dard variables used for drought in the literature. First, the measure relies on two
indicators of water availability, namely, how much it rains and how much it evapo-
rates. These features are important because they depict the water storage capacity.
Using levels of precipitation alone provides incomplete information about the soil
moisture balance. Second, the measure gives an intensity indicator that captures
how arid a municipality is during a certain period and distinguishes high humidity
areas from desertification areas. Third, the measure is constructed using ground sta-
tion data, which provide objective weather information. Rainfall levels are recorded
7Since the timing difference between mayoral elections and presidential elections is always two
years, the adoption of this time window of 24 months is convenient.
8This dataset contains an extensive list of weather variables in the period between 1963 to 2013.
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(a) Location of ground stations (b) Average of Aridity Index
(c) Average of Z-score of rainfall (d) Difference in percentile
Note: maps of Brazil divided by states. Figure 3.2a depicts the location of the INMET ground stations. Figure 3.2b
represents the average Aridity Index in the period of analysis. Figure 3.2c depicts the average Z-score of rainfall
during the period of analysis. Figure 3.2d illustrates the difference of percentile of average Z-score of rainfall and
percentile of average of Aridity Index in the period of study. Municipalities in color white represent areas where the
Z-score of rainfall infer higher propensity of drought compared with the Aridity Index, and cities in black the other
way around.
Figure 3.2.: Maps of Brazil
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with a pluviograph, and levels of evaporation are recorded from a Piche evaporime-
ter. These data collection instruments provide meteorological observations that are
superior to widely used satellite data because satellites do not directly measure pre-
cipitation and evaporation but rather make inferences (Dell et al., 2014).9
Figure 3.2b depicts the average aridity index from 1998-2012 for the Brazilian
territory. The map confirms that the proposed measure of drought overcomes the
problem of misidentifying water scarcity for areas where such scarcity is unlikely
to occur. In fact, a significant part of the northern region, which is mostly covered
by the Amazon rainforest, has an average aridity index below 0.5. However, the
inland regions of the northeast, an area that is commonly associated with humani-
tarian crisis because of droughts, has the highest index in the territory. The north
of the southeast region and the south of the center-west region exhibit a high av-
erage aridity. For comparison, Figure 3.2c shows the average Z-score of rainfall
during the period of analysis, similar to Larreguy and Monteiro (2014) and Bobonis
et al. (2017).10 The map indicates the dispersion of drought propensity throughout
the territory, including that in highly humid areas such as the Amazon rainforest.
Figure 3.2d compares the difference in the percentiles of average aridity index and
average rainfall Z-score for municipalities during the study period. White areas
show the municipalities where the Z-score of rainfall suggests a higher incidence
of drought in comparison to the measure of the aridity index. Black areas indicate
otherwise. In summary, while the aridity index identifies more drought incidence
in the Brazilian region known as semi-arid, the Z-score of precipitation identifies
more drought incidence in extremely humid areas.11
Figure 3.3 shows how levels of aridity have evolved in time. The positive trend
raises concern about the growth of drought incidence and the spread to areas that
never suffered from this natural disaster before.
For the empirical analysis, I compute the incidence of drought following the gen-
eralized climate classification scheme for values of the global aridity index proposed
by Middleton et al. (1997).12 In the simplest definition, I assume that the variable
drought takes a value of one if during the two years preceding each election the
9Indeed, the aridity index outperformed the prediction of states of emergency because of drought
compared with measures of drought using satellite datasets such as NOAA’s PRECipitation RE-
Construction Dataset (PREC) (Chen et al., 2002) and Terrestrial Precipitation - 1900-2010 Gridded
Monthly Time Series (Matsuura and Willmott, 2013). These results are available upon request.
10High values indicate low precipitation.
11Note that using the Z-score of the aridity index would encounter the same problem described if
one uses the Z-score of rainfall only. That is, the measure could infer that there is a high incidence
of drought in highly humid areas in Brazil.
12Note that my index is equivalent to the inverse of the index of aridity in Middleton et al. (1997).
The reason for this transformation is the ease of interpreting of results. The idea is to make the
measurement positively monotonic with drought.
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Figure 3.3.: Historical evolution of average of aridity index in Brazil
aridity index is equal to or higher than 2.13 That is, evaporation was at least twice
as large as rainfall. In order to account for nonlinear effects among different levels
of droughts and ensure that a few extreme cases do not drive the primary results,
I split the drought variable into categories. The category extreme takes a value of
one if the index is equal to or higher than 5 and is zero otherwise. The category
severe takes a value of one if the index is equal to or greater than 2 and lower than
5 and is zero otherwise. Finally, the category moderate takes a value of one if the
index is equal to or higher than 1.59 and lower than 2 and is zero otherwise. In this
sense, the measure of water scarcity informs gradual levels of droughts. Figure 3.4
shows the kernel density of the aridity index and presents the drought classification
scheme.
Figure 3.4.: Kernel density of aridity index
13The purpose is to make the empirical analysis as readable as possible. The interpretation and
statistical significance of the results are the same if one uses levels of the aridity index.
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3.3.3. Drought Mitigation Policies
The government’s methods of dealing with the consequences of drought can be
assigned into the following two groups: palliative policies and preventive policies
(Cohen and Werker, 2008; Neumayer et al., 2014). Essentially, palliative policies
are designed to serve citizens after an incidence of drought and have an immediate
but short-term effect. In contrast, prevention policies are intended to mitigate the
impact of the future conditions and usually have a long-term benefit.
In the context of this study, palliative and preventive policies also have different
bureaucratic rigidities. Palliative policies are more bureaucratically loose to carry
out, and therefore more easy to bias, than prevention policies. Additionally, pallia-
tive policies are more easily manageable to promote vote buying. For instance, in
addition to instantly diminishing the suffering of the poor, politicians can also use
these palliative grants to buy voter support by sending water trucks to the appro-
priate places and by making food distribution conditional on voting for the national
incumbent or at least on turning out on the day of the election. Infrastructure invest-
ments, in turn, are more immobile in space and are thus less flexible for discrimina-
tory purposes.
Concerning electoral results, both methods may have distinct implications. Pal-
liative policies may be more salient for voters than prevention policies since the
absence of the latter diminishes voters’ counterfactual perceptions of their situa-
tion. From a political economy perspective, these implications could distort the op-
timal balance between these policies. For instance, studying natural disasters in the
U.S., Healy and Malhotra (2009) show that voters reward ruling parties in elections
for spending on disaster relief but not for investing in disaster prevention, leading
governments to spend less on the preparation for disasters, thus causing substantial
public welfare losses.
Although the objective of this study is not to determine the best balance between
prevention and palliative policies, I aim to identify how these policies are allocated
among municipalities and how their effects are associated with elections given their
different properties. Below, the construction of proxies for both policies is detailed.
Palliative policy
When a municipality suffers from an extended period of water scarcity that dam-
ages the economy of the locality, the mayor may request emergency aid from higher
levels of public administration (i.e., the state and central governments). To be ac-
cepted by the central government, this request has to pass through a public admin-
istrative bureaucracy. The mayors of the affected municipalities need to declare a
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state of emergency because of drought and send documents and reports to the Min-
istry of National Integration of Brazil.14 The National Secretariat of Civil Defence
is the agency within the ministry that has the designation of analyzing the gravity of
the drought. This agency comprises a commission that decides whether the mayor’s
request for aid relief is reasonable. All these institutions are politically subordinate
to the president. If these institutions agree that providing aid to the municipality is
necessary, the central government publishes an ordinance recognizing the declara-
tion of a state of emergency or public calamity.15
From this moment, the municipalities for which the state of emergency was rec-
ognized become eligible to receive several types of financial support and bureau-
cratic relief. In cases of drought, federal aid relief may arrive in the form of emer-
gency funding through so-called mandatory transfers, the supply of water trucks,
food distribution, the waiver of legal bureaucratic procedures for public spending,
the renegotiation of agriculture debts, and permission for citizens withdraw money
from labor insurance (FGTS).
I extract from Sistema Integrado de Informações sobre Desastres Naturais (S2ID)
the central government ordinances recognizing the declaration of the state of emer-
gency by drought for the period 1993 - 2013. Unfortunately, there is no information
available on the monetary amount disbursed for each instance of emergency aid.
I use in my analyses a dummy variable that is a proxy for palliative policy. This
variable takes a value of 1 if there was a recognition of the state of emergency be-
cause of drought for up to two years before the specific election in question (mayoral
election or presidential election) and is 0 otherwise.
Prevention policy
One of the principal forms of transferring resources for infrastructure investments
between the central government and municipal governments is through the so-called
Convênios. These plans function as agreements between different levels of public
administration and usually serve as a means of promoting the decentralization of
public expenditure on projects related to physical facilities and structures. This
modality of intergovernmental transfer is the most commonly adopted to implement
long-lasting public policies to fight the effects of droughts.
I gather detailed data from 461,958 Convênios projects that were implemented
14For example, some of these documents are preliminary notifications of disaster, detailed dam-
age reports, and action plans.
15A state of emergency because of drought was first proposed in 1962 by Celso Furtado, at the
time the chair of SUDENE (Superintendência do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste), in Resolution No:
453.
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between the years 1995 and 2014. Among these projects, I identified 2,023 that
have included in their project scopes the construction or maintenance of water dams,
barrages for lakes, cisterns, and water distribution systems. These types of public
works have minimal effects in situations where drought is already present but are
intended to relieve the aftermath of future droughts.
The average execution time on these kinds of projects is one year and six months,
and the average amount of money spent is US 120,000.00, an increase of approxi-
mately 9% in the annual budget of a medium-sized municipality.16
I use in my analyses a dummy variable that is a proxy for prevention policy. This
variable takes a value of 1 if one such project was implemented up to two years
before the specific election in question and is 0 otherwise. It is reasonable to sup-
pose that prevention policies are likely to provide spillover effects on neighboring
municipalities. After all, in times of crisis, people can commute a short distance to
the nearest source of water. To take into account this possibility, I also expand my
definition of municipalities that have benefited from drought prevention policies to
include those localities that are located at a maximum distance of 30 km from the
centroid of the municipality in which the project was originally addressed.17
3.3.4. Municipality Characteristics
To ensure that the effect of droughts does not incorporate time-varying character-
istics of municipalities, I gather information from the 1991, 2000 and 2010 popu-
lation censuses conducted by the Brazilian Bureau of Statistics (IBGE), and then, I
extrapolate these data to election years. More specifically, I control for production
structure by introducing variables such as the share of workers in the agricultural
sector and the industrial sector. The average income controls the welfare of a mu-
nicipality. The GINI coefficient controls the inequality. The proportion of graduates
controls the level of human capital.
Additionally, I also gather information on the size of the municipal population
from Tesouro Nacional FINBRA and the share of voters below 18 years old from
Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.18 The average temperature is collected from INMET.
For these variables, extrapolations are not needed. In the empirical analyses, the
control variables used are lagged for two years (the initial condition before drought
shock) and log transformed. Because state capital cities have special political desig-
nations, these cities are dropped from the database. Table 3.1 depicts the summary
16Prices deflated by the IPCA (IBGE) with the base year 2000, which represents approximately
R$ 380,000.00.
17The results do not change when using a maximum distance of either 10 km or 50 km.
18Voting is optional for Brazilians between 16 and 18 years.
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statistics.
Table 3.1.: Summary statistics
Dependent variable: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Vote share of mayor’s party 0.268 0.271 0.000 1.000 22,099
Vote share of president’s party 0.500 0.192 0.022 0.950 21,712
Palliative policy before presidential elections 0.189 0.391 0 1 50,436
Palliative policy before mayoral elections 0.264 0.441 0 1 50,436
Prevention policy before presidential elections 0.104 0.306 0 1 50,456
Prevention policy before mayoral elections 0.144 0.351 0 1 50,446
Weather variables: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Aridity Index (AI) 1.305 1.043 0.133 15.625 50,436
Drought 0.153 0.360 0 1 50,436
Categories:
Extreme drought 0.013 0.113 0 1 50,436
Severe drought 0.140 0.347 0 1 50,436
Moderate drought 0.083 0.276 0 1 50,436
Temperature 23.164 3.055 13.299 29.737 50,436
Forcing variables: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Margin of victory before presidential elections 0.003 0.247 -0.988 0.938 2,549
Margin of victory before mayoral elections -0.029 0.257 -0.988 0.938 2,018
Municipalities characteristics Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Share of workers in agriculture sector 16.227% 9.355 0% 72.294% 44,314
Share of workers in industry sector 4.764% 4.580 0% 40.880% 44,314
Population 24,693 56,820 163 1,251,831 47,536
Average income R$ 660.01 R$ 358.37 R$ 29.84 R$ 7,726.86 44,314
Share of graduated citizens 2.228% 1.944 0% 24.212% 44,314
GINI coefficient 0.528 0.066 0.261 0.880 47,285
Share of voters below 18 years old 3.337% 1.455 0.059% 11.355% 49,645
3.4. Droughts, Mitigation Policies, and Electoral
Results
To demonstrate why politicians should be concerned about the incidence of natural
disasters and how voters react to the actions of central government, I investigate
in this section the relationship between droughts, mitigation policies, and electoral
outcomes in presidential and mayoral elections in Brazil, both at the municipality
level. More specifically, I test the hypotheses that severe droughts adversely affect
the parties in office in subsequent elections and that mitigation policies, conditioned
on drought, have a positive influence on the re-election performance of incumbents.
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Methodology
To adequately address the first hypothesis, I propose the following econometric
specification:
SVt,m = αDt,m+γXt−2,m+fm+ft+ εt,m, (3.2)
where SVtm represents the share of the vote for the incumbent party in election t
and in municipality m. The term D indicates the set of variables that reflect water
scarcity during the two years prior to the election. X represents a number of control
variables lagged two years before the corresponding election. The terms fm and ft
are a municipality fixed effect and year fixed effect, respectively. The term ε is the
error.
Such specification captures the effect of droughts using within-municipality vari-
ation. The underlying assumption here is that weather conditions over two years
preceding an election are exogenous to the political dispute. This assumption is
reasonable because it is hard to argue that there is an omitted factor that could drive
the vote share of the incumbent party and the levels of rainfall and evaporation si-
multaneously. Indeed, several studies relied on a similar assumption to identify the
causal effect of natural disasters on economic outcomes (Kahn, 2005; Strömberg,
2007; Yamamura, 2014; Felbermayr and Gröschl, 2014; Neumayer et al., 2014).
Subsequently, I examine the hypothesis that the promulgation of public policies
to fight droughts would reduce the negative impact these natural events may have on
re-election. If voters indeed punish incumbent political parties because of droughts,
it is to be expected that this effect will be exacerbated in places that have not re-
ceived government assistance. Therefore, I introduce interaction variables in the
previous econometric model as follows:
SVt,m = αDt,m+ δPt,m+β(Dt,m ∗Pt,m)+γXt−2,m+fm+ft+ εt,m, (3.3)
where Pt,m expresses whether a municipality has received a drought mitigation
policy. I study the palliative policies and prevention policies separately. β is the
coefficient of interest that expresses the heterogeneous correlation of the impact of
drought on the municipalities benefiting from each type of public policy.19
19One could be concerned as to whether drought and palliative policies suffer from multi-
collinearity. However, this is not the case because there is no particular rule for the recognition
of a state of emergency, and the conditions for this declaration turn out to be subjective. The pair-
wise correlation between palliative policies and the aridity index is only 0.36, so estimations should
not suffer from multicollinearity. Still, my measure of drought has the highest correlation between
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This coefficient must be interpreted with care. Although the estimation extracts
the coefficient from the within-municipality variation and controls for the common
yearly shocks as well as a set of covariates, it is still unable to rule out the hypothesis
that there is an unobservable time-variant characteristic that drives the allocation of
these public policies. The results should be taken only as suggestive rather than
causal. For instance, it is well documented that political alignment is a determinant
of the allocation of public policy, and this dynamic may also influence election
results, which in turn may bias the coefficient (Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro,
2008; Brollo and Nannicini, 2012). I will address this issue explicitly later in the
paper. However, it would be informative to construct a horse race for the effects of
policy design on election results and make a comparative analysis.
Results
There are four takeaways from the analyses. First, the results confirm that droughts
have an adverse impact on incumbent parties in elections. Moreover, the findings
suggest that voters are likely to blame the local politicians and the central govern-
ment alike for water shortages. In a way, this result could enigmatically stem from
a voter rationality perspective since mayors have less decision-making power than
presidents to implement preparedness policies and immediate aid relief in the after-
math of a drought. Nevertheless, this evidence could be explained by the citizen’s
perceptions of their proximity to public agents. An uprising against local politicians
could be more effective since they usually live in the same city and are more tan-
gible, whereas bureaucrats in higher levels of public administration usually live in
capital cities that are generally distant.
Second, voters reward the incumbent party for the delivery of mitigation policies.
Such a reward seems to be more sensitive to short-term relief spending than invest-
ments in drought preparedness spending. This finding suggests that if the central
government has opportunistic and partisan motivations and selects policies so as to
maximize electoral outcomes, it would be wise to focus more on palliative policies
when allocating strategically among municipalities.
Third, the effectiveness of the use of drought mitigation policies as a strategic
tool to reduce voter dissatisfaction in certain municipalities appears only for pres-
idential elections, whereas this effect is absent in municipal elections. One could
expect that the mayor’s party might reap some electoral benefit from an additional
expenditure financed by higher levels of public administration if voters are unsure
palliative policies compared to other indexes of droughts. For instance, the pairwise correlation with
the Z-Score of rainfall is 0.08, and the correlation with rainfall that is one standard deviation below
the mean precipitation is 0.02.
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about the source of the government spending. As this is not the case, an alternative
explanation may be that citizens are sufficiently able to disentangle the provision
of public goods by the central government from that by the municipal government.
Reconciling these findings with the assumption that voters are irrational is difficult.
Fourth, the findings demonstrate that the effect of aid relief is not high enough
for a net increase in popularity. Previous works have shown that the government’s
responsiveness implies a gain in voter gratitude to the extent that negative shocks
from natural disasters disappear completely until these events become beneficial for
the incumbent (Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011; Gasper and Reeves, 2011; Lazarev
et al., 2014). This dynamic does not apply for droughts in Brazil. The provision
of palliative and prevention policy compensates for the negative shock of droughts,
but this compensation is not enough to result in an increase in the vote share.20
Interpreting the results in detail, Table 3.2 depicts the findings using the vote
share of the incumbent party in presidential elections as the dependent variable.
Column (1) shows that a drought decreases the vote share of the incumbent party
by an average of five percentage points. Column (2) suggests that such an effect is
nonlinear regarding the intensity of water scarcity. While extreme droughts decrease
the vote share of the presidential party by an average of twenty percentage points,
severe droughts and moderate droughts result in a six percentage points and one
percentage point decrease, respectively. Column (3) confirms that the nonlinear
effect holds even when including time-varying covariates. Column (4) includes
interactions between the incidence of drought and policies aimed at mitigating the
consequences of drought. The results show that such policies indeed, on average,
counteract the adverse impact that an incumbent party in central government would
face if voters suffered from water shortages. Column (5) shows that even though
voters experiencing an extreme drought react positively to the delivery of palliative
and prevention policies by eleven and thirteen percentage points, respectively, the
overall impact is still negative. When voters are subjected to a severe drought, only
palliative policies appear to be relevant to the electoral outcome. In the case of
moderate droughts, mitigation policies do not appear to be relevant at all. These
findings suggest that from the perspective of the central government, the allocation
of palliative policy against drought is potentially more rewarding with respect to
electoral outcomes than preventive policy, which is in line with the results in Healy
and Malhotra (2009).
Regarding municipal elections, Table 3.3 shows the results using the vote share
of the mayor’s party as the dependent variable. Column (1) confirms that drought
20This conclusion holds even for municipalities that have received the palliative and preventive
policies simultaneously. The triple interaction between drought and the two type of policies is sta-
tistically insignificant. The results are available upon request.
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Table 3.2.: Drought and mitigation policies on presidential elections
Dependent variable: vote share of president’s party




Extreme -0.209*** -0.131*** -0.251***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.021)
Severe -0.059*** -0.012 -0.036***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Moderate -0.011** 0.011** 0.013**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Interactions between policies and drought:
Palliative x Drought 0.065***
(0.008)
Prevention x Drought 0.021**
(0.010)
Interactions between policies and categories of drought:
Palliative x Extreme 0.114***
(0.019)
Palliative x Severe 0.063***
(0.009)
Palliative x Moderate 0.008
(0.010)
Prevention x Extreme 0.133***
(0.020)
Prevention x Severe 0.008
(0.011)
Prevention x Moderate -0.016
(0.012)
Observations 21,712 21,712 19,343 19,343 19,343
R-squared 0.447 0.455 0.503 0.504 0.511
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Note: the analyses use data for presidential elections of 1998, 2002, 2006, and
2010. Municipalities and years fixed effects included in all specifications. Con-
trols variables are lagged two years before each election and include population,
average income, GINI coefficient, the share of graduated citizens, the share of
voters below 18 years old, the proportion of workers in agriculture and industry
sector, palliative policy, and prevention policy. Standard error clustered at mu-
nicipality level in parentheses. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value
< 0.10.
is harmful to the re-election efforts of the party of the mayor. The incidence of
drought decreases, on average, the vote share of the mayor’s party by seven per-
centage points. Although this negative shock seems to grow according to drought
levels, the hypothesis that the effect is linear cannot be ruled out, as observed in
column (2). Column (3) reaches a similar conclusion once time-varying covariates
are included. Concerning the allocation of mitigation policies, column (4) provides
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Table 3.3.: Drought and mitigation policies on mayoral elections
Dependent variable: vote share of mayor’s party




Extreme -0.131*** -0.100*** -0.039
(0.032) (0.033) (0.072)
Severe -0.080*** -0.070*** -0.071***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.021)
Moderate -0.011 -0.007 -0.008
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Interactions between policies and drought:
Palliative x Drought 0.001
(0.015)
Permanent x Drought 0.012
(0.018)
Interactions between policies and categories of drought:
Palliative x Extreme -0.008
(0.071)
Palliative x Severe 0.008
(0.016)
Palliative x Moderate 0.008
(0.016)
Prevention x Extreme -0.143***
(0.053)
Prevention x Severe 0.019
(0.020)
Prevention x Moderate -0.015
(0.025)
Observations 22,099 22,099 19,585 19,585 19,585
R-squared 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.021
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Note: the analyses use data for mayoral elections of 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012.
Municipalities and years fixed effects included in all specifications. Controls
variables are lagged two years before each election and include population, aver-
age income, GINI coefficient, the share of graduated citizens, the share of voters
below 18 years old, the proportion of workers in agriculture and industry sector,
palliative policy, and prevention policy. Standard error clustered at municipality
level in parentheses. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10.
different evidence from what was found in presidential elections. Neither pallia-
tive policies nor prevention policies appear to deter voter anger in local elections.
Surprisingly, column (5) exhibits a negative correlation between the provision of
prevention policies and the vote share of the incumbent in municipalities that suffer
from extreme drought. This result could be explained by the electorate believing
that the prevention policies implemented were useless given the scale of the envi-
ronmental catastrophe.
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In sum, these findings are in line with those in the economics and political science
literature. The results of this work reinforce and extend the validity of previous work
by showing that there is gratitude from the electorate for the government’s response
following natural disasters, and by showing that the reaction of voters is nonlinear
in the severity of natural disasters.
3.5. Allocation of Drought Mitigation Policies
In the structure of Brazilian federalism, the central government has the greatest
decision-making authority to intervene in areas devastated by drought. Given that
high levels of water scarcity are also bad news for the electoral future of politicians
in office, the central government could bias particular policies towards aligned mu-
nicipalities. There may be different impetuses in mayoral compared to presidential
elections. The discretionary allocation of public resources can be accomplished
through the recognition of a state of emergency or an agreement through Convênios
for investment in infrastructure. The distortion in these policies in favor of specific
political parties penalizes the efficient provision of public goods. To rigorously
investigate the veracity of the aforementioned assertion, I examine the effect of po-
litical alignment on the provision of drought mitigation policies.
Methodology
The methodological challenge comes from the fact that political preferences could
be associated with several confounding factors that would bias the analysis. Thus,
the most appropriate way to extract the causal impact of political alignment is to an-
alyze the municipalities that met the following condition in the previous municipal
elections: the two candidates with the most votes are from the party of the presi-
dent and a party in the opposition coalition, as in Brollo and Nannicini (2012).21
The underlying assumption is that in elections where the margin of victory is very
small, the only difference between the treatment groups and control groups is party
alignment with the central government, and all the confounding factors are ran-
domly assigned around the threshold of winning an election.22 More specifically, I
implement the following regression discontinuity design (RDD):
21An alternative condition is a restriction of the sample to municipalities in which only two
candidates ran in the previous municipal election, one of whom is in the same party as the incumbent
president. The results are qualitatively and statistically the same, and they are available upon request.
22The validity of such an assumption could be tested using municipality characteristics as depen-
dent variables. Appendix C shows the graphs of this test.
85












where Pm represents whether a municipality m received palliative or prevention
policies during the two years before an election. The term MV is the forcing vari-
able that represents the margin of victory of the candidate for mayor of the presi-
dent’s party in the previous mayoral election. The term T accounts for the treatment
effect to be aligned with the central government. Naturally, T assumes a value of
one if and only if MV > 0. Such specification allows for local or global polynomial
order (p) in the forcing variable on both sides of the threshold 0. The coefficient α
gives the local average treatment effect (LATE) of political alignment on receiving
federal drought relief (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
I implement two criteria to deal with the traditional trade-off between the size
of bandwidth around the threshold and the polynomial order of the forcing variable
when executing the RDD. First, I select arbitrarily elections in which the margin of
victory is between −50% and 50% (excluding cases where the margin of victory
is extremely high). Then, I regress for different degrees of polynomial order of the
forcing variable, allowing different shapes on both sides of the threshold. I use first-
, second-, third-, and fourth-order polynomials and select the one that minimizes
the AIC criteria (Akaike, 1974). Second, I use the bandwidth selectors proposed
by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and Calonico et al. (2014) and use the local
polynomial with a rectangular kernel.
Additionally, I investigate whether politically-motivated allocation is heteroge-
neous across levels of water scarcity. Depending on the type of election that is ap-
proaching, the drought may exacerbate or reduce the central government bias. Put
another way, the effect of political alignment could be directed towards a particular
set of municipalities depending on the magnitude of the drought. I implement an
RDD with heterogeneous treatment effects that provide a heterogeneous local av-
erage treatment effect (HLATE) but with a less conservative specification proposed
by Becker et al. (2013). Instead of just allowing different shapes on both side of the
threshold of the forcing variable regarding the treatment effect, I also allow differ-
ent shapes for the heterogeneous treatment effect. More specifically, I implement
the following econometric specification:
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(λp+ δpDm)∗ (MVm)p]+ εm, (3.5)
where the coefficient ϑ indicates the local probability of receiving mitigation pol-
icy if a municipality suffers a certain degree of drought. The coefficient θ represents
the heterogeneous local average treatment effect (HLATE) of party alignment when
a municipality experiences a certain degree of drought. The linear combination of
coefficients ϑ, α, and θ informs the local probability of receiving drought mitigation
policy when a municipality suffers a certain degree of drought, and the incumbent
mayor is in the same party of the current president of Brazil.23
(a) Before presidential elections (b) Before mayoral elections
Note: The x-axis is the forcing variable margin of victory of mayor candidate in the president’s party in the previous
municipal election.
Figure 3.5.: McCrary tests
There are three important underlying assumptions required to implement this
identification strategy. First, the covariates are continuous, and there is no jump
at the threshold. Second, there is continuity in the probability of the degree of
droughts at the threshold to capture genuine variation in the interaction with party
alignment. Third, the interactions between the degree of drought and party align-
ment are not correlated with the error term, conditional on the margin of victory
(Becker et al., 2013). The first two assumptions are tested in Appendix C. The latter
assumption relies on the exogenous characteristic of weather variables and the fact
23The results are equivalent in terms of sign and have more statistical power if we strictly fol-
low the econometric specification proposed in Becker et al. (2013). However, their specification is
rigid in the sense that they do not admit the margin of vote share to have a distinct prediction for
municipalities that suffered from droughts and municipalities that did not.
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that the electoral victory of aligned parties is controlled by the forcing variable mar-
gin of victory. The McCrary (2008) test of the forcing variables depicted in Figure
3.5. It can be seen that for both forcing variables, there is a smooth distribution
around the threshold of zero, which rules out sorting concerns.
Results
(a) Before presidential elections (b) Before mayoral elections
Note: The x-axis is the margin of victory of mayor candidate in the president’s party in the previous municipal
election. The y-axis of Figure 3.6a is the probability of receiving palliative policy before presidential elections. The
y-axis of Figure 3.6b is the probability of receiving palliative policy before mayoral elections.
Figure 3.6.: Graphical analysis of RDD: Alignment on palliative policy
(a) Before presidential elections (b) Before mayoral elections
Note: The x-axis is the margin of victory of mayor candidate in the president’s party in the previous municipal
election. The y-axis of Figure 3.7a is the probability of receiving prevention policy before presidential elections.
The y-axis of Figure 3.7b is the probability of receiving prevention policy before mayoral elections.
Figure 3.7.: Graphical analysis of RDD: Alignment on prevention policy
The analyses prove that there is a tremendous advantage for voters that experience
a water shortage in having an incumbent mayor who is aligned with the central
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government. Such a feature is strikingly important for receiving palliative policies.
However, the same is not applicable for policies that have long-run effects and is
less immediately noticeable for the poor. In short, when water scarcity reaches a
critical level in which thirst and famine forces citizens into extreme attitudes, such
as blocking roads to plunder necessary supplies, the marginal effect of government
assistance makes a big difference. Hence, a political alliance between the levels of
government becomes a strong factor. The patronage relationship in the provision of
drought palliative policies seems to persist.
Table 3.4.: Palliative policies before presidential elections
Dependent variable: palliative policy before election for president
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Party alignment -0.032 0.013 0.016 -0.013 -0.010 -0.007
(0.025) (0.042) (0.043) (0.035) (0.044) (0.044)
Party alignment x Drought 0.181** 0.343** 0.358**
(0.087) (0.145) (0.147)
Drought 0.196*** 0.109 0.083
(0.060) (0.103) (0.103)
Categories of drought:
Party alignment x Extreme 0.519** 0.738*** 0.736***
(0.259) (0.273) (0.273)
Party alignment x Severe 0.236* 0.287* 0.300*
(0.135) (0.163) (0.165)
Party alignment x Moderate 0.192 0.239 0.237
(0.134) (0.155) (0.155)
Extreme 0.162 -0.014 -0.012
(0.200) (0.209) (0.209)
Severe 0.137 0.112 0.085
(0.093) (0.112) (0.114)
Moderate -0.071 -0.077 -0.075
(0.082) (0.088) (0.088)
Observations 2,395 1,165 1,152 2,395 1,165 1,152
R-squared 0.104 0.089 0.093 0.121 0.097 0.101
Polynomial order 1 1 1 2 1 1
Bandwidith 0.500 0.120 0.118 0.500 0.120 0.118
Procedure CTT IK CTT IK
AIC 1943.09 1920.045
Note: forcing variable is the vote margin of victory of the candidate for mayor in the president’s
party in the previous municipal election. In columns (1) and (4) the bandwidth is chosen ar-
bitrarily and the polynomial order of forcing variable is chosen by AIC criteria. The columns
(2) and (5) use bandwidth selector proposed by Calonico et al. (2014) (CTT). The columns (3)
and (6) use the bandwidth selector proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (IK). Robust
standard error in parentheses. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10.
Demonstrating the interpretation of the results, Figure 3.6 provides a graphical
analysis of the effect of party alignment on the provision of palliative policy against
droughts. Although the coefficient for party alignment is larger when the election
following the delivery of palliative policy is the presidential election, the effect
for both types of electoral contest is not statistically significant at usual standards.
Figure 3.7 shows similar results for the case of prevention policy.
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Table 3.5.: Palliative policies before mayoral elections
Dependent variable: palliative policy before election for mayor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Party alignment -0.031 -0.009 0.018 -0.017 0.005 0.025
(0.040) (0.039) (0.052) (0.040) (0.039) (0.052)
Party alignment x Drought 0.100 -0.018 0.139
(0.151) (0.143) (0.189)
Drought 0.316*** 0.390*** 0.432***
(0.095) (0.093) (0.127)
Categories of drought:
Party alignment x Extreme -0.516 -0.633 -0.707
(0.640) (0.461) (0.674)
Party alignment x Severe 0.108 0.011 0.161
(0.156) (0.148) (0.193)
Party alignment x Moderate -0.102 -0.141 -0.024
(0.154) (0.150) (0.202)
Extreme 0.690 0.544* 0.360
(0.463) (0.328) (0.527)
Severe 0.328*** 0.405*** 0.450***
(0.097) (0.096) (0.130)
Moderate 0.155 0.159 0.145
(0.104) (0.105) (0.131)
Observations 1,868 1,327 838 1,868 1,327 838
R-squared 0.160 0.158 0.123 0.188 0.185 0.141
Polynomial order 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bandwidith 0.500 0.197 0.104 0.5 0.197 0.104
Procedure CTT IK CTT IK
AIC 1673.608 1636.946
Note: forcing variable is the vote margin of victory of the candidate for mayor in the president’s
party in the previous municipal election. In columns (1) and (4) the bandwidth is chosen ar-
bitrarily and the polynomial order of forcing variable is chosen by AIC criteria. The columns
(2) and (5) use bandwidth selector proposed by Calonico et al. (2014) (CTT). The columns (3)
and (6 use the bandwidth selector proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (IK). Robust
standard error in parentheses. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10.
In order to dig a little more into whether there is a political bias towards a set of
areas depending on the level of water scarcity, Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show the results
of the heterogeneous treatment effects of political alignment. Table 3.4 depicts the
results for palliative policy before presidential elections. Columns (1), (2), and (3)
use the three proposed criteria for the simplest definition of drought. The results
indicate that the central government distributes palliative policy opportunistically
following a pattern. The president prioritizes aligned municipalities in the event
that the environmental condition is acute. Given a drought, an aligned city has
an approximately 18 - 36 percentage points greater chance of receiving assistance
from the central government. This effect is more than 70 percent greater than the
average probability of receiving a palliative policy. Columns (4), (5), and (6) show
the results once the drought variable is decomposed into categories. The sizes of
the effects are astonishing. Aligned municipalities experiencing an extreme case of
drought have an approximately 51 - 73 percentage points greater chance of receiving
immediate relief compared to municipalities where the incumbent mayor is in the
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opposition coalition. In the case of severe drought, the chances are approximately
23 - 30 percentage points higher. Moderate drought has similar coefficients, but
these are not statistically significant.
Table 3.5 shows the results for palliative policy before mayoral elections. In this
case, party alignment seems to not play a role in the allocation of instantaneous aid
relief. The linear combination of the party alignment variable and its interaction
with drought has no statistical significance in any specification. In fact, the drought
variable alone seems to be responsible for a large part of the predictive power in the
econometric model, which suggests that the behavior of the central government is
responsible, as seen in columns (1), (2) and (3). The same conclusion is reached
when the results are observed in the categories of droughts, in columns (4), (5) and
(6).
Table 3.6.: Prevention policy before presidential elections
Dependent variable: prevention policy before election for president
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Party alignment 0.019 0.036 0.036 0.025 0.034 0.038
(0.018) (0.028) (0.030) (0.017) (0.025) (0.026)
Party alignment x Drought -0.052 -0.075 0.017
(0.086) (0.136) (0.146)
Drought 0.397*** 0.428*** 0.382***
(0.060) (0.097) (0.105)
Categories of drought:
Party alignment x Extreme 0.229 0.028 0.299
(0.199) (0.291) (0.307)
Party alignment x Severe -0.107 -0.080 -0.030
(0.094) (0.150) (0.160)
Party alignment x Moderate -0.040 0.022 -0.023
(0.098) (0.164) (0.181)
Extreme 0.131 0.206 0.081
(0.139) (0.195) (0.210)
Severe 0.464*** 0.494*** 0.468***
(0.065) (0.106) (0.113)
Moderate 0.203*** 0.259** 0.296**
(0.072) (0.121) (0.131)
Observations 2,395 1,393 1,240 2,395 1,393 1,240
R-squared 0.172 0.164 0.165 0.195 0.189 0.192
Polynomial order 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bandwidith 0.500 0.151 0.129 0.500 0.151 0.129
Procedure CTT IK CTT IK
AIC 1041.097 1002.844
Note: forcing variable is the vote margin of victory of the candidate for mayor in the president’s
party in the previous municipal election. In columns (1) and (4) the bandwidth is chosen ar-
bitrarily and the polynomial order of forcing variable is chosen by AIC criteria. The columns
(2) and (5) use bandwidth selector proposed by Calonico et al. (2014) (CTT). The columns (3)
and (6) use the bandwidth selector proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (IK). Robust
standard error in parentheses. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10.
The results of party alignment heterogeneous effects for droughts on prevention
policy are depicted in the Tables 3.6 and 3.7. For this kind of policy, the central
government does not seem to have any partisan or opportunistic conduct. In both
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Table 3.7.: Prevention policies before mayoral elections
Dependent variable: prevention policy before election for mayor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Party alignment 0.016 0.033 0.036 0.025 0.032 0.038
(0.020) (0.026) (0.031) (0.019) (0.024) (0.028)
Party alignment x Drought -0.121 -0.043 -0.021
(0.104) (0.142) (0.166)
Drought 0.419*** 0.450*** 0.451***
(0.065) (0.090) (0.107)
Categories of drought:
Party alignment x Extreme -0.024 -0.028 -1.286**
(0.394) (0.467) (0.628)
Party alignment x Severe -0.122 -0.045 -0.017
(0.108) (0.148) (0.171)
Party alignment x Moderate -0.060 0.018 -0.003
(0.088) (0.119) (0.144)
Extreme -0.119 0.333 0.524
(0.282) (0.310) (0.525)
Severe 0.463*** 0.481*** 0.480***
(0.066) (0.093) (0.110)
Moderate 0.204*** 0.139* 0.117
(0.061) (0.080) (0.090)
Observations 1,868 1,361 1,064 1,868 1,361 1,064
R-squared 0.126 0.138 0.141 0.152 0.165 0.171
Polynomial order 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bandwidith 0.500 0.207 0.143 0.500 0.207 0.143
Procedure CTT IK CTT IK
AIC 718.4768 688.3544
Note: forcing variable is the vote margin of victory of the candidate for mayor in the president’s
party in the previous municipal election. In columns (1) and (4) the bandwidth is chosen ar-
bitrarily and the polynomial order of forcing variable is chosen by AIC criteria. The columns
(2) and (5) use bandwidth selector proposed by Calonico et al. (2014) (CTT). The columns (3)
and (6) use the bandwidth selector proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (IK). Robust
standard error in parentheses. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10.
types of electoral contest, neither the party alignment variable nor the linear com-
bination with its interaction with droughts have sizable or statistically significant
impacts. The only exception is the interaction between extreme droughts and party
alignment, which has an unstable coefficient and is likely to be dictated by a just
few observations.
These findings corroborate the results of previous academic works supporting that
political alignment is an important determinant in the allocation of targeted public
good (Downton and Pielke Jr, 2001; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008; Co-
hen and Werker, 2008; Brollo and Nannicini, 2012; Larreguy and Monteiro, 2014).
What can also be learned from this exercise is that the government seems to be more
opportunistic than partisan, and therefore, the type of election matters. In addition,
governments are more likely to bias the distribution of more immediate and less
bureaucratic spending than long-term and bureaucratically rigid spending.
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3.6. Voters Sometimes Demand Clientelism
The two last sections have demonstrated that although high levels of water scarcity
have adverse effects on incumbents, citizens living in areas in which the mayor
and the president are aligned have a significant gain in terms of the probability of
receiving immediate aid from the central government in times of drought. From
the voters’ point of view, this dynamic creates a situation that requires a decision
between opposing alternatives. The failure to implement adaptive policies to miti-
gate the effects of droughts would be a motivation to punish the incumbent in the
subsequent election. However, in a scenario in which there is already a party align-
ment between the two levels of government, punishing the incumbent, and thereby
changing the party in power, would result in fewer chances to obtain palliative poli-
cies. I address the outcome of these two antagonistic motivations in this section.
More specifically, the two key questions are as follows: do voters comprehend the
benefit of political alignment and vote in favor of this alignment in elections? Given
a voter’s perception of the political alignment advantage, what is the effect of actual
drought on this perception? In the next two subsections, I address these points.
3.6.1. Voter Assessment of Political Alignment
Voters can appraise two kinds of political alignment. In municipal elections, voters
evaluate whether to vote for the incumbent mayor who is aligned with the central
government taking into account the expected benefit from such an action. Mean-
while, in presidential elections, voters evaluate whether the maintenance of the in-
cumbent president’s party is relevant given that their mayor is in the same party
as the central government. The importance of party alliance may be different in
each situation. In one case, the voter decides the party at the top of the state, and
in the other circumstance, the voter chooses the party lower in the hierarchy. In
this subsection, I first analyze whether party alignment per se is relevant to voter
behavior.
Methodology
Similar to the previous section, I implement an RDD, as in equation 3.4. Nev-
ertheless, the dependent variable in this empirical strategy is SVm, which assumes
the share of the vote for the mayor’s party when analyzing municipal elections and
the share of the vote for the president’s party when analyzing federal elections. The
rest of the approach remains the same.
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Results
It could be inferred that voters assess political alignment positively in municipal
elections but do not mind such alignment in presidential elections. Figure 3.8a gives
a graphical analysis of the political alignment advantage for presidential elections.
It can be seen that in this kind of election, party alignment does not seem to play any
role. The predicted vote share of the president’s party is flat across the threshold of
the forcing variable. Voters are indifferent whether the incumbent president is in the
same party as the mayor or not. A different conclusion is reached when I analyze
the party alignment advantage for mayoral elections. The results can be examined
graphically in Figure 3.8b. The upward jump in predicted vote share around the
threshold suggests a large party alignment advantage. In this case, alignment be-
tween the local and federal parties increases the vote share of the incumbent party
in the municipal contest by approximately 17 percentage points.
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
Note: The x-axis is the margin of victory of mayor candidate in the president’s party in the previous municipal
election. The y-axis of Figure 3.8a is the vote share of president’s party in federal elections. The y-axis of Figure
3.8b is the vote share of mayor’s party in municipal elections.
Figure 3.8.: Graphical analysis of RDD: Alignment on election
There are at least two possible explanations for the results. The first reason is
related to the federative structure of Brazilian public administration. Since the mu-
nicipal budget is mainly formed by transfers from the central government, mayors
are dependent on higher levels of executive power. Therefore, the alliance with the
central government in municipal elections is expected to have a significant advan-
tage. This expectation is consistent with the system of patronage between differ-
ent levels of public administration in order to ensure the flow of federal revenues
(Brollo and Nannicini, 2012). The second possible explanation is related to group
rule-utilitarian theory (Coate and Conlin, 2004), which suggests that in municipal
elections, individual voters can more easily identify themselves as members of a
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group of citizens, organize themselves strategically, and then do their part to help
their group win. A strategic vote is less likely to happen in national elections be-
cause the heterogeneity of individuals is sufficiently large to prevent a voter bloc
from forming in larger contests. Thus, voters might behave more strategically in
municipal elections than in national elections, and the importance of political align-
ment for a group of citizens is taken into account in their voting decisions.
3.6.2. Droughts Impact on Voter Assessment of Political
Alignment
Bearing in mind the assessment of party alignment, what would be the influence of
the water shortage on the voting strategy of citizens and subsequently on the chances
of re-electing the incumbent? As droughts expand economic vulnerability, voters
might increase their demand for individualistic transactions and place even more
value in the party alliance advantage. One possible way to test this hypothesis is to
examine whether party alignment has a heterogeneous effect among municipalities
regarding incidents of drought.
Methodology
Two feasible methodologies could provide both informative and distinct answers.
The first is a fixed effects panel data model, similar to equation 3.2. The difference
in this case is that the interactions are between levels of water scarcity and party
alignment. Remember, the coefficients of such a specification should be interpreted
as a global average correlation. Because political preferences are not randomly as-
signed, causal interpretation has to be avoided. Second, in order to employ political
alignment as if this effect were exogenous, I implement a regression discontinuity
design analysis with heterogeneous treatment effects, as in equation 3.5. The co-
efficients express the causal average local effect. However, since in this analysis,
the impact extracted applies to a particular type of municipality that has the largest
share of swing voters, the results raise external validity concerns.
Results
There are three important conclusions from the findings. First, the results con-
firm that the effect of drought on the vote share of the politically aligned incumbent
party would be different in each kind of election. An aligned mayor’s party in a mu-
nicipal election is rewarded, and an aligned president’s party in a federal election
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is not. Second, voters act more strategically in mayoral elections than in presiden-
tial elections. Voters perceive that is important to maintain mayors who are aligned
with the president to maximize their chances of being assisted with drought relief.
Third, although both applied methodologies are based on completely different as-
sumptions and provide a distinct interpretation of results, the global average effects,
and the causal local average treatment effects are very similar, suggesting that both
causal inference and external validity can be applied with some reasonableness. So,
when there is an extended period of water shortage, voters might ponder the value
of immediate aid relief, rewarding, even more, political alignment in the municipal
contest. Thus, voters boost patronage relations by rewarding political linkages be-
tween levels of the state’s hierarchy. In presidential elections, however, there is no
clear incentive for voters to act strategically.
To be more precise, Table 3.8 shows the results for presidential elections. Columns
(1) and (2) depict the results of the interaction between party alignment and drought
extracted from the fixed effects panel data model with and without controls, respec-
tively. As a global average, the correlation of party alignment in municipalities af-
fected by drought decreases the vote share of the incumbent party by approximately
12 percentage points. Columns (5)-(7) depict the coefficients extracted from the
regression discontinuity design analysis with heterogeneous treatment effects. The
findings are very similar. The local causal impact of party alignment when there is
a water shortage decreases the incumbent party vote share by approximately 9 to 12
percentage points. Splitting the drought variable into categories provides a coherent
interpretation of what was found. Columns (3) and (4) suggest no differences in
effects among extreme and severe droughts. The correlation accounts for approxi-
mately 11 to 13 percentage points of the incumbent party vote share. The moderate
category has a tiny and insignificant effect. The effects are larger in columns (8)-
(10), which depict the results from RDD. In the cities near the cut-off point of the
previous margin of victory, the causal effect of drought combined with party align-
ment is negatively strong, approximately 30 and 32 percentage points for extreme
droughts. However, the hypothesis of linearity between the categories cannot be
rejected.
The results are inverted when I study the elections for mayor. Table 3.9 shows the
results. Instead of punishing the incumbent party that is aligned with the president
for the impacts of a drought, voters switch to voting for the re-election of this party.
In other words, voters reward political alignment when they experience a drought.
In the columns (1) and (2), the global average correlation of party alignment and
drought increases the vote share of the mayor’s party by approximately 7 percent-
age points. Columns (5)-(7) present the results of the RDD that deal with causality
issues. The effects are slightly larger, 9 to 12 percentage points. When I study the
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categories of drought, the analyses reach very similar conclusions. Columns (3)
and (4) show that extreme droughts have a positive average correlation of 10 to 12
percentage points, severe droughts have a correlation of approximately 6 percent-
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age points, and moderate droughts have a negative correlation. Columns (8)-(12)
show the heterogeneous local causal effect of each category of drought. Although
the extreme category yields unstable coefficients, in general, the findings are very
similar in the sense that it seems that the causal effect is positive and linear.
3.7. Concluding Remarks
In Brazil, drought is the most common natural disaster and is a major cause of
hunger, thirst, death, and forced migration. However, Nelson and Finan (2009)
indicate that some people living in regions that have historically been devastated
by these events in fact prefer periods of extreme water scarcity. In particular, they
report that an elderly female goes so far as to pray for a drought. The suggested
reason for someone to have such a desire is that the poor have become entirely
dependent on government aid. As the arrival of the drought triggers the government
aid relief mechanism, locals come to wish for it.
The above paper departed from this long debate suggesting that the high inci-
dence of droughts in Brazil established the foundation for a long-run model of
clientelism. For centuries, the rural households have traded their servility with large
landowners by means of subsistence. In periods of severe water scarcity, people in
extreme poverty face even higher welfare deterioration. Landlords, in turn, afforded
them supplies food and water, among other necessities, but not without imposing
rent extraction and patronage. This enforced social interaction becomes known as
the drought industry.
A force that could detach the historical ties of rural households with their patrons
would be the insertion of a welfare-maximizing state, which would promote long-
run investment in infrastructure to improve natural disasters preparedness and assist
the most deprived. Instead, what is found is that the Brazilian government oppor-
tunistically captures the historical aid dependency of peasants in order to maximize
re-election chances.
The high political turnover due to drought creates a unique scenario that encour-
ages the central government to allocate aid relief strategically in order to assist po-
litically aligned municipalities to the detriment of those governed by opposition
parties. On the one hand, sending aid relief to aligned municipalities is a manner
of forestalling the advance of opposition parties and maintaining incumbent party
alignment between municipal and central governments. On the other hand, neglect-
ing aid relief for non-aligned municipalities could guarantee municipal political
turnover and make room for candidates allies.
This paper finds evidence suggesting that voters anticipate the opportunistic be-
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havior by governments and therefore act strategically to maximize their future ben-
efits. As political alignment plays a significant role in public resource allocation,
citizens foster this alignment to increase their chances of being assisted in times of
water crisis. Such voter behavior is boosted when voters are experiencing a drought,
which confirms that increased vulnerability leads citizens to demand patronage pol-
itics in line with Bobonis et al. (2017). Politicians, for their part, assimilate the
demand of voters and strive to give them what they want. This dynamic connects
results in a long-run patronage equilibrium that leads to the sub-optimal provision
of public goods and prevents the development of a region.
In conclusion, the continued absence of investments in drought preparedness in-
frastructure combined with the lack of responsibility in the allocation of immediate
relief verifies the government’s low willingness to promote the general welfare. In
fact, the intrinsic motivation of landlords to take advantage of such degrading sit-
uations remains present in governmental actions. Therefore, the old clientelism
system between landlords and peasants described as the drought industry did not
vanish. Instead, this system was captured by the central government. A relevant
follow-up research agenda would be to examine how to break such a clientelism
cycle to ensure government efficiency in implementing welfare-enhancing public
policies and in promoting resilience against droughts.
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Appendix A Institutional Setting
Drought is one of the most common natural disasters in the world, and this phe-
nomenon is the most frequent disaster in Brazil and is both economically and envi-
ronmentally destructive (Dai, 2011). In this scenario, the expression drought indus-
try was invented from a singular observance of the long-term socioeconomic con-
sequences that this natural event triggers (Callado, 1960). This catchphrase is reg-
ularly used in novels, song lyrics, and political debates (de Castro, 1967; Oliveira,
1977; Ribeiro, 1995; Silva, 2006; Matos, 2013) and refers to a complex process
of distortions in government transfers that initially aimed to alleviate the drought’s
adverse effects but are instead used for political purposes. Although the drought
industry has never been empirically tested, it is sustained by an informal rhetoric
suggesting that the incidence of droughts and the Brazilian political economy are
directly linked. In the following subsections, I first detail the background of the
political anecdote, and I then describe the contemporary situation.
A.1 The Origins of the Drought Industry
The roots of the drought industry in Brazil originate in the Portuguese colonial
period (1500 − 1815). To populate the Brazilian territory and extract its productive
value, the Portuguese Crown granted vast areas of land to nobles, military officers,
investors, and others loyal to Lisbon. This practice resulted in land being distributed
to just a few people who had some prestige with the Crown. Because of this uneven
distribution of land, large landholdings remained, through time, in the hands of a
small group of privileged citizens, who we will call the elite.
Because the environment in drought-prone regions is characterized by very pre-
carious conditions, agricultural workers and their families lived permanently on the
edge of survivability (Guilhoto et al., 2011). In addition to facing extreme poverty
and all social illnesses intrinsic to this condition, during periods of severe water
shortages, rural households are fated to fight every day to find means to drink and
to eat. Hunger and thirst reached their most drastic levels and often led to death.
Rural families become dependent on external aid to stay alive.
In exchange for protection during periods of thirst and starvation, landlords ex-
tended to rural households a condition of servility, exploitation, and dependency.
The characteristics of such social contract, which has close ties with the uneven
land ownership regime, are usually associated with the “aristocratic mentality” that
is characterized by values of obedience and loyalty and have built a set of social
relations marked by despotism and violence (Matos, 2013).
The panorama of elite citizens running their landholdings as fiefdoms persisted
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for centuries throughout Brazilian history and underpinned a platform of unequal
power of exchange between landlords and peasants. Such an relationship with
landlords providing the means of survival and demanding loyalty in return become
known as coronelismo.
A.2 The Contemporary Drought Industry
At the end of the nineteenth century, droughts began to receive public attention, and
the Brazilian central government began to promote aid relief policies to assist rural
households suffering from this kind of natural disaster. Indeed, these governmental
interventions reduced drought-related mortality, attenuated migration movements,
and reduced the vulnerability of rain-fed farmers but did so at the expense of re-
silience to the weather perturbation. Families living in drought-prone regions re-
mained dependent on external aid to deal with a crisis because aid relief policies
are rarely designed for drought preparedness measures. Instead, these policies are
mostly formulated in real time to attenuate the ongoing consequences of drought.
This approach to humanitarian aid programs led peasants to long-run adaptations to
weather shocks and has precluded these people from developing alternative adaptive
mechanisms for survival. Thus, in the absence of landlord protection, rural house-
holds continued to rely solely on government actions for access to food, water, and
necessary supplements during periods of drought.
In this new context of governmental intervention, the role played by landlords
in protection for peasants did not vanish. Rather, quite the opposite occurred. Oli-
garchs captured the agencies responsible for the aid relief programs, and the access
to public resources from the central government, in some way, was controlled by
landlords (Silva, 2006). For instance, the locations chosen for the construction of
water reservoirs with public funds were on the landlords’ properties so they could
charge exorbitant prices for water access. In addition, funding for public works
was put directly into the hands of landlords, and thus, they had a stronger influence
over the hiring of rural workers, thus expanding their patriarchal authority. In short,
drought had become a large and prosperous business for this sui generis social class,
the industriais da seca (industrials of drought) (Callado, 1960).
Farmworkers in drought-prone regions, regardless of whether they had been servile
to landlords, are dependent on the political apparatus of the government, and thus
to the local elite, during times of crisis. Since rural households face livelihood in-
security almost every year, there are some anecdotes suggesting that beneficiaries,
who are not sponsored by landlords, actually prefer years of drought because gov-
ernment intervention brings a sense of security (Nelson and Finan, 2009). In the
period before public assistance is mobilized, communities commonly invade local
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stores in search of food and block federal highways, stopping commercial food
trucks to plunder their contents. This activity indicates that citizens have become
accustomed to the dynamics between drought and governmental policies and have
built expectations around future actions by government agencies.
In some sense, the direct patronage role of landlords was replaced by govern-
ment actions, which is still an indirect patronage relationship between a political
apparatus (landlords) and voters (peasants). Mitigation policies for drought started
to be a political commodity between lower levels and higher levels of public ad-
ministration. In order to guarantee the flow of public revenues, a coalition between
politicians at the municipality level and the federal level began to be crucial. Mu-
nicipalities where mayors were members of the opposition political party of the
central government suffer from delays in emergency funds or even the denial of
funds (Larreguy and Monteiro, 2014). Thus, the patronage system (coronelismo)
also dominated the relationships between levels of government itself (Nelson and
Finan, 2009).
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Appendix B Robustness Checks of the Main
Analysis
The main findings of the study are corroborated by two empirical strategies that
are grounded in different assumptions: a fixed-effects model and a regression dis-
continuity design. However, there is still room to question potential flaws in the
methodology. In order to address some possible flaws, this section proposes robust-
ness checks that complement the main findings. Specifically, I reanalyze the two
empirical strategies by 1) using a different technique for clustering the standard er-
rors, 2) restricting the sample to municipalities with a higher propensity for drought,
3) decomposing droughts into cyclical and trend components, and 4) testing an al-
ternative measure of aridity shocks. I report the results for mayoral elections given
that this is the type of election where I find that voters rewarded political alignment
and given that voters do not care about party alignment in the presidential election.
Table B.1 shows the results.
One concern might be how the standard errors are grouped. Although the tech-
nical procedure for clustering the standard errors does not affect the estimations,
this procedure affects the statistical significance. For instance, it may be that the
variance of the incidence of drought is correlated within municipalities that are ge-
ographically close to one another, that is, cities located in the same Brazilian federal
state. To consider this potential flaw in the analyses, I cluster the standard errors at
the state level instead of at the municipality level in Panel A. As it can be seen in
columns (1) to (5), how standard errors are clustered is not of concern since the
results maintain their statistical significance at the usual levels.
Given the extensive heterogeneity of Brazilian municipalities, one may be con-
cerned about which cities are driving the results. In the fixed-effects models, the
estimates are provided by the variation of droughts within the municipalities. How-
ever, some cities did not experience any droughts during the analysis period, and
therefore, these municipalities are not adding information on the impact of droughts
to the outcome variable apart from improving the accuracy of the prediction of
the control variables. In the same vein, municipalities that have never experienced
droughts may not be reasonable counterfactuals for the regression discontinuity de-
sign approach. To ensure that the effects found are not due to the presence of mu-
nicipalities that have a very low likelihood of experiencing droughts, I restrict the
sample to cities that have experienced at least one drought. The results are depicted
in Panel B. The coefficient sizes remain similar to those in the primary analysis;
however, for RDD, I probably lose statistical power due to the drastic reduction in
sample size in columns (8) to (10).
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Table B.1.: Robustness checks
Panel A
Fixed-effects model RDD for HLATE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Party alignment 0.081*** 0.089*** 0.143*** 0.153*** 0.157***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.024) (0.030) (0.035)
Party alignment x Drought 0.078** 0.075** 0.124** 0.099 0.125
(0.033) (0.036) (0.057) (0.112) (0.093)
Drought -0.079*** -0.071*** 0.007 -0.017 -0.047
(0.020) (0.023) (0.042) (0.073) (0.066)
Observations 21,888 19,466 1,864 1,191 973
R-squared 0.032 0.031 0.088 0.100 0.105
Panel B
Fixed-effects model RDD for HLATE
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Party alignment 0.043* 0.050** 0.185* 0.183* 0.132
(0.022) (0.024) (0.111) (0.095) (0.095)
Party alignment x Drought 0.101*** 0.106*** 0.071 0.071 0.122
(0.030) (0.032) (0.139) (0.118) (0.119)
Drought -0.072*** -0.066*** -0.091 -0.047 -0.099
(0.015) (0.016) (0.100) (0.090) (0.090)
Observations 5,631 5,198 446 260 252
R-squared 0.071 0.065 0.136 0.156 0.171
Panel C
Fixed-effects model RDD for HLATE
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Party alignment 0.074*** 0.083*** 0.101* 0.093** 0.085*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.056) (0.043) (0.049)
Party alignment x Cyclical component (AI) 0.070*** 0.056** 0.300** 0.219** 0.247**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.125) (0.096) (0.106)
Party alignment x Trend component (AI) 0.016** 0.014** 0.079** 0.066** 0.079**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.036) (0.028) (0.032)
Cyclical component (AI) -0.066*** -0.057*** -0.241*** -0.119** -0.169**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.071) (0.060) (0.068)
Trend component (AI) -0.019*** -0.015** -0.056*** -0.029* -0.051**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020)
Observations 21,888 19,466 1,864 1,191 973
R-squared 0.033 0.032 0.093 0.101 0.111
Panel D
Fixed-effects model RDD for HLATE
(16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Party alignment 0.090*** 0.098*** 0.181*** 0.157*** 0.166***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.032) (0.026) (0.029)
Party alignment x Zscore AI 0.009 0.010 0.086** 0.086*** 0.075**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.038) (0.029) (0.032)
Zscore AI -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.049** -0.046** -0.052***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020)
Observations 21,888 19,466 1,864 1,191 973
R-squared 0.033 0.032 0.086 0.098 0.103
Note: no controls included in columns (1), (6), (11), and (16). Controls included in columns (2),
(7), (12), and (17). In columns (3), (8), (13), and (18) the bandwidth are chosen arbitrarily and the
polynomial order of forcing variable are chosen by AIC criteria. Columns (4), (9), (14), and (19)
use bandwidth selector proposed by Calonico et al. (2014) (CTT). Columns (5), (10), (15), and (20)
use bandwidth selector proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (IK). Robust standard error in
parentheses. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10.
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Additionally, I deal with two crucial issues that can be raised from the analyses.
First, an open question in the literature regarding the economic impacts of natural
disasters is that what matters most is not clear: the intensity of a shock or the change
in the level of a shock (Healy and Malhotra, 2013). It may be that voters living in a
region that regularly experiences extreme droughts act differently from voters resid-
ing in an area that rarely faces these kinds of events and that between-municipality
variation characteristics do not accurately capture these behavioral differences. Sec-
ond, since voters’ previous expectations are crucial in deciding who to vote for, and
because both the level and level change shocks may have different implications for
voter expectations, the electoral consequences may also be different. One way to
address both of the issues referred to above is to decompose the drought measure
into the following two components: the trend and the cycle. Municipalities that
have A path dependence on droughts would exhibit high values of the trend vari-
able, ensuring control of the difference in characteristics between drought-prone
cities, and the cyclical component would capture an unexpected change in the level
of aridity. Since I have time series data on aridity from 1963 to 2013, I decompose
the trend and cyclical components following the procedure suggested by Hamilton
(2017). This procedure calculates the trend and cycle components for each period as
a simple prediction of linear regression taking into account only past observations.
This approach is fundamental because a priori, voters have no information on future
weather conditions and base all their beliefs solely on the past. Note that the trend
component smoothly tracks the actual aridity index, while the cyclical component
follows a random walk around zero and is arguably exogenous. Panel C depicts the
results. The cyclical component seems to be the most determinant for the positive
effect of drought and political alignment on the vote share of mayor’s party. That is,
both impacts on the level and level changes are important for voter behavior. How-
ever, the change in level has a stronger consequence. This finding may be because
an unexpected change leads to a reordering of the beliefs of voters. That is to say,
voters alter their predictions of the trajectory of the level of aridity drastically, and
thus, they react more forcefully in their voting strategies.
Finally, to ensure meaningful comparisons across municipalities with different
water scarcity conditions, aridity shocks are measured as the Z-score of the arid-
ity index. More specifically, I calculate the difference between the current period’s
aridity and the historical mean of aridity in the municipality during the same two
years divided by the municipality’s historical standard deviation. Such a measure-
ment is regularly used in studies that analyze droughts only taking into account pre-
cipitations (Rocha and Soares, 2015; Bobonis et al., 2017). The results presented
in Panel C are robust to this aridity shock measurement choice and confirm that the
party alignment effect increases when municipalities suffer a more significant water
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shortage than their historical average.
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Appendix C RDD Validity
In this appendix, I graphically show the validity of the Regression Discontinuity
Design (RDD) using covariates as dependent variables.
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
Figure C.1.: Share of workers in agriculture sector
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
Figure C.2.: Share of graduated citizens
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(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
Figure C.3.: Extreme drought
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
Figure C.4.: Moderate drought
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
Figure C.5.: Severe drought
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(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
Figure C.6.: GINI coefficient
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
Figure C.7.: Average income
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
Figure C.8.: Share of workers in industry sector
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(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
Figure C.9.: Population
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
Figure C.10.: Share of voters below 18 years
(a) Presidential elections (b) Mayoral elections
Figure C.11.: Temperature
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Appendix D Data Sources





Share of graduated citizens Brazilain Census (1991, 2000, 2010) from IBGE www.ibge.gov.br
Share of workers in agriculture sector Brazilain Census (1991, 2000, 2010) from IBGE www.ibge.gov.br
Share of workers in industry sector Brazilain Census (1991, 2000, 2010) from IBGE www.ibge.gov.br
Average income Brazilain Census (1991, 2000, 2010) from IBGE www.ibge.gov.br
GINI coefficient Brazilain Census (1991, 2000, 2010) from IBGE www.ibge.gov.br
Population FINBRA www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br
Share of voters below 18 years old Tribunal Superior Eleitoral www.tse.jus.br
Margin of victory before presidential elections Tribunal Superior Eleitoral www.tse.jus.br
Margin of victory before mayoral elections Tribunal Superior Eleitoral www.tse.jus.br
Vote share of president’s party Tribunal Superior Eleitoral www.tse.jus.br
Vote share of mayor’s party Tribunal Superior Eleitoral www.tse.jus.br
Palliative policy S2ID s2id.integracao.gov.br
Prevention policy Portal da Tranparência www.portaldatransparencia.gov.br
112
References
Abney, F. G. and Hill, L. B. (1966). Natural disasters as a political variable: The
effect of a hurricane on an urban election. American Political Science Review,
60(4):pp. 974–981.
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2008). Persistence of power, elites, and institu-
tions. American Economic Review, 98(1):267–293.
Achen, C. H. and Bartels, L. M. (2004). Blind retrospection: Electoral responses
to drought, flu, and shark attacks. Estudios/Working Papers (Centro de Estudios
Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales), (199):1.
Ahlerup, P. (2013). Natural disasters and government turnover. Working Papers in
Economics 554, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
Akaike, H. (1974). A new look at the statistical model identification. Automatic
Control, IEEE Transactions on, 19(6):716–723.
Anderson, S., Francois, P., and Kotwal, A. (2015). Clientelism in Indian villages.
American Economic Review, 105(6):1780–1816.
Arceneaux, K. and Stein, R. M. (2006). Who is held responsible when disaster
strikes? The attribution of responsibility for a natural disaster in an urban elec-
tion. Journal of Urban Affairs, 28(1):43–53.
Arora, V. K. (2002). The use of the aridity index to assess climate change effect on
annual runoff. Journal of Hydrology, 265(1):164–177.
Arulampalam, W., Dasgupta, S., Dhillon, A., and Dutta, B. (2009). Electoral goals
and center-state transfers: A theoretical model and empirical evidence from India.
Journal of Development Economics, 88(1):103 – 119.
Bagues, M. and Esteve-Volart, B. (2016). Politicians’ luck of the draw: Evidence




Bardhan, P. and Mookherjee, D. (2013). Political clientelism and capture: Theory
and evidence from West Bengal, India. Working papers, eSocialSciences.
Barnhart, J. D. (1925). Rainfall and the populist party in Nebraska. American
Political Science Review, 19(3):527–540.
Bechtel, M. M. and Hainmueller, J. (2011). How lasting is voter gratitude? An anal-
ysis of the short-and long-term electoral returns to beneficial policy. American
Journal of Political Science, 55(4):852–868.
Becker, S. O., Egger, P. H., and von Ehrlich, M. (2013). Absorptive capacity and
the growth and investment effects of regional transfers: A regression discontinu-
ity design with heterogeneous treatment effects. American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy, 5(4):29–77.
Besley, T. and Burgess, R. (2002). The political economy of government respon-
siveness: Theory and evidence from India. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
117(4):1415–1451.
Bobonis, G. J., Gertler, P., Gonzalez-Navarro, M., and Nichter, S. (2017). Vul-
nerability and clientelism. Working Paper 23589, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Brollo, F. and Nannicini, T. (2012). Tying your enemy’s hands in close races:
The politics of federal transfers in Brazil. American Political Science Review,
106:742–761.
Bruckner, M. and Ciccone, A. (2011). Rain and the democratic window of oppor-
tunity. Econometrica, 79(3):923–947.
Cabral, L. M. B. and Villas-Boas, M. (2005). Bertrand supertraps. Management
Science, 51(4):599–613.
Callado, A. (1960). Os industriais da seca e os Galileus de Pernambuco: Aspectos
da luta pela reforma agrária no Brasil. Editôra Civilização Brasileira.
Calonico, S., Cattaneo, M. D., and Titiunik, R. (2014). Robust nonparametric confi-
dence intervals for regression-discontinuity designs. Econometrica, 82(6):2295–
2326.
Chen, M., Xie, P., and Janowiak, J. (2002). Global land precipitation: A 50-yr




Coate, S. and Conlin, M. (2004). A group rule−utilitarian approach to voter turnout:
Theory and evidence. American Economic Review, pages 1476–1504.
Cohen, C. and Werker, E. D. (2008). The political economy of “natural” disasters.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52(6):795–819.
Cole, S., Healy, A., and Werker, E. (2012). Do voters demand responsive govern-
ments? Evidence from Indian disaster relief. Journal of Development Economics,
97(2):167–181.
Dai, A. (2011). Drought under global warming: A review. Wiley Interdisciplinary
Reviews: Climate Change, 2(1):45–65.
de Castro, J. (1967). Sete palmos de terra e um caixão. Editôra Brasiliense.
Dell, M., Jones, B. F., and Olken, B. A. (2014). What do we learn from the weather?
The new climate-economy literature. Journal of Economic Literature, 52(3):740–
98.
Downton, M. W. and Pielke Jr, R. A. (2001). Discretion without accountability:
Politics, flood damage, and climate. Natural Hazards Review, 2(4):157–166.
Drazen, A. and Eslava, M. (2010). Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spend-
ing: Theory and evidence. Journal of Development Economics, 92(1):39–52.
Fair, C. C., Kuhn, P. M., Malhotra, N., and Shapiro, J. N. (2015). Natural disasters
and political engagement: Evidence from the 2010-11 Pakistani floods. Mimeo.
Felbermayr, G. and Gröschl, J. (2014). Naturally negative: The growth effects of
natural disasters. Journal of Development Economics, 111:92 – 106. Special
Issue: Imbalances in Economic Development.
Ferejohn, J. (1986). Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice,
50(1/3):5–25.
Fuchs, A. and Rodriguez-Chamussy, L. (2014). Voter response to natural disaster
aid: Quasi-experimental evidence from drought relief payments in Mexico. World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper, (6836).
Fukuyama, F. (2014). Political order and political decay: From the industrial rev-
olution to the globalization of democracy. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Garrett, T. A. and Sobel, R. S. (2003). The political economy of FEMA disaster
payments. Economic Inquiry, 41(3):496–509.
115
References
Gasper, J. T. and Reeves, A. (2011). Make it rain? Retrospection and the atten-
tive electorate in the context of natural disasters. American Journal of Political
Science, 55(2):340–355.
Girma Kebbede, M. J. J. (1988). Drought, famine and the political economy of
environmental degradation in Ethiopia. Geography, 73(1):65–70.
Guilhoto, J., Azzoni, C. R., Silveira, F. G., Ichihara, S. M., Diniz, B.
P. C., and Moreira, G. R. C. (2011). PIB da agricultura familiar:
Brasil-Estados. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1803225 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1803225.
Hamilton, J. D. (2017). Why you should never use the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The
Review of Economics and Statistics.
Healy, A. and Malhotra, N. (2009). Myopic voters and natural disaster policy.
American Political Science Review, 103(3):387–406.
Healy, A. and Malhotra, N. (2010). Random events, economic losses, and retro-
spective voting: Implications for democratic competence. Quarterly Journal of
Political Science, 5(2):193–208.
Healy, A. and Malhotra, N. (2013). Retrospective voting reconsidered. Annual
Review of Political Science, 16:285–306.
Heersink, B., Peterson, B. D., and Jenkins, J. A. (2017). Disasters and elections:
Estimating the net effect of damage and relief in historical perspective. Political
Analysis, 25(2):260–268.
Hicken, A. and Simmons, J. W. (2008). The personal vote and the efficacy of
education spending. American Journal of Political Science, 52(1):109–124.
Imbens, G. and Kalyanaraman, K. (2012). Optimal bandwidth choice for the re-
gression discontinuity estimator. The Review of Economic Studies, pages 79(3),
933–959.
Kahn, M. E. (2005). The death toll from natural disasters: The role of income,
geography, and institutions. Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(2):271–284.
Larreguy, H. A. and Monteiro, J. C. (2014). Media networks and political account-
ability: Evidence from radio networks in Brazil. Mimeo.
116
References
Lazarev, E., Sobolev, A., Soboleva, I. V., and Sokolov, B. (2014). Trial by fire:
A natural disaster’s impact on support for the authorities in rural Russia. World
Politics, 66(04):641–668.
Lee, D. S. and Lemieux, T. (2010). Regression discontinuity designs in economics.
Journal of Economic Literature, 48:281–355.
Lichand, G. and Mani, A. (2016). Cognitive droughts. Mimeo.
Martinez-Bravo, M. (2014). The role of local officials in new democracies: Evi-
dence from Indonesia. American Economic Review, 104(4):1244–1287.
Matos, M. P. S. R. (2013). Famílias desagregadas sobre a terra ressequida: Indústria
da seca e deslocamentos familiares no Nordesde do Brasil. Nómadas. Revista
Crítica de Ciencias Sociales y Jurídicas, pages 155–186.
Matsuura, K. and Willmott, C. J. (2013). Terrestrial air temperature and precip-
itation: 1900-2008 gridded monthly time series, version 1.02. University of
Delaware.
McCrary, J. (2008). Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discon-
tinuity design: A density test. Journal of Econometrics, 142(2):698–714.
Middleton, N., Thomas, D., et al. (1997). World atlas of desertification. Number
Ed. 2. Arnold, Hodder Headline, PLC.
Nelson, D. R. and Finan, T. J. (2009). Praying for drought: Persistent vulnerability
and the politics of patronage in Ceará, Northeast Brazil. American Anthropolo-
gist, 111(3):302–316.
Neumayer, E., Plümper, T., and Barthel, F. (2014). The political economy of natural
disaster damage. Global Environmental Change, 24:8 – 19.
Nordhaus, W. D. (1975). The political business cycle. The Review of Economic
Studies, 42(2):169–190.
Oliveira, F. d. (1977). Elegia para uma re(li)gião: Sudene, Nordeste, planejamento
e conflito de classes. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, pages 13–38.
PAN-BRASIL (2004). Programa de ação nacional de combate à desertificação e
mitigação dos efeitos da seca. Technical report, Secretaria de Recursos Hídricos,
Ministério do Meio Ambiente, Brasília, DF.
Persson, T., Roland, G., and Tabellini, G. (1997). Separation of powers and political
accountability. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4):1163.
117
References
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. E. (2002). Political economics: Explaining economic
policy. MIT Press.
Quiroz Flores, A. and Smith, A. (2013). Leader survival and natural disasters.
British Journal of Political Science, 43(4):821âĂŞ843.
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4. Does Emergency Aid for Drought
Increase Corruption? §
4.1. Introduction
Extreme weather events as droughts, floods, and tornadoes are likely to occur more
frequently in the coming years as a result of climate change (Pachauri and Reisinger,
2007). This will further intensify the tragedy of natural disasters and the problems
they cause (Strömberg, 2007). The economic costs are substantial and escalating.
These natural shocks affect various aspects of an economy, including the declining
average productivity of assets, lower long-term growth rates, and worsening health
and human capital (Maccini and Yang, 2009; Felbermayr and Gröschl, 2014; Rocha
and Soares, 2015). The situation is even more dramatic in developing countries,
where state capacity is usually deficient and catastrophic deaths are on average the
highest (Kahn, 2005). In this scenario, how governments design and implement
public policies to mitigate the adverse impacts of natural disasters will play a key
role in development economics.
In countries with frequent natural disasters, governments usually prioritize pal-
liative and short-term policies at the expense of prevention and long-term policies.1
One explanation for this may be the fact that voters behave myopically and reward
incumbents for delivering disaster relief, but not for investing in disaster prepared-
ness (Cole et al., 2012). As emergency relief has an immediate impact on the well-
being of citizens and is highly discretionary, it has become attractive to policymak-
ers who use it to promote clientelism and favor their constituencies.2 Emergency
policies are also characterized by low regulation and little transparency, which cre-
§The paper in this chapter is single-authored.
1Neumayer et al. (2014) argue that private individuals tend to under-invest in prevention be-
cause of information asymmetry and collective action problems. Cohen and Werker (2008), using a
political-economy model of disaster prevention, show that aid relief distorts a government’s incen-
tives to prepare well for disasters.
2In fact, the nature of disaster relief as an emergency expenditure which is often not previously
reserved in the public budget plan creates room for discretionary allocations, and it is frequently
associated with lack of accountability (Downton and Pielke Jr, 2001; Garrett and Sobel, 2003; Cole
et al., 2012).
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ates a window of opportunity for rent extractors (Leeson and Sobel, 2008; Nikolova
and Marinov, 2017). The diversion of public resources for private use is one of
the worst flaws that a public policy design can produce. This paper aims to study
whether the allocation of palliative policies creates an increase in the level of cor-
ruption in the context of droughts in a developing country. Interestingly, the extent
of rent seeking related to these policies is essential for evaluating their cost-benefit
and reshaping them to achieve their purposes properly.
This paper proposes an empirical analysis of whether federal palliative transfers
to municipalities to address severe water shortages are diverted from their original
aim by mayors in municipal governments in the Brazilian setting. Historically, the
process to trigger palliative policies by the federal government starts with the recog-
nition of a state of emergency. Then, aid relief can arrive in various forms that are
difficult to monetize, such as water distribution and sending the army to help with
basic needs. Thus, this study investigates the number of federal emergency declara-
tions against droughts as it relates to municipal corruption. Corruption is measured
as the number of irregularities in the local governments’ expenditures found by au-
ditors in Brazilian cities during a full mayor’s term. To isolate the causal impact
of an additional emergency declaration on corruption, I exploit the quasi-random
nature of the cycle component of the aridity relative to its trend as an instrumental
variable. Additionally, the study implements a battery of robustness checks and ex-
amines heterogeneous effects regarding electoral features, social capital, propensity
to suffer droughts, and fiscal capacity.
Investigating the relationship between emergency aid for droughts and the level
of corruption in the Brazilian context is attractive for at least two reasons. The first
is because the Brazilian tragedy of drought is a deeply scrutinized problem and has
secular roots. Governmental interventions to mitigate the worst of its effects began
in the era of Emperor Dom Pedro II (1825 - 1881) and experienced several changes
as experts debated vigorously on how to approach the problem (Callado, 1960;
Campos, 2015).3 Second, drought is the most frequent natural disaster in Brazil,
and its incidence has increased in recent decades. Between 1970 and 2012, it ac-
counted for more than 50% of all federal declarations of a state of emergency (Nel-
son and Finan, 2009). In the period between 2013 and 2015, the number of droughts
increased by 168%.4 Quantitatively, the number of people benefiting from aid relief
from drought is superlative. For instance, during the years 2012 to 2013, approx-
imately 1,400,000 people were received government aid, while 660,000 farmers
received financial support because of broken harvests (Campos, 2015).
3Section 4.2 provides an historical review of the Brazilian government interventions to address
droughts.
4For more details see ANA (Agência Nacional de Águas).
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In recent years, a growing body of literature has claimed that a windfall of re-
sources can have adverse effects through the political process leading to increased
rent-seeking (Arezki and Brückner, 2011). Studying the federal funds triggered
by diverse types of natural disasters in the U.S, Leeson and Sobel (2008) estimate
that additional $1 per capita in average annual relief increases corruption nearly 2.5
percent in the average state. Using flood-related transfers that the Bulgarian cen-
tral government distributed to municipalities following torrential rains in 2004 and
2005, Nikolova and Marinov (2017) find that a 10% increase in per capita funds
leads to a 9.8% increase in corruption. Other studies investigate the reduced form
of the impact of extreme weather events on corruption. For instance, Yamamura
(2014) finds that public sector corruption increases in both developing and devel-
oped countries when affected by natural disasters. In the same vein, Escaleras and
Register (2015) confirm similar results for natural hazards as earthquakes, wind-
storms, and floods. However, these studies do not specifically address aid relief to
handle water scarcity.
This study presents some advantages over previous works. First, I rely on an
objective measure of corruption instead of a measurement based on perception.
Perception-based measures of corruption are less accurate due to several confound-
ing factors (Olken, 2009).5 We construct a proxy for the amount of money involved
in illegal procurement practices, fraud, favoritism, and over-invoicing collected
from public audits reports produced by a Brazilian anti-corruption agency, Con-
troladoria Geral da União (CGU). An unusual characteristic of this anti-corruption
program is that the audited municipalities were selected by lottery. As the audit
reports provide a detailed picture of how local governments make their expendi-
tures, the sample contains municipalities without accurate corruption cases. This is
important for the empirical analysis because it provides an ideal control group for
corrupt municipalities. Such a feature is presumably absent in studies on corruption
that are based on lawsuits or media reports because the control group can be ei-
ther municipality without corruption or municipalities where graft and bribery were
simply not discovered. Second, our measure of corruption represents the level of
corrupt practices throughout the entire term of an incumbent. That is, the study does
not consider cases where the audit reports were published when the incumbent was
still in office. Thus, it avoids measurement noise related to the behavioral change of
incumbent politicians due to information shocks that revealed corruption scandals
5The papers of Nikolova and Marinov (2017) and Leeson and Sobel (2008) also use objective
measures of corruption. However, while the former builds the measure of corruption based on judi-
cial convictions and may thus miss cases that were not prosecuted, the latter includes in its definition
cases of corruption that can be interpreted simply as mismanagement rather than explicitly corrupt
practices.
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cause (Timmons and Garfias, 2015).
In previewing the paper’s results, I find that emergency relief increases the amount
of money involved in corrupt practices. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first
evidence of the impact of aid relief for droughts on corruption in the public sector
Precisely, the partial effects of recognitions of the state of emergency lead to an
increase of approximately R$ 5.00 per capita for all observations and R$ 41.00
per capita for corrupted municipalities of diverted public money.6 Although the
dataset format precludes panel data analysis, the sizes of the coefficients are ro-
bust for the inclusion of economics and political characteristics, incumbent mayor
characteristics, and municipal public finances controls. However, the provision of
aid relief does not seem to induce an honest mayor to commit acts of corruption.
The coefficients are not significant when the dependent variables are the presence
of corruption and the fraction of corruption among audited municipal expenditures.
Aid relief against drought seems only to open an opportunity for dishonest mayors
to steal more public resources. As an extension, the study shows that the hetero-
geneity of the effect is unclear concerning various dimensions such as electoral
characteristics, media presence, history of droughts, and fiscal capacity.
Our results complement the literature on the determinants of corruption (Serra,
2006; Treisman, 2007; Dong and Torgler, 2013). Our study is also related to works
that exploit the impact of natural disasters on political outcomes (Hunt, 2007; Bech-
tel and Hainmueller, 2011; Cole et al., 2012; Quiroz Flores and Smith, 2013). Addi-
tionally, this paper is connected to the recent literature that studies Brazil’s random-
ized auditing policy (Ferraz and Finan, 2008, 2011; Brollo et al., 2013; Timmons
and Garfias, 2015). As for policy implication, this paper reinforces a call for a re-
assessment of how emergency policies are designed to meet the needs of those that
deserve it more.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides a brief
explanation on how the design of public policies against droughts evolved over
time in Brazil. Section 4.3 gives a very simple framework of why emergency aid
against drought might affect the level of corruption. Section 4.4 presents the data
source. Section 4.5 describes the empirical strategy. Section 4.6 presents the results.
Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2. Background of Emergency Aid for Droughts
Drought is one of the most common natural disasters in the world. As this phe-
nomenon restricts access to an essential resource for humans, it has disturbing im-
6Based on 2008 prices.
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plications for economic development (Dai, 2011; Freire-Gonzalez et al., 2017). In
Brazil, drought has been associated with hunger and mortality. The occurrence of
droughts in the Brazilian territory has been reported since the beginning of Por-
tuguese colonization.7 However, it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that the
state began to implement public policies to mitigate its effects (Campos, 2015).8
A continuous debate between experts and the elite over time has determined the
design of policies against droughts and the amount of public money disbursed on it.9
The dominant view that prevailed for many years was that the cause of the drought
was due to the ignorance of the rural workers who did not know how to manage the
land properly.10 This view is later confronted by the argument that climatic factors
would be the cause of periods of water scarcity.11 Consequently, in the 1850s, as
the first governmental intervention to deal with droughts, ground stations began to
be built across the country to monitor the rainfall levels and predict future droughts
(Campos, 2015).
The great drought in north-eastern Brazil in 1877 was a turning point, as it el-
evated this natural tragedy to another level of public debate.12 As a reaction, the
state began to build water reservoirs in drought-prone regions. Although this public
policy endured until the early 1950s, these reservoirs had proven to be ineffective
in times of water shortage because they were non-perennial and had no water dis-
tribution system. Another turning point that switched the design of policies against
drought came after the critical drought in 1958, which caused several deaths and
displaced thousands of people. Policymakers changed the focus towards human-
itarian aid as the social condition of the peasants was increasingly discussed by
experts and the elite. At that time, the procedure of declaring a state of emergency
7The first reference from the Brazilian drought tragedy date to 1583, when the Jesuit Priest
Fernão Cardim (1549 - 1625) wrote that a drought caused death by hunger of approximately five
thousand Indians.
8However, the state was already concerned about it even before the nineteenth century. In 1777,
members of the Camera Official, which represented the Portuguese Kingdom, asked the King for
assistance by sending as many slaves as had died from starvation in a drought that killed 7/8 of the
cattle.
9On May 30, 1856, in a session chaired by the Emperor D. Pedro II, a commission of Brazil-
ian engineers and naturalists was established to explore the problem of lesser-known Brazilian
provinces. This became the symbolic moment in which policies against drought began to be for-
mulated.
10This view, represented by Guilherme de Capanema (1824 - 1908), argued that because of the
lack of human capacity in the drought-prone regions, nothing could be done by the state to resolve
the problem of droughts.
11The engineer Virato de Medeiros (1823 - 1900) was the voice of this vision and advocated that
the state should improve the state capacity to predict coming droughts.
12Because of the severity of the water shortage, the Emperor D. Pedro II had promised to sell the
crown jewels to solve the problem.
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to trigger individualistic provision of food and water was set up.13
The priority given to palliative policies to address drought became common both
in the period of military dictatorship (1964 - 1985) and in the democratic peri-
ods. Permanent policies that promote environmental sustainability and economic
activity have been left out of the public policy agenda.14 Although humanitarian
aid has reduced drought-related deaths and extinguished massive migratory move-
ments, this happened at the expense of rural workers’ resilience. Rural workers’
dependence on humanitarian aid in times of water crisis created a propitious sce-
nario for a clientelism relationship between politicians and voters. In exchange for
votes, incumbent politicians favored their supporters with water distribution. This
clientelism relationship became known as the drought industry (indústria da seca)
(Callado, 1960).
Public scandals involving the misuse of public resources that originally aimed to
relieve the consequences of drought are not rare. The increasing amount of public
resources earmarked for humanitarian aid combined with low transparency on its
implementation has opened a window of opportunity for corrupt activities.15 In
fact, the malfeasance in government programs to address droughts was supported
by informal rhetoric in novels and song lyrics suggesting that the Brazilian political
economy and the incidence of drought are intrinsically linked. It is not in vain that
the drought industry is still used in regional and national political debates (Nelson
and Finan, 2009).
13This novel approach was led by the creation of the Superintendência de Desenvolvimento do
Nordeste (SUDENE) by the Brazilian government. Under the supervision of Celso Furtado, the
process of implementing public policies against drought became more decentralized, and the target
of these policies became more individualistic than before.
14By the end of the 1990s, the Brazilian federal government added other forms of policy against
drought. For example, rural families already included in the Bolsa Família conditional cash transfer
program became eligible for Bolsa Estiagem, a program that increases the earnings of the families
suffering from a drought. Another social program that was created focuses on drought is the Garan-
tia Safra initiative, which offers insurance to rural farmers who are remunerated during the drought
years. These programs are conditional on the declaration of the state of emergency of the residents
of a Brazilian municipality.
15Episodes pointing to misuse of public money have taken place since public policies to fight
drought began to be implemented. For instance, a member of the commission formed by the Emperor
D. Pedro after the drought in 1877 noted that several commissioners responsible for managing funds
allocated by the central government were incompetent and some were dishonest. However, it was
notably during the drought of 1958 that corruption in the application of public resources became




The determinants of corruption have been studied extensively (Treisman, 2007;
Dong and Torgler, 2013). Among these determinants, scholars have agreed that rent
extraction is an increasing function of budget size (Brollo and Nannicini, 2012). For
instance, an incumbent who faces fewer budget constraints can marginally extract
more rents without penalizing her re-election prospects. Emergency aid increases
the size of the budget since it behaves as unilateral transfers from higher tiers of gov-
ernment and ultimately increases corruption (Leeson and Sobel, 2008; Yamamura,
2014; Nikolova and Marinov, 2017). This section describes intuitively a framework
of why aid relief due to drought could affect the level of corruption according to a
political agency model (Persson and Tabellini, 2002; Besley and Burgess, 2002).
Consider a population in which citizens differ from each other exclusively by
income. Elections follow a majority rule, and individuals decide their vote based
on their policy preferences that rely on two dimensions: private consumption and
public goods. Politicians are identical in all respects, from the perspective of voters,
and voters coordinate their voting strategy based on the observable state of nature.
Voters will only vote for incumbent re-election if retrospectively the voters’ level
of utility were at least higher or equal to a certain threshold, the reservation utility.
Otherwise, voters will vote for the challenger candidate.
The incumbent policymaker faces a trade-off between rent extraction while in
office and the probability of future re-election. Conceptually, rent extraction could
refer to both funding for political parties and a diversion of resources for private
use. The public budget can take the form of public goods provision but also the
form of rents for politicians. It falls exclusively upon the incumbent to choose the
ideal balance of the budget between public goods provision and rents.
In this framework, incumbent politicians face a maximization problem given that
if they extract all rents from the public budget, they will not provide sufficient public
goods to be re-elected. Incumbent politicians should decline some of the rents to
guarantee their re-election chances. Thus, the optimal choice is to provide citizens
precisely the level of public goods that equalizes with voter reservation utility. The
money left in the budget turns into rents for private use or funding political parties.
Given the rent extraction and public goods provision equilibrium, how could in-
tergovernmental emergency transfers for water scarcity affect the level of corrup-
tion? Bearing in mind that emergency aid coming from the federal government to
municipalities can be admitted as a lump-sum inflow of public resources, the budget
tightening may be reduced. This would imply a higher margin to distribute more
resources between rent extraction and provision of public goods. The ultimate im-
pact of emergency aid on the level of corruption would then be determined by the
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incumbents’ preferences between re-election and expropriation of public resources
for personal gain.
One can also expect that features such as fiscal capacity level, historical drought
frequency, level of social capital, and political competition may change the level
of rent extraction. Higher levels of fiscal capacity and social capital are related
to the development of democratic institutions, which in turn enables individuals to
identify corrupt behavior better and thus to prevent malfeasance. For instance, hav-
ing free and independent media appears to reduce corruption as voters are better
informed about government performance (Dong and Torgler, 2013). Drought fre-
quency could be related to corruption. For instance, Yamamura (2014) shows that
people who live in disaster-prone areas do so to benefit from disasters, although this
finding is only significant for developed countries; it is less evident for develop-
ing countries. Political competition can influence corruption because it reinforces
the political agency problem (Treisman, 2007). As incumbents are less likely to be
re-elected in a highly competitive environment, they need to allocate most of the
public budget for the public goods provision, leaving less room for rent extraction.
4.4. Data
The empirical analysis exploits Brazilian data at the municipal level regarding the
level of corruption, federal government aid relief, incidence of droughts, economic
and political features, mayor’s characteristics, and municipal public finances. In
the following subsections, I provide the sources and describe how I construct the
variables. Summary statistics are shown in Table 4.1.
4.4.1. Corruption
I gather information about corruption at the municipal government level from Brollo
et al. (2013). The dataset contains information about the share of public resources
that have been diverted from its original purpose. The source comes from audit
reports of an anti-corruption program conducted by the Brazilian Federal Govern-
ment.
The federal agency Controladoria Geral da União (CGU), in 2003, began to
examine in close detail how mayors were spending federal transfers. Auditors were
assigned to personally visit local governments and inspect their public finances.
They produced reports providing information about the exact amount of money that
was being diverted. These reports were subsequently made publicly available on
the internet and had been used in several empirical studies on corruption (Ferraz
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Table 4.1.: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
=1 if at least one corruption episode is reported 0.436 0.496 0 1
Amount involved in corruption episodes over the total amount audited 0.020 0.061 0.000 0.746
Amount involved in corruption episodes per capita R$ 7.59 34.48 R$ 0.00 R$ 679.75
Log of narrow corruption in level per capita 0.727 1.274 0 6.523
Log of broad corruption in level per capita 1.510 1.633 0 6.523
=1 if aid relief because of drought 0.213 0.41 0 1
Number of aid relief because of drought 0.250 0.517 0 3
Aridity Index (AI) 1.396 1.039 0.219 7.621
Trend component of AI 1.513 1.298 0.167 8.890
Cycle component of AI -0.117 0.502 -3.755 1.648
Population 24,546 33691 837 425,772
Average income per capita R$ 565.60 1158.34 R$ 5.21 R$ 14,292.38
Average years of education 2.533 1.009 0.375 6.036
Share of employee working in the agriculture sector 17.468% 8.385 0.069% 58.275%
Share of employee working in the industry sector 5.781% 4.627 0.303% 37.148%
Share of employee working in the public sector 1.382% 0.810 0.129% 8.218%
Share of inhabitants living below the poverty line 55.171% 7.524 31.684% 70.384%
Political alignment with federal government 0.565 0.496 0 1
Herfindahl-Hirshman Index for political competition 0.518 0.115 0.000 0.786
Years of education of the mayor 13.149 4.152 1 17
Second term 0.238 0.426 0 1
Municipal budget debt 64.40% 0.651 0.10% 767.60%
Local tax collection per capita R$ 103.50 323.733 R$ 0.00 R$ 6761.78
Located within the boundary of the Amazon rainforest 0.132 0.339 0 1
Funded before the 20th century 0.220 0.414 0 1
Presence of local radio 0.416 0.493 0 1
Change in population (1991 - 2000) 0.068 1.505 -0.966 43.183
Change in income per capita (1991 - 2000) 1.824 2.977 -0.995 17.100
Change in level of education (1991 - 2000) 0.48 0.271 -0.266 2.101
Historical aid relief 0.407 0.492 0 1
Obs: 1,081
and Finan, 2011; Timmons and Garfias, 2015; Brollo and Troiano, 2016).
Unquestionably the most important feature of this program for empirical analysis
is the way in which it was designed. A lottery was the selection procedure used to
choose the municipalities that would be audited. The randomness characteristic of a
lottery avoids concerns about the data-generation process that would bias empirical
investigations. That is, the sample accurately contains non-corrupt municipalities as
the audit reports give a comprehensive picture of how the incumbent implemented
local government spending. In this way, the municipalities found to be without any
cases of corruption are an ideal control group for the corrupt municipalities. This
is unlikely to be achieved in studies where corruption measurement is based on
media news or lawsuits since the control group can be municipalities where graft
and bribery were simply not disclosed. It is interesting that the auditors do not limit
their inspections to only the mayor; instead, they investigated the expenditures of
federally-funded transfers since 1997. During the period of analysis, 29 lotteries
collected between 50 and 60 cities each between the years 2003 and 2010, which
resulted in a total of 1,600 municipalities that had their finances investigated; this
led to an audit of 2,293 terms of mayors. Another significant advantage of these data
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is that they are built as an objective measure of corruption instead of a perception-
based measure.
The Brollo et al. (2013) dataset contains two definitions of corruption. I focus on
the narrow definition of corruption because it is the measure that explicitly reports
irregularities that are undoubtedly serious cases of dishonest behavior. The broad
definition of corruption also includes wrongdoings that could also be interpreted as
mismanagement instead of unethical behavior. I create a proxy of it by multiplying
the share of narrow corruption with the non-mandatory federal transfers.16 Thus,
the outcome variable of this study is the monetary value of theft per capita during
the administration of a particular mayor. Due to the skewness of the variable and
because some municipalities did not present cases of corruption, for the empirical
analysis I add the value of 1 and transform it into its logarithm.
For the sake of consistency, the analysis focuses only on the audit outcomes that
have led the auditors to examine the mayor’s expenditures over the duration of her
entire term. The reason for this is that it does not make sense to compare levels of
corruption among municipalities where public spending was inspected for only one
year of the mayor being in office with municipalities that had their public spending
inspected during all four years, for instance. Additionally, municipalities that had
their public expenditures audited in three or fewer years of the mayor’s term are
those that had their audit reports released during the mayor’s term. This is problem-
atic because a shock of information, as in the case of revealed corruption scandals,
affects the behavior of both voters and politicians; this reinforces the inadequacy of
making comparisons with municipalities that did not have an audit report released
during the mayor’s term.17
4.4.2. Federal Aid Relief
Since the 1960s, the Brazilian government has used a state of emergency as a pro-
cedure to allocate emergency aid against drought. (Nelson and Finan, 2009).18 Fol-
lowing the president’s recognition of the need to rescue a particular municipality,
the federal government publishes an ordinance that triggers several types of benefit
to the affected locality.
16I do not use FPM transfers to compute the amount of corruption because most audits do not
scrutinize this type of transfer. See Brollo et al. (2013) for more specific details.
17For instance, revealed corruption causes voters to punish the incumbent mayor in subsequent
elections (Ferraz and Finan, 2011), leads incumbents to reduce municipal property tax (Timmons
and Garfias, 2015), and prompts political parties select more educated candidates to run for election
(Cavalcanti et al., 2016).
18State of emergency because of drought was first proposed in 1962 by Celso Furtado at the time
chair of SUDENE (Superintendência do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste), in Resolution No: 453.
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These benefits include monetary transfers, disclaimer of legal bureaucratic pro-
cedures for public spending, investment in infrastructure, distribution of water and
food, and sending the army to affected areas to help with basic needs (Campos,
2015). The variety of forms of help makes aid relief challenging to express in mon-
etary terms.
For simplicity, I proxy aid relief as the recognition of a state of emergency or
public calamity because of drought by the federal government. The main variable
of interest is computed as the amount of aid relief for drought during the term of the
mayor of a given city. I cover both definitions of meteorological and hydrological
droughts according to Dai (2011).19 The data are gathered from Sistema Integrado
de Informações sobre Desastres Naturais (S2ID) for the period of 1996 to 2008.
4.4.3. Drought
I define the level of water scarcity as a measure of aridity of a municipality. For
this purpose, I construct the aridity index; this index is similar to the ones used
in studies explicitly focused on the hydrology of lands (Wolfe, 1997; Arora, 2002)
and calculates the monthly ratio between the amount of rain and the amount of





The subscript t represents the monthly observations of each weather variable, and
the subscript m represents the municipality. Since a mayor’s term lasts four years,
I use the corresponding number of months (t = 48). Higher values of the index
indicate that the net retention of water is deficient.
The data about monthly rainfall and evaporation are collected from 280 ground
weather stations from INMET, the Brazilian Institute of Meteorology, and spatially
interpolated among municipalities.20 The coverage of each weather station ranges
from 1961 to 2008.21
19I define aid relief for hydrological droughts when the recognition of a state of emergency is
because of secas and aid relief for meteorological droughts when the recognition of a state of emer-
gency is because of estiagens.
20We compute the distance between the municipality’s centroid and the closest ground station of
each quadrant. The inverse square of such distance is used as a weight to proxy weather variables of
each municipality.
21Using data from these stations is advantageous because they provide objective weather infor-
mation. Rainfall levels are recorded with a pluviograph, and levels of evaporation are recorded from
a Piche evaporimeter. Objective weather data are superior to those gathered from satellites data be-
cause satellites do not directly measure rainfall and evaporation, but instead make inferences (Dell
et al., 2014).
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The reason for using this index is because droughts in Brazil are commonly asso-
ciated with the process of desertification of areas, and the index relies on two indica-
tors of water availability that depicts the net flow of water of a given region. This is
important since it describes the capacity of water storage. Using a unique variation
of rainfall provides incomplete information about the soil moisture balance.22 Nev-
ertheless, I implement other proxies for drought shocks using variations of rainfall
and a different source of precipitation data in the robustness checks section.
To ensure that the drought measure does not merely capture a long-term level
of corruption of a municipality that can be correlated with institutional factors, the
identification strategy exploits the quasi-random nature of the cycle component of
aridity index. I decompose the aridity index into trend and cycle components fol-
lowing the procedure proposed by Hamilton (2017). That is, I predict the trend
component using a very simple forecast using the four most recent values of arid-
ity index for each municipality and for each point of time.23 The cycle component
is merely the difference between the actual value of the aridity index and the trend
component. This procedure guarantees the random walk characteristic of the aridity
index cycle component, which is presumably exogenous to any structural element.
Given its random feature, the cycle component of the aridity index is used as an
instrumental variable in the empirical analysis.
Figure 4.1 depicts histograms of the trend and cyclical components. Note that
the trend component smoothly tracks the level aridity index and that the cyclical
component is uniformly distributed around zero.
4.4.4. Municipality Characteristics
I construct variables that account for the characteristics of the municipalities from
1991 Census of the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). The rea-
son is to control for structural features that could determine the long-run pattern of
corruption level of a municipality. The control variables are population, average
income per capita, the share of people below the poverty line24, average years of
schooling, and the proportion of employees in the agriculture, industry, and public
sectors.25 I also gather information related to the age of a municipality, whether the
22For interested readers, Dai (2011) demonstrates why one should not use total precipitation
alone to measure changes in aridity or drought.
23For example, to estimate the trend component of the aridity index of a municipality in 2004, I
use the aridity index of that municipality in the years 2000, 1996, 1992, and 1988.
24People living with less than $1.90 per day based on 2011 prices.
25Using variables from the 2000 Census provide qualitatively and statistically similar results.
However, the use of the 2000 Census would result in the control variables not being prior to the
dependent variable, since some cases of corruption date back to 1997.
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(a) Trend component (b) Cycle component
The figures show the histograms of the trend component of aridity index and the cycle component of aridity in-
dex, respectively. Trend component smoothly tracks the level of aridity while the cycle component is uniformly
distributed around zero.
Figure 4.1.: Decomposing the aridity index in trend and cycle components
city is located within the boundary of the Amazon rainforest, and whether the city
is located within the boundary of the semi-arid region. I collect data from the 2000
Census to calculate the percentage change in the level of population, income, and
education of a municipality compared to the 1991 Census. Finally, I extract data on
whether a municipality has a local radio from the 2006 municipality survey Perfil
dos Municípios Brasileiros: Cultura.
4.4.5. Political Characteristics
I compute variables that depict political features of a municipality. For an index of
political competition, I use the outcomes of the previous mayoral election to con-
struct the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (Hirschman, 1964). This index provides a
measure of how dispersed the votes were among the candidates for mayor in the
prior election. Additionally, I construct a dummy variable to note whether a munic-
ipality is politically aligned with the federal government.26 Regarding individual
characteristics of the incumbent mayors, I build variables that stand for the number
of years of education, and whether the mayor is in the second term in office.27 All of
these variables are constructed using data from Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE).
26We follow the definition of a presidential coalition of parties by Brollo and Nannicini (2012).
27Re-election has been permitted since 1997 (Emenda Constitucional n. 16, 4th of June) but is
still limited to two terms.
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4.4.6. Municipal Public Finance
I extract data regarding municipal government budget from FINBRA. More specif-
ically, I calculate non-mandatory federal transfers and mandatory federal transfers
(FPM) to a municipality during the entire term of each mayor. Furthermore, I calcu-
late a measure of indebtedness of the municipal public finance and the total revenue
from local taxes per capita. Monetary values are normalized to 2008 price levels.
4.5. Empirical Strategy
The main objective of this analysis is to test whether disaster relief for droughts
has an impact on the level of corruption. More precisely, I investigate whether the
number of emergency state declarations due to drought increases the amount of
graft found by auditors about federal transfers at the city level.
Hence, I first perform a naive analysis by estimating the following model:
Ci,t = β1+β2Ai,t+Xi,tβ3+yt+ zs+ εi,t (4.1)
where C represents the amount of corruption per capita of the municipality i at
the term t. The coefficient of interest is β which represents the average association
of the number of state of emergency recognition due to drought during the full term
of the mayor. Xi,t represents a matrix with the characteristics of the municipalities
and the attributes of the mayor. The terms yt and zs represent state and year fixed
effects. The ε is the error term.
As 66% of the municipalities in my sample do not show evidence of corruption,
the dependent variable is left-censored at zero. To accommodate the characteristics
of the data on the econometric method, we estimate a Tobit model as the main
approach.
Isolating the causal effect of humanitarian aid on the level of corruption is chal-
lenging because there are several determinants of intergovernmental transfers. For
example, the interested coefficient extracted from the above econometric specifica-
tion may suffer from bias due to cultural, institutional, and political characteristics
in which it is not observable.
To overcome problems caused by bias in the allocation of humanitarian aid, I
adopted as the main econometric strategy the method of instrumental variable re-
gression. I exploit the unexpected nature of weather conditions to isolate exogenous
variation in the amount of aid relief received by each municipality. For this, the cor-









3 +yt+ zs+ εi,t, (4.2)
where Z represents the cycle component of the aridity index of the municipality
during the full term of the mayor. The underlying assumption here is that deviations
from the aridity trend are exogenous to the incumbent mayor’s honesty and the
quality of institutions, and consequently Z is not correlated with the error term.
4.6. Results
4.6.1. Main Results
In this section, I report the main results. As a preliminary analysis, I plot in Figure
4.2 the reduced form relationship between the level of corruption and the cycle com-
ponent of the aridity index in a two-way scatter with a regression line fit through
it. The figure shows the first evidence suggesting that levels of water scarcity and
levels of corruption per capita are intrinsically positively correlated. Holding mu-
nicipalities and mayor characteristics constant, a one standard deviation increase in
the cycle component of the aridity index increases around 12 percentage points on
the level of narrow corruption per capita.
The figure shows the reduced form relationship between the level of corruption and the
cycle component of the aridity index in a two-way scatter with a regression line fit through
it.
Figure 4.2.: Reduced form analysis
In Table 4.2, I present the results of the econometric strategy. In Panel A, I present
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the simple OLS and Tobit specifications. Although these estimations cannot be de-
fined as causal, they serve as a useful benchmark for the IV regressions. In Panel
B, I present the results of the first stages of the instrumental variables’ regressions,
and in Panel C, I present the results of the second stages. In the first columns of
each panel, I show the results using an OLS estimation. In the subsequent columns
of each panel, I implement a Tobit approach. In each panel, I introduce the control
variables systematically. In columns (1) to (2), (7) to (8), and (13) to (14), no con-
trol is included. In columns (3), (9), and (15), I include the control variables that
account for the economic and social structure, such as population, average income,
average years of education, share of employees working in the agriculture sector,
share of employees working in the industrial sector, share of employees working in
the public sector, and share of inhabitants living below the poverty line. In columns
(4), (10), and (16), I include control variables that account for political characteris-
tics of a municipality, such as political competition and political alignment with the
federal government. In columns (5), (11), and (17), I include control variables that
account for the characteristics of the incumbent mayor, such as years of education,
gender, whether the incumbent is in the second term and the level of fiscal capac-
ity. In columns (6), (12), and (18), I include controls variables such as whether the
municipality is located within the boundary of the Amazon rainforest, whether the
municipality was founded before the 20th century, and whether the municipality has
a local radio.
Going to the interpretation of the results, the coefficients estimated in Panel A
suggest a weak association between disaster relief and level of corruption. The co-
efficients range from −0.010 to 0.045, but none of them is statistically significant at
the usual standards. If the distribution of aid relief due to droughts were exogenous
of any other not observable characteristic, I would conclude that such a policy does
not affect the level of corruption in a municipality.
However, the results of instrumental regressions suggest that there may be the
omitted variables may exert an influence on the latter specifications.28 In the columns
of Panel C, the coefficient estimated using two-stage least squares in column (13) is
1.3 and statistically significant at the 10% level. The coefficients of columns (14) to
(18) are extracted from the Tobit model that uses maximum likelihood estimation.
This econometric approach considers that the dependent variable is left-censored in
zero given there are municipalities that did not present any case of corruption. In
this case, the coefficients range from 3.2 to 3.4, and they are statistically significant.
The first stages of the IV regressions depicted in Panel B suggest that the proposed
28Several studies recognize that public sector corruption is associated with institutional factors




Table 4.2.: Aid relief for droughts and level of corruption
Panel A: OLS and Tobit Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid Relief 0.001 -0.010 0.004 0.021 0.045 0.033
(0.080) (0.211) (0.212) (0.210) (0.212) (0.214)
R-squared 0.100
Pseudo R-squared 0.0495 0.0542 0.0553 0.0562 0.0572
Panel B: First Stage of IV Regressions
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Cycle Component of Aridity Index 0.188*** 0.195*** 0.178*** 0.177*** 0.180*** 0.176***
(0.026) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Anderson-Rubin (AR) Test P-value 0.0470 0.0278 0.0335 0.0311 0.0347 0.0376
Wald Test P-value 0.0953 0.0460 0.0562 0.0534 0.0567 0.0611
Panel C: Second Stage of IV Regressions
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Aid Relief 1.306* 3.228** 3.423* 3.470* 3.384* 3.394*
(0.780) (1.618) (1.793) (1.797) (1.772) (1.809)
Method OLS Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Observations 1,081 1,081 1,081 1,081 1,081 1,081
Municipal Characteristics    
Political Features   
Incumbent Characteristics  
Others 
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of monetary value of narrow corruption per capita.
Trend component of aridity index, states dummies, and terms fixed effects included in all specifi-
cations. Robust standard error in parentheses. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value
< 0.10.
instrumental variable works well. The Wald Tests reject the hypothesis that the in-
strumental variable is irrelevant at 90$ level of confidence. The Anderson-Rubin
tests readily reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the endogenous regres-
sor in the structural equation is jointly equal to zero at the 95% level of confidence
and indicate that the endogenous regressor is relevant.
To put the results in perspective, I use the estimate drawn in column (18) of Panel
C to calculate in Figure 4.3 the margin effects separately for municipalities that
were recognized once, twice, and three times in a state of emergency. The margin
effect does not vary at each number of state of emergency recognition. Figure 4.3a
measures the overall effect of aid relief on corruption for all observations and Fig-
ure 4.3b measures the effect of aid relief on corruption for corrupted municipalities.
The average partial effects estimated indicates that the amount of narrow corruption
per capita increase approximately by 70% for all observations and by 183% for cor-
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rupted municipalities, respectively. Given the average level of narrow corruption in
Brazilian municipalities, the estimate suggests that disaster relief against droughts
translates to a rise in stolen public money throughout the whole mayor’s term of
approximately R$ 5.00 and R$ 41.00 per capita, respectively.29
(a) For all observations (b) For corrupt municipalities
Note: The y-axis is the partial effect at the average of aid relief on corruption, and the x-axis represents the
quantity of aid relief granted by a municipality during a mayor’s 4-year term.
Figure 4.3.: Partial effects
A possible explanation for the sharp difference in the positive evidence in the
relationship between aid relief for droughts and the levels of corruption extracted
from the IV regressions and the estimates obtained from the simple OLS and Tobit
methods may be due to the reverse causality in the naive estimates. The Brazil-
ian central government could decide not to recognize a state of emergency due to
droughts in municipalities that historically have high levels of corruption, anticipat-
ing that a significant part of this humanitarian aid would be diverted for purposes
other than its original aim. Likewise, municipalities that historically have more
honest and competent mayors may receive more aid relief and implement it appro-
priately, which would again attenuate the OLS and Tobit coefficients on aid relief
granted.
Although the findings above are, to the best of my knowledge, the first evidence
of the effect of disaster relief for water scarcity on corruption, it stands in the similar
direction that previous studies found relative to other kinds of natural disasters. For
instance, in a close study to our, Nikolova and Marinov (2017) show that flood-
related transfers in Bulgaria are associated with spending infringements identified
in publicly available audit reports. In the context of U.S., Leeson and Sobel (2008)
show that the number of corruption-related crime convictions increased in states
that received FEMA disaster relief. Analyzing as a reduced form the impact of
29The average corruption of all observations in the sample is R$ 7.59 per capita. The average
corruption only for corrupt municipalities is R$ 22.40 per capita. Based on 2008 prices.
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natural disaster incidence over corruption, the study of Yamamura (2014) found a
positive effect in both developing and developed countries. Investigating if victims
of droughts in Peru are more likely to bribe public officials, also as a reduced form,
Hunt (2007) finds no significant effect.
4.6.2. Robustness Checks
In this section, I test the main results using alternative variables. Table 4.3 shows the
results of the Tobit model for IV specification using different measures of corrup-
tion, aid relief, testing the exclusion restriction, and using alternative instrumental
variables. The table also presents the p-value of the Anderson-Rubin (AR) test
and Wald test for weak instruments with only one endogenous regressor, and addi-
tionally the p-value of conditional likelihood ratio (CLR) test for weak instruments
when there are more than one endogenous regressor.
In column (1) of Panel A, I use the definition of broad corruption as the depen-
dent variable rather than narrow corruption according to Brollo et al. (2013). The
broad definition of corruption also includes practices that could be interpreted as
a matter of mayor mismanagement instead of explicitly fraudulent practices. The
result remains very similar to the main analysis. In column (2), I use a different
proxy to calculate the amount of narrow corruption. Instead of using federal trans-
fers throughout the mayor’s term, I exclude the transfers that were made during
electoral years. It is documented that central governments often prioritize munici-
palities that are politically aligned with more public resources in electoral years to
influence electoral results (Garrett and Sobel, 2003; Brollo and Nannicini, 2012).
Thus, the definition of corruption by construction could incorporate the noise that
comes from the political business cycle (Nordhaus, 1975). Nevertheless, the result
suggests that this is not the case since the coefficient does not change. Moreover, to
ensure that the results are not capturing a mechanical effect of federal transfers to
municipalities, I use the federal transfers alone in column (3) as a dependent vari-
able, without taking into account the share of corruption identified by the auditors.
The coefficient confirms that the result is robust about this hypothesis since the esti-
mated coefficient is close to zero and statistically insignificant. In column (4), I use
as a dependent variable a dummy that takes the value of 1 if an episode of narrow
corruption was found by auditors and 0 otherwise. In this case, the coefficient is
not statistically significant. A similar result is found in column (5) if I use as the
dependent variable the fraction of narrow corruption episodes over the total amount
audited. These findings suggest that disaster relief against drought does not turn an
honest mayor into a corrupt one but only opens an opportunity for dishonest mayors
to steal more public resources.
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Table 4.3.: Robustness checks









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2.997** 3.065* 0.510 0.486 0.084
(1.451) (1.711) (0.318) (0.525) (0.076)
AR Test P-value 0.0150 0.0495 0.0735 0.3219 0.2587
Wald Test P-value 0.0367 0.0737 0.1016 0.3350 0.2739









(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
5.262* 25.509 3.903* 1.560 1.339
(2.899) (19.836) (2.140) (3.765) (1.684)
AR Test P-value 0.0373 0.0365 0.0384 0.0378 0.0369
Wald Test P-value 0.0697 0.2018 0.0685 0.0738 0.0419








(a + b + c)
Political
Alignment
(16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
3.386* 3.368* 3.430* 3.408* 3.679**
(1.802) (1.802) (1.817) (1.812) (1.835)
AR Test P-value 0.0368 0.0380 0.0356 0.0365 0.0500
Wald Test P-value 0.0607 0.0622 0.0595 0.0605 0.0451
CLR Test P-value 0.0250













(11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
2.458* 2.475** 2.478 4.394 0.510
(1.368) (1.254) (6.658) (12.032) (1.401)
AR Test P-value 0.0991 0.2848 0.6926 0.6670 0.7150
Wald Test P-value 0.0734 0.0492 0.6984 0.7071 0.7382
CLR Test P-value 0.0564 0.0425
Notes: States and terms fixed effects included in all specifications. Controls variables include trend
component of aridity index, population, average income, share of graduated, share of employee work-
ing in the agriculture sector, share of employee working in the industry sector, share of employee
working in the public sector, share of inhabitants living below the poverty line, political competi-
tion, political alignment with the federal government, years of education of mayor, gender, a dummy
whether the incumbent is in the second term, level of fiscal capacity of the municipal government,
whether the municipality is located within the boundary of the Amazon rainforest, whether the munic-
ipality was founded before the 20th century, and whether the municipality has a local radio. Standard
error clustered at municipality level in parentheses. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value
< 0.10.
Regarding different measures of aid relief, in column (6) of Panel B, I use as an
explanatory variable a dummy that takes the value of 1 if there has been at least
one recognition of the state of emergency and 0 otherwise. We observe that the
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coefficient increases, to some extent. This result is reasonable because it depicts
the average difference between municipalities that were granted by humanitarian
aid from those municipalities that were not. Thus, as this definition of aid relief
does not consider the number of times that a municipality has been recognized in a
state of emergency, the coefficient increases to accommodate the municipalities that
were granted more the once. In columns (7) and (8), I disentangle the recognition
of state emergency between hydrological droughts and meteorological droughts,
respectively. The difference between them is that the hydrological drought refers
to a prolonged lack of rainfall that has a more dramatic impact on the livelihoods
of the citizens and the meteorological drought mainly affects crops. As each type
of drought leads to different forms of government aid, I test whether the results are
sensitive to this difference.30 In fact, the results of such differentiation indicate that
aid relief for hydrological droughts has a low precision in the coefficient of interest,
while aid relief for meteorological droughts seems to drive all the effect found in
the main analysis. To confirm that the effect of disaster relief on corruption comes
from the recognition of a state of emergency against drought during the years in
which the mayor is in his term, I propose two falsification tests. First, I use as an
alternative measure of disaster relief whether a municipality was recognized in a
state of emergency during the years of Brazilian military dictatorship (1964 1986).
Second, I use an indicator as an endogenous regressor of whether a municipality is
located within the boundary of the semi-arid region. In both cases, the coefficients
are not statistically significant, as described in columns (9) and (10), respectively.
The instrumental variable strategy would be valid provided that the cycle com-
ponent of aridity index does not affect corruption, except through the allocation of
disaster relief. In Panel C, I test for such an exclusion restriction. Intuitively, natural
disasters can trigger massive migration, which would, in turn, reduce the population
size, affect the income level of the region, and impact the level of human capital.
Thus, if the hypothesis that the droughts impact the level of corruption of a munic-
ipality through mechanisms other than public fund windfalls, it would presumably
be through the change of these characteristics mentioned above. Thus, if I add such
changes in characteristics in the empirical analysis as control variables and the dis-
aster relief against drought estimation remains stable, this finding would advocate
against the direct influence of the cyclical component of the aridity index on cor-
ruption. In columns (16) to (18), I introduce systematically the percentage change
in population, income, and education of each municipality using Census of 1991
and 2000, respectively. In column (19) I introduce these controls variable simul-
taneously. Even so, the interested coefficient of disaster relief remains unchanged.
30Hydrological droughts lead to the distribution of basic survival aid, and meteorological
droughts often result in financial support for farmers (Campos, 2015).
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Furthermore, to ensure that the effect is actually given through disaster relief, I
also incorporate as an additional instrumental variable the interaction between party
alignment and the cyclical component of the aridity index. Although party align-
ment is not an exogenous feature, it is well documented that political alignment
is a strong determinant of intergovernmental transfers (Arulampalam et al., 2009;
Brollo and Nannicini, 2012). By doing so, I forcefully describe that the impact
found in the main analysis is through the proposed mechanism. Again, in column
(20), the estimated coefficient remains stable.
I also test the results of the main analysis using different instrumental variables.
More specifically, I divide the variation of aridity index into the term of the mayor.
In column (11), I compute the ratio between evaporation and rainfall for every 24
months for each municipality and do so in column (12) for every 12 months, and
I introduce them to capture variation within the mayor’s term. Although the coef-
ficient of interest decreases slightly, it remains positive and statistically significant
in both cases. Alternatively, in column (13), I use as an instrumental variable the
Zscore of the aridity index.31 In columns (14) and (15), I use as an instrumental vari-
able the rainfall from INMET and NOAA’s PRECipitation REConstruction Dataset
(Chen et al., 2002), respectively. In each alternative of the instrumental variables
using Zscore, the first stage of regression becomes weaker, impairing the precision
of the coefficients of interest. These results suggest that the cycle component of the
aridity index performs better than the indicated alternatives.
4.6.3. Heterogeneous Analysis
This section explores the heterogeneity of the impact of aid relief because of droughts
on the level of corruption regarding characteristics that may influence the level of
rent extraction. In the main empirical specification, I systematically introduce an in-
teraction between various dimensions and aid relief and use the interaction between
the heterogeneous variable and the cycle component of aridity index as an additional
instrument. I am interested in characteristics that may be related to the electoral
contest, individual characteristics of the mayor, social capital, and level of fiscal ca-
pacity of a municipality. These characteristics have been shown in previous works
that are associated with the level of corruption (Treisman, 2007; Dong and Torgler,
2013; Yamamura, 2014). The coefficients and the p-values of the Anderson-Rubin
(AR) test and Wald test for weak instruments are presented in Table 4.4. The esti-
mates depict non-significant findings. The interpretation of the coefficients should
31Specifically, the Zscore of a weather variable is the difference between the current weather
measure and the historical average of such measure in the municipality during the same years divided
by the municipality’s historical standard deviation.
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be taken only as suggestive and by no means intends to describe an impact inference
or causal relation.
Table 4.4.: Heterogeneous analysis





Second Term Media Level of
Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aid Relief 4.069** 3.384* 3.361 3.526* 7.012
(1.944) (2.035) (3.223) (1.875) (8.090)
x Aid Relief -11.036 -0.009 -0.181 -3.000 4.541
(9.792) (0.731) (7.967) (4.171) (8.783)
AR Test P-value 0.0261 0.1149 0.1088 0.1019 0.1157
Wald Test P-value 0.0776 0.1700 0.1509 0.1653 0.3136








(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Aid Relief 3.348 8.118 3.200* 5.003 2.812
(3.573) (16.535) (1.777) (3.720) (1.833)
x Aid Relief 1.632 0.337 -2.388 -0.010 -1.272
(5.734) (6.521) (1.668) (0.017) (1.391)
AR Test P-value 0.1260 0.3172 0.0946 0.1041 0.1022
Wald Test P-value 0.2062 0.6286 0.1567 0.2787 0.1022
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of monetary value of narrow corruption. States and
terms fixed effects included in all specifications. Controls variables include trend component of aridity
index, population, average income, share of graduated, share of employee working in the agriculture
sector, share of employee working in the industry sector, share of employee working in the public
sector, share of inhabitants living below the poverty line, political competition, political alignment
with the federal government, years of education of mayor, gender, a dummy whether the incumbent
is in the second term, level of fiscal capacity of the municipal government, whether the municipal-
ity is located within the boundary of the Amazon rainforest, whether the municipality was founded
before the 20th century, and whether the municipality has a local radio. Standard error clustered at
municipality level in parentheses. *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10.
In the first three columns, I study dimensions related to electoral features. Col-
umn (1) shows the interaction between aid relief and the level of political competi-
tion. The proxy used for political competition is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.
The result shows that municipalities that have low political competition are those
that were found to have higher levels of corruption than those that have high politi-
cal competition. In column (2), I interact with the years of education of the mayors.
The results do not suggest a meaningful difference in levels of corruption, regard-
less of whether the incumbent has high or low human capital. In column (3), I use
a dummy that differentiates the sample between mayors who are in the first term
and mayor who are lame ducks. It seems that the level of corruption is higher when
mayors are in the first term, but the very high standard error indicates that the co-
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efficient points towards zero. If it were true that mayors in the second term are less
corrupt, it would contrast the conclusions of Ferraz and Finan (2011), who find less
corruption in municipalities where mayors can seek re-election. However, while
Ferraz and Finan (2011) study the level of corruption regardless of the nature of
federally-transferred funds, this study focuses exclusively on the mechanism of aid
relief due to drought. The unexpected characteristic of aid relief combined with low
transparency can make corrupt activities particularly tempting compared to waiting
to capture other political rents later, and this temptation can be softened if the mayor
already has long experience in governing the municipal budget.
In columns (4) and (5), I use as a proxy for social capital the presence of a local ra-
dio station in the municipality and the average years of education of the inhabitants
of the municipality. Citizens who are exposed to information from local radios are
likely to be more informed of the mayor’s actions and better able to keep the mayor
accountable for her actions. The level of education of the inhabitants of a city can
describe the capacity to assimilate social capital knowledge. The results show an
inverse relation with the level of social capital.
Subsequently, I study heterogeneity regarding municipalities that have histori-
cally faced droughts and that have received aid to fight against them. In column
(6), I use a dummy variable that takes a value of one if during the military dictator-
ship the municipality was recognized as being in a state of emergency because of
drought and is zero otherwise. In column (7), I interact with the average of aridity
index calculated between 1961 to 1996. In the two columns described above, the
estimates produce an incredibly high standard error concerning the estimates, sug-
gesting that the coefficients found are close to zero. If the positive coefficients found
were not randomly determined, this would suggest that the municipalities that had
previous experience with aid relief and droughts are those municipalities that have
the highest extraction of rents.
Finally, columns (8) to (10) display the results of the heterogeneous exercise
regarding municipal characteristics that express fiscal and administrative state ca-
pacity. In column (8), I interact with a proxy that depicts the level of budget debt
of a municipality. It seems that municipalities with better financing conditions are
those that show a larger effect on the level of corruption than those municipali-
ties with higher fiscal constraint. Similar findings are for municipalities that have
greater local tax collection, in column (9). As the size of the public sector corre-
lates with development of the state and the size of the city is associated with the
capacity of the state to provide public goods, the result in column (10) suggests that
the negative impact of aid relief on governance is stronger in more developed mu-
nicipalities. These findings are consistent with studies that investigate corruption in
countries making the transition to a market economy. In a within-country analysis
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in the context of Bulgaria, Nikolova and Marinov (2017) show that the impact of
flood assistance on corruption is stronger in municipalities that are more econom-
ically developed. Studying also in a within-country analysis but in the context of
China, Dong and Torgler (2013) identify a positive relationship between corruption
and economic development of the provinces. Nevertheless, it is important to note
that there is robust evidence from cross-country analysis showing that economic
development is associated with less corruption (Mauro, 1995; Treisman, 2007).
4.7. Concluding Remarks
This paper has assessed whether aid relief for droughts increases the level of cor-
ruption at the municipality level in a context of a developing country. Using an
instrumental variable strategy with Tobit method this study shows that an additional
recognition of a state of emergency indeed increases the levels of corruption. The
estimations show that the margin effects of recognitions of the state of emergency
lead to an increase of corruption of R$ 5.00 per capita for all observations and R$
41.00 per capita for corrupted municipalities. This finding is alarming because it
suggests that there is a misappropriation of emergency relief and this prevents those
who need it most from being reached. This paper’s findings also suggest that aid
relief provision does not imply that honest mayors will begin performing unethi-
cally, but the aid relief against drought opens a window of opportunity for dishonest
mayors to steal more public resources.
This study has shortcomings that cannot be overlooked. One limitation is due to
the arguably weak inference power of the instrument used, which leads to the stan-
dard error of the variable of interest becoming high. For this reason, the analysis
reveals limited statistical power. However, the usage of other instrumental variables
that are commonly used in similar studies of droughts does not perform better than
the proposed cycle component of the aridity index. Another caveat is that the study
does not explicitly observe the amount of corruption, but rather is based on a proxy
of how much was stolen. Finally, although Brazil is a vast country in which mu-
nicipalities are quite heterogeneous regarding social, economic and environmental
characteristics, I still cannot say much about the external validity of this study.
Nonetheless, from a policy implication perspective, the results of this study call
for a reassessment of how emergency policies are designed to meet those who need
them. Although drought programs may invite rent seekers to divert funds, the po-
tential for corruption does not depend on drought policies themselves, but rather on
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Strong institutions are crucial in explaining the difference in the development of
nations. Democratic systems together with the rule of law and state capacity are ac-
cepted as a pathway towards vigorous institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013;
Fukuyama, 2014). This could be reached by gradually improving the efficiency of
governments to promote social protection. The central mechanism by which democ-
racy is good for modern, well-governed states is by electoral accountability. Sev-
eral models in the political economy literature have focused on this aspect to com-
prehend agents’ behavior (Besley and Coate, 1997; Ferejohn, 1986; Osborne and
Slivinski, 1996). This thesis contributes to the literature by shedding light on how
political parties, voters, and governments, in a context of regular elections, react
when struck by shocks as corruption scandals, droughts, and windfall revenues. The
lessons derived from each chapter could serve as benchmarks for enhancing mod-
els of electoral accountability and provide insights on which conditions democracy
produces either intended or undesired outcomes. Withstanding theoretical models
with more realistic assumptions could help these models improve their performance
in predicting how shocks change agents’ behavior and, ultimately, how they impact
the economy.
Political parties
An essential function for electing high-quality public managers is the supply of
politicians; however, little has been studied about the strategic behavior of the par-
ties when selecting candidates. Chapter 2 provides some of the newest empirical
evidence of the effect of popularity shocks, such as information about the corrup-
tion level of government, in the selection of political candidates by parties. By
exploring Brazil’s city council election data for 2004 and 2008, the study found that
an unexpected positive shock over government honesty hurts the quality of candi-
dates put forward by the coalition in the subsequent election. Conversely, the party
selects better candidates when a corruption scandal is revealed.
The study also brings parallel lessons about the role of the parties in the selection
of candidates. The first lesson is related the party organization. The study suggests
that the results found are, in fact, related to the demand of candidates rather than to
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their supply of candidates because the impact of a political scandal on the character-
istics of the selected candidates is stronger in more centralized parties. Centralized
parties have more control over the selection process than the decentralized parties
since centralized parties usually intervene in local directories by dissolving them
and putting in place a temporary committee that follows the instructions of party
leaders (Guarnieri, 2011; Avelino et al., 2012).
Another lesson that can be drawn is about the role of the media in political se-
lection. It has been shown that the media are essential for electoral accountability
from the perspective of voters because they inform on the conduct of governments
(Besley and Burgess, 2002; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; León, 2017). The study demon-
strates that the media is also relevant to party behavior. The effect of popularity
shocks is higher when the analysis is restricted to municipalities that have easier
access to information due to the existence of local radio stations. However, in this
case, the role of the media may be harmful as they lead the political parties to select
even worse candidates when the information disclosure is positive over the conduct
of the coalition of incumbent parties. On the other hand, this does not seem to
raise much concern about democratic accountability since the results do not find
that changes in the pool of candidates affect the electoral outcome.
Voters
Voter behavior is another component of models of electoral accountability that
has been subject to numerous discussions. The analysis in Chapter 3 provides some
answers to important questions that have been raised. The first one refers to the
inability of voters to differentiate between the outcomes that come from incumbent
performance and the outcomes that come from exogenous shocks (Achen and Bar-
tels, 2004; Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2016). The study shows that voters punish
both mayors and presidents for the incidence of droughts, which in principle ad-
vocates against the voter rationality assumption as politicians have no control over
meteorological variables. On the other hand, voters reward presidents in elections
for the provision of mitigating policies against drought but do not reward mayors.
As the central government is the one responsible for providing such policies, rather
than local governments, voter behavior does not seem to be completely irrational.
In other words, it is not exactly the natural disaster shocks that drive voters to pun-
ish incumbents; instead, it is the response of governments to these shocks that is
considered by voters on the assessment of the incumbent performance (Healy and
Malhotra, 2010).
The second draw that one can extract from the analysis of the Chapter 3 concerns
voter’s myopic behavior (Cole et al., 2012). As voters are short-sighted and put
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more emphasis on recent events in their evaluation of government performance, they
might reward more short-term effect policies than policies that have a long-term
impact. In fact, the findings suggest that voters reward relatively more palliative
policies against drought compared to prevention policies, although the difference
is not statistically significant. This result is consistent with studies advocating that
voters’ responses to government policy could distort the incentives of politicians,
leading the government to underinvest in drought preparation, thereby producing
considerable public welfare losses (Healy and Malhotra, 2009; Neumayer et al.,
2014).
The third and main lesson from the analysis in Chapter 3 is the evidence that
voters can provide the wrong incentives to elected officials. The electoral response
of voters is of paramount importance to politicians because it is through the sys-
tematic pattern of voting that politicians learn about the preferences of their elec-
torate. If voters have preferences attached to attributes that do good to governance,
then democratic accountability will lead to an improvement in the quality of the
provision of public goods by the state. However, the consequences of clientelism
are perverse to the efficiency of governments and worsen the functioning of demo-
cratic institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). The research discovers that in
a historically clientelist environment, citizens foresee the opportunistic conduct of
governments and therefore respond strategically to maximize their future benefits.
Specifically, citizens reward political alignment between local governments and the
central government to increase their chances of receiving assistance in times of wa-
ter shortage, since political alliance is a significant determinant in the allocation of
public resources. When voters face a drought, voters’ strategic behavior in favor of
the political alliance increases, and this reinforces the notion that growing vulnera-
bility leads citizens to demand more clientelism policies. In this way, governments
do not have incentives to change the way they operate, and consequently, the prob-
lem of bias in the allocation public resources is perpetuated, connecting the dots of
a clientelism system.
Governments
Chapter 3 also discusses the strategic behavior of governments to maximize their
chances of re-election. The incumbents want to remain in power, and to this end,
they could strategically allocate public policies to reap electoral advantages (Aru-
lampalam et al., 2009; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008; Cole et al., 2012;
Brollo and Nannicini, 2012). As it was shown that voters reward the federal gov-
ernment for aid relief for drought, these policies are distorted in favor of politically
aligned municipalities. However, this distortion only happens when subsequent
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5. Conclusion
elections are for president. When the elections are for the municipal government,
the federal government does not seem to bias aid relief distribution. These results
imply that the type of election matters for the strategic behavior of the government.
The bias will be higher when the electoral benefits directly affect the incumbent
government responsible for the distribution of public policies.
Another contribution of this thesis on government behavior is related to a shock
of an unexpected increase in public revenue (Leeson and Sobel, 2008; Brollo et al.,
2013; Nikolova and Marinov, 2017). As emergency relief against drought is charac-
terized by low regulation, little transparency, and highly discretionary spending, it
has become a window of opportunity for policymakers to extract rents. The distor-
tion of public resources that initially aimed to rescue citizens deprived by droughts
is one of the worst flaws that a public policy design can produce. Chapter 4 aims to
study whether the allocation of palliative policies reflects an increase in the level of
corruption in the context of droughts in Brazil. Historically, the process to trigger
palliative policies by the federal government starts through the recognition of the
state of emergency and this is used. Thus, this study investigates the number of fed-
eral emergency declarations against droughts as a proxy for aid relief distribution,
and its effect on the number of irregularities in the local governments’ expenditures
found by auditors in Brazilian cities during a mayor’s full term. The analysis shows
that emergency relief increases the amount of money involved in corrupt practices.
Aid relief against drought seems to create an opportunity for dishonest mayors to
graft more public resources.
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